• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.224-233
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• 2013

In supply chain management, the supply contract can induce collaboration and coordination among the supply chain members in order to optimize supply chain performance. Numerous supply contracts have been examined; however, some difficulties related to the application of these contracts still occur. One of the solutions is to apply the composite supply contract which can assist in the supply chain coordination. This research examines the composite contract of the revenue sharing and quantity flexibility contracts in a two-stage supply chain, which comprises a retailer and a supplier. In this research, a mathematical model of the composite contract is developed; then, the applicability of the proposed composite contract is examined by investigating its capability in terms of supply chain coordination and profit allocation. In the numerical experiments, the composite revenue sharing-quantity flexibility contract showed that it is superior to both component contracts in terms of supply chain coordination and profit allocation among supply chain members.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.95-103
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• 2024

Purpose: Focusing on the complex supply chain operations beyond the simple dyadic relationship, this study evaluates the performance of the revenue sharing contract in three stage supply chain system. Research design, data, and methodology: The optimization model is developed to describe the supply chain system where one manufacturer, one wholesaler, and one retailer exist and pursue the maximum level of their own profits. In the numerical examples of the proposed supply chain model, two types of the revenue sharing contract, pairwise and spanning methods, are tested and their performances are compared with the traditional system. Results: The numerical analysis reveals that both types of the revenue sharing contract outperform the traditional system. All supply chain members can achieve the improved profits only when they determine the proper combination of revenue share ratios and price discount rates. Conclusions: This study finds out that both pairwise and spanning revenue sharing contracts can make the positive outcome that is acceptable to all members in three stage supply chain system. When the proper contract content is agreed among the supply chain members, the revenue sharing contract has the potential to be the practically feasible collaboration program for the multiple stage supply chain system.

• Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.19-27
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• 2022

This study compares and analyzes wholesale(or price-only) contract, revenue-sharing contract, quantity-flexibility contract, and channel-rebate contract in a decentralized supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer. By setting the parameters of each coordination contract based on the previous results, we conduct simulations using @RISK for several combinations of these parameters. Under the supply chain coordination, we evaluate the probability of successfully signing a contract and the participant in favor of each contract. As a result, the quantity-flexibility contracts is most advantageous for the retailer and the channel-rebate contracts is most advantageous for the supplier. It revealed that revenue-sharing contracts can be used more flexibly because they can be selected in the widest range to redistribute profits between supplier and retailer.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.41 no.2
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• pp.101-127
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• 2016

Irrational ordering decisions of supply chain members have been gaining growing importance in the area of supply chain management. Irrational ordering behaviors that deviate from the profit maximizing decisions in the newsvendor settings have observed with human experiments in recent research. These behaviors can be modeled with several typical decision bias elements. This bias in ordering decisions affects the performance of supply chain contracts designed based on the assumption that the supply chain members make optimal decisions, making it necessary to design supply chain contracts by considering the irrationality. The purpose of this research is to derive a method to design the revenue sharing contract that considers human irrationality in ordering decisions. This research considers a simple two-echelon supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer, where the supplier is assumed to be perfectly rational while the retailer making newsvendor type ordering decisions displays irrational ordering behaviors. Under this environment, this research analytically models the revenue sharing contract to maximize the total supply chain profit or the supplier's own profits while considering the three decision bias patterns of the retailer, which include the pull-to-center effect, the prospect theory, and the increased subjective sensitivity to the revenue sharing ratio. Irrationality parameters are measured through human experiments based on which and through numerical simulations, we showed that significant improvements in the supply chain performance can be achieved.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.221-227
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• 2009

There are customer services jointly provided by two facilities so that each customer will complete the course made up of both facilities' sub-services. The two facilities are assumed invested respectively by an infrastructure owner and one subordinate facility owner, whose partnership is built on their capital investments. This paper presents a mathematical model of Stackelberg competition between the two facility owners to derive their optimal Nash equilibrium. In this study, each facility owner's profit is consisted of fixed revenue fractions of sold services, operating costs (including depreciation cost) and maintenance costs of her facility. The maintenance costs of one facility are incurred both by failures and deterioration due to usage. Moreover, for both facilities, failures are rectified immediately by minimal repairs and preventive maintenance is carried out at a fixed time epoch. Additional assumptions are also employed to develop the model such as customer arrivals are manipulated to follow a Poisson process, and each facility's lifetime is independently Weibull-distributed. The Stackelberg game proceeds as follows. At the first stage of decision making process, the infrastructure owner (acting as a leader) decides the allocation of revenue shares based on her self-interest. After observing the allocation of revenue shares, the subordinate facility owner determines her own optimal price of services. This paper investigates actions and reactions of the two partners in the system. Then analytical conditions are proposed to achieve a unique optimal Nash equilibrium. Finally, some suggestions for further research are discussed.

• Journal of Korean Society for Quality Management
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• v.46 no.4
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• pp.959-972
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• 2018

Purpose: This study developed a simulation model that incorporates the uncertainty of demand and yield to obtain optimized results for supply chain coordination within environmental constraints. The objective of this study is to examine whether yield management for perishable products can achieve the goal of supply chain coordination between a single buyer and a single supplier under a variety of environmental conditions. Methods: We investigated the efficiency of a revenue-sharing contract and a wholesale price contract by considering demand and yield uncertainty, profit maximizing ratio, and success ratio. The implications for environmental variation were derived through a comparative analysis between the wholesale price contract and the revenue-sharing contract. We performed Monte Carlo simulations to give us the results of an optimized supply chain within the environments defined by the experimental factors and parameters. Results: We found that a revised revenue-sharing contracting model was more efficient than the wholesale price contract model and allowed all members of the supply chain to achieve higher profits. First, as the demand variation (${\sigma}$) increased, the profit of the total supply chain increased. Second, as the revenue-sharing ratio (${\Phi}$) increased, the profits of the manufacturer gradually decreased, while the profits of the retailer gradually increased, and this change was linear. Third, as the quality of yield increased, the profits of suppliers appear to increased. At last, success rate was expressed as the profit increased in the revenue-sharing contract compared to the profit increase in the wholesale price contract. Conclusion: The managerial implications of the simulation findings are: (1) a strategic approach to demand and yield uncertainty helps in efficient resource utilization and improved supply chain performance, (2) a revenue-sharing contract amplifies the effect of yield uncertainty, and (3) revised revenue-sharing contracts fetch more profits for both buyers and suppliers in the supply chain.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.75-94
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• 2009

The process of obtaining third-party financing contacts was analyzed via a two-stage game model: a "signaling game" for the first stage,and a "principal-agent model" for the second stage. The two-stage game was solved by a process of backward induction. In the second stage game, the optimal effort level of the energy saving company (ESCO), the optimal compensation scheme of the energy user, and the optimal payoffs for both parties were derived for each subgame. The optimal solutions forthe different subgames were then compared with each other. Our main finding was that if there is some restriction on ESCO's revenue (e.g. a progressive sales tax) that causes ESCO's revenue toincrease at a decreasing rate, then the optimal sharing ratio is uniquely determined at a level of strictly less than one under a linear compensation scheme, i.e. a unique balance exists. Subgames have a unique equilibrium arrived at separately for each situation,. Within this equilibrium, energy users accept energy audit proposals from H-type ESCOs with high levels of technology, but reject proposals from L-type ESCOs with low levels of technology. While L-type ESCOs cannot attain profits in the third-party financing market, H-type ESCOS can pocket the price differential between L-type and H-type audit fees. Accordingly, revenues in an H-type ESCO equilibrium increase not only in line with the technology of the ESCO inquestion, but also faster than in an L-type equilibrium due to more advanced technology. At the same time, energy users receive some positive payoff by allowing ESCOs to perform third-party financing tasks within their existing energy system without incurring any extra costs.