• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.6
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• pp.269-275
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• 2002

Recently, Korea's electric industry has experienced substantial changes in its structure and function including the introduction of competition in the generation sector. Korea is in the early stages of market competition where the market price is determined by generation costs. In the future, the market Price will be determined by generators'bids. Therefore, the generators'profit is determined by market pool price, the prospects of pool price are very important for new capacity investment decision made by generators and IPPS. This study analyzes hourly marginal costs and LOLP considering basic generation mix and characteristics develops the relationship of pool price and Profit by generation-type using the change in reserve margin, and proposes basic direction for profits variation and supply-demand analysis in the electricity market in future.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.113-133
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• 2024

Variable renewable energy (VRE) such as solar and wind power is the main sources of achieving carbon net zero, but it undermines the stability of power supply due to high variability and uncertainty. Energy storage system (ESS) can not only reduce the curtailment of VRE by load shifting but also contribute to stable power system operation by providing ancillary services. This study analyzes how the allocation of ESS resources between load shifting and ancillary service can contribute to maximizing the efficiency of power supply in a situation where the problems caused by VRE are becoming more and more serious. A stochastic power system optimization model that can realistically simulate the variability and uncertainty of VRE was applied. The analysis time point was set to 2023 and 2036, and the optimal resource allocation strategy and benefits of ESS by varying VRE penetration levels were analyzed. The analysis results can be largely summarized into the following three. First, ESS provides excellent functions for both load shifting and ancillary service, and it was confirmed that the higher the reserve price, the more limited the load shifting and focused on providing reserve. Second, the curtailment of VRE can be a effective substitute for the required reserve, and the higher the reserve price level, the higher the curtailment of VRE and the lower the required amount of reserve. Third, if a reasonable reserve offer price reflecting the opportunity cost is applied, ESS can secure economic feasibility in the near future, and the higher the proportion of VRE, the greater the economic feasibility of ESS. This study suggests that cost-effective low-carbon transition in the power system is possible when the price signal is correctly designed so that power supply resources can be efficiently utilized.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.4
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• pp.396-402
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• 2005

In an electricity market with imperfect competition, participants devise bidding plans and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is analyzed by using bi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.63-83
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• 1988

This study is concerned with the equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design of sequential auction with a reserve price and an entry fee. It is assumed that each bidder has a fixed reservation value and draws the reservation values of other bidders independently in the same distribution and may obtain at most one object to be sold. Under such assumptions, the sequential auction will be analyzed by the game theoretic approach. The purpose of this paper is, in the sequential auction, to find the equilibrium bidding strategy and to design the optimal auction under the equilibrium bidding strategy. The equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design are further analyzed with respect to change of the reserve price, the entry fee, and the number of bidders and objects. Specially, the auctioneer's expected revenue for each auction is obtained and analyzed.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.63-83
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• 1987

This study is concerned with the equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design of sequential auction with a reserve price and an entry fee. It is assumed that each bidder has a fixed reservation value and draws the reservation values of other bidders independently in the same distribution and may obtain at most one object to be sold. Under such assumptions, the sequential auction will be analyzed by the game theoretic approach. The purpose of this paper is, in the sequential auction, to find the equilibrium bidding strategy and to design the optimal auction under the equilibrium bidding strategy. The equilibrium bidding strategy and the optimal auction design are further analyzed with respect to change of the reserve price, the entry fee, and the number of bidders and objects. Specially, the auctioneer's expected revenue for each auction is obtained and analyzed.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.4
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• pp.199-204
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• 2005

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of bidding and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium(NE) is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare(SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.115-133
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• 2000

The policy of suppling tax-exempt fishery oil in Korea has a history of almost 40 years, which was initiated by the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives in 1965. In 1999 the volume of fishery oil supplied to the earning fishermen and fishing entrepreneurs amounted to 8,390 thousand DM, 500 billion won in total. This paper analyzes the oil supplying system to fishermen in Korea and shows that the structural obstacles to the stable provision of fishery oil lies in the ineffective bargaining power (fixing price). Provided that the NFFC as a buyer, which is not equipped with the storage facilities for oil bids for a unit-price contract of fishery oil, there exists a possibility of collusion among 5 local oil refineries corporations to influence the oil price, making it difficult to reach a resonable price of oil. Though the international bids and direct imports following the liberalization of oil imports would help lower the unit price, purchasing and importing the oil out of season at a lower price would not be guaranteed without the oil storage facilities. Furthermore, the current supply system of oil is quite vulnerable to the extraneous factors and, say when the oil price soars unpredictably, it is almost impossible to supply low - priced fishery oil to fishermen. The National Federation of Fisheries Association of Japan(Zengyoren), for instance, possesses 10 oil storage facilities, which had been built across the country during the last 20 years (1964-1984). The storage capacity of these facilities reaches 0.6million DM(by kind, 0.56million DM for A heavy oil, 38thousand D/M kerosene, 5thousand D/M for diesel fuel oil). Allowing no intermediary of production associations(fisheries cooperatives) the NFFA's capacity for keeping oil in reserve rises much higher. As these storage facilities can keep the oil amounting to as much as of 70 days demand in reserve, a stable supply of fishery oil on favorable terms is secured. In contrast with Japan case, unequipped with the storage facilities for fishery oil, Korea does not have much bargaining power for bringing down the price of fishery oil. To make matters worse, the oil storing capacity of the member cooperatives is the volume of only 8 days demand. In case the oil price rises, it is almost impossible to supply the oil to the fishermen at a price lower than the price risen.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.36 no.3
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• pp.61-93
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• 2014

This paper analyzes Onbid car auction data by employing various methods, including structural estimation, to identify main factors which decides auction prices and figure out what effects those factors are making on the auction price. I then discuss on how to maximize sellers' revenue in OnBid car auctions. The government and public institutes sell their assets through the OnBid auction, hence the optimal design of the OnBid auction is important. The paper's main findings are as follows: (ⅰ) The independent private value model explains OnBid car auction data better than the correlated private value model or the interdependent value model; (ⅱ) Both the number of bidders and the ratios of the auction price to the evaluation value were lower in the auctions posted by the Kamco than auctions by institutes other than the Kamco; (ⅲ) Some auctions require that at least two bidders should submit a bid no less than the reserve price for sale. In those auctions, both the number of bidders and each bidder's valuation on the auctioned object were lower than in auctions without that requirement; (ⅳ) The sum of sellers' revenue would be decreased in the simulation with the reserve price higher by 5%, 10%, and 20% across auctions by institutes other than Kamco.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.1640-1647
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• 2012

The allocation to third parties in increase of capital is increasing in KOSDAQ firms. With this trend, they cause many problems which involves stock price manipulation. Under this condition, this study analyzes stock price reaction by event study to 197 cases of 81 KOSDAQ companies that allocated to third parties in increase of capital between the year of 2007 and 2009. And we find determinants of cumulative abnormal return by using multiple regression. Results of this research are as follows. First, in case of excess return of (-5, +5), it reveals positive excess return significantly at 1% significance level during 4 days before payment day(event day). But it reveals negative excess return significantly at 1% significance level during 5 days after payment day. Second, in case of excess return of (-40, +40), it reveals positive excess return significantly at 1% significance level during 40 days before payment day(event day). But it reveals negative excess return significantly at 1% significance level during 40 days after payment day. Third, in case of excess return of (0, 1 year), it reveals negative excess return significantly at 1% significance level during 1 year after payment day. Fourth, significant determinant of cumulative abnormal return to (-5, +5) was firm size with positive effect. Significant determinants of cumulative abnormal return to (-40, +40) were reserve ratio and debt ratio. Reserve ratio has positive effect But debt ratio has negative effect. Significant determinants of cumulative abnormal return to (0, 1 year) were firm size, debt ratio, reserve ratio. equity ratio to large shareholder. Firm size, debt ratio, equity ratio to large shareholder have negative effect. But reserve ratio has positive effect.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.38
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• pp.47-68
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• 2008

I have observed the validity of open-offer from a point of European contract law in comparison with International Trade Law in this paper. Generally we know that an offer is an expression of willingness bo be bound to the contract. In English law if there are no intention it will be considered such as circulation of price lists or catalogues. As for French law these activities could be considered as an offer. However German law is closer to English law as to an offer. A contract which does not ascertained price is open-price terms and it can be applied not only for general commercial contracts but also for franchise or for distributorship agreements especially in Europe. When open-price terms applied to reserve a exclusive right to the contract the validity of contract can be a serious matter between principals. In English law an offer must be sufficiently complete to be capable of acceptaqnce. English law does not require that price terms should be indicated on offer. English law allow a open-price terms in the contract. In French law a contract will be valid in the absense of a price which is either determined or objectively determinable. A price by the market price of similar products is not enough to be valid offer. It should be recognized and accepted objectively by third parties. French law require that price terms should be indicated on offer. Open-price terms are not enough to be an effective offer. However German law shows more flexible than French law. In German law if the price is not fixed in the contract there are four ways to determine it. The seller may determine the price by the time of deliver. By reason of thess backgrounds I have made comparison with European contract law and International trade law on the validity of open-price offer in this paper. It seems that we are not familiar with open-price terms although franchise contract or special terms of contract have been increased in these days. So I hope this paper will be helpful to show a new point of view.