• Title/Summary/Keyword: Reporting earnings strategy CEO compensaion

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Effect of Reporting Earnings Strategy on Asymmetric CEO Performance-Compensation Sensitivity (보고이익전략이 비대칭적 경영자 성과-보상 민감도에 미치는 영향)

  • Eun-Ju, Lee
    • Journal of Industrial Convergence
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    • v.20 no.11
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    • pp.105-112
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    • 2022
  • The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of the reporting earnings strategy on the relationship between managerial ability and manager performance-reward sensitivity. Both upward and downward adjustments can occur in the direction of management performance adjustment according to the manager's reporting earnings strategy. was found to decrease performance-based performance-reward sensitivity. The underreporting strategy is hypothesized that, although additional compensation is paid for the performance of the reporting strategy according to the manager's ability, the level of compensation increases, but this type of compensation will decrease the performance-reward sensitivity because this type of compensation is irrelevant to the actual performance of the manager. This is the result of indirectly confirming that discriminatory compensation is provided for upward and downward adjustment of business performance according to the reporting earnings strategy.