• 무역상무연구
• /
• 제76권
• /
• pp.125-145
• /
• 2017

Where an insurer has unreasonably refused to pay a claim or paid it after unreasonably delay, the existing law in England does not provide a remedy for the insured. Accordingly, the insured is not entitled to damages for any loss suffered as a result of the insurer's unreasonable delay. This legal position differs from the law in Scotland and most major common law jurisdictions. LC thought that the legal position in England is anomalous and out of step with general contractual principles. LC considered that a policyholder should have a remedy where an insurer has acted unreasonably in delaying or refusing payment of claim, and, therefore, recommended a statutory implied term in every insurance that the insurer will pay sums due within a reasonable time and breach of that term should give rise to contractual remedies, including damages. More detailed recommendations of LC are as followings. First, it should be an implied term of every insurance contract that, where an insured makes a claim under the contract, the insurer must pay sums due within a reasonable time. Secondly, a reasonable time should always include a reasonable time for investigating and assessing a claim. Although a reasonable time will depend on all the relevant circumstances, for example, the following things may need to be taken into account, that is, (1) the type of insurance, (2) the size and complexity of the claim, (3) compliance with any relevant statutory rules or guidance, and (4) factors outside the insurer's control. Thirdly, if the insurer can show that it had reasonable grounds for disputing the claim(whether as to pay or not, or the amount payable), the insurer does not breach the obligation to pay within a reasonable time merely by failing to pay the claim while the dispute is continuing. In those circumstances, the conduct of the insurer in handling the dispute may be a relevant factor in deciding whether the obligation was breached and, if so, when. Fourthly, Normal contractual remedies for breach of contract should be available for breach of the implied term to pay sums due within a reasonable time. Finally, In non-consumer insurance contracts, the insurer should be permitted to exclude or limit its liability for breach of the obligation to pay sums due within a reasonable time, unless such breach was deliberate or reckless, and such an insurer's right to contract out will be subject to satisfying the transparency requirements.

• 무역상무연구
• /
• 제49권
• /
• pp.257-281
• /
• 2011

The duty of utmost good faith is found in sections 17-20 of MIA 1906. Critics of the current legal regime on the pre-contractual duty from the viewpoint of the assured, have been concentrated on two points in particular. First, the scope of the duty is so wide that it imposes too high burden on the assured. The second criticism is directed at the remedy, prescribed by the MIA 1906, s.17, against breach of the duty. This article intends to analyse the legal implications of proposals in CP 2007 for reforming pre-contractual duty of utmost good faith of business assured in English insurance contracts law and the problems of proposals. The Law Commissions are proposing four fundamental changes to meet the long-standing criticism and the results of analysis are as following. First, the Law Commissions are proposing a change in the test of constructive knowledge in relation to the duty of disclosure so that a business assured will be obliged to disclose facts which he knows or a reasonable ought to know in the circumstances. Secondly, deviating from the current legal position, the Law Commissions are proposing that if a business assured has made a misrepresentation, but the assured honestly and reasonably believe what it said to be true, the insurer should not have any remedy due to the misrepresentation. The proposal is designed to protect the reasonable expectations of business assured at the pre-contractual stage. Thirdly, the Law Commissions are proposing to change the test for materiality by replacing the "prudent insurer" test by a "reasonable assured" test. The proposed test would focus on the question of what a reasonable assured in the circumstances would think what is relevant to the judgment of the insurer. Finally, the Law Commissions are proposing flexible remedies in case of the breach of the duty. The Law Commissions are proposing no remedy when an assured is acting honestly and reasonably, while avoidance in case of dishonesty. On the other hand, The Law Commissions seem to have an intention to introduce a compensatory remedy in case of negligent breach of the duty.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
• /
• 제13권2호
• /
• pp.291-319
• /
• 2004

The seller may take a warranty with respect to the goods. If they are not as warranted, they may be held liable for the breach of warranty. Even when they has not made a warranty, the law will in some instances hold them responsible as though they had made a warranty. An express warranty is a part the basis for the sale. That is, the buyer has purchased the goods on the reasonable assumption that they were as stated by the seller. When the buyer intends to use the goods for a particular or usual purpose, as contrasted with the ordinary use for which they are customarily sold, the seller makes an implied warranty that the goods will be fit for the purpose when the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, and when the seller at the time of contracting knows or has reason to know the buyer's particular purpose and his reliance on the seller's judgment. A merchant seller who makes a sale of goods in which he customarily deals makes an implied warranty of merchantability. The Uniform Commercial Code expressly abolishes the requirement a privies to a limited extent by permitting a suit for breach of warranty to be brought against the seller by members of the buyer's family, his household, and his guests, with respect to personal injury sustained by them. Apart from the express provision made by the Code, there is a conflict of authority as to whether privies of contract is required in other cases, with the trend being toward the abolition of that requirement. At common law the rule was that only the parties to a transaction had my rights relating to it. Accordingly, the buyer could sue his immediate seller for breach of warranties. The rule was stated in the terms that there could be no suit for breach of warranty unless there was a privies of contract. The code expressly abolishes the requirement of privies to a limited extent by permitting a suit for breach of warranty to be bought against the seller by members of the buyer. Apart from the express provision made by the Code, there is a conflict of authority as to whether privies of contract is required in other cases, with the trend being toward the abolition of that requirement.

• 한국산업보건학회지
• /
• 제23권4호
• /
• pp.374-383
• /
• 2013

Objectives: The major objective of this study is to review overall and in detail the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 in the U.K.and the principal contents of this act. Methods: A variety of articles related to the background and circumstances under which the legistration was enacted and the details of this act were investigated and analyzed. Results: In enacting Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, legislators mainly took elements of legal culture into account and focused on seeking to broaden the law on corporate manslaughter. An indictable offence is considered to have been committed if the way in which an organization's activities are managed or organised causes a person's death and amounts to a gross breach of the relevant duty of care owed by the organization to the deceased. The way in which its activities are managed or organized by its senior management is a substantial element in the breach. Upon conviction, a corporation may be ordered to remedy any breach, publicize its failures, or be given an unlimited fine. Conclusions: The enactment background and details of Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 is understood accurately. On the basis of the findings, it is necessary to heighten effectiveness of punishment.for senior management or corporations that cause a person's death in Korea.

• 무역상무연구
• /
• 제14권
• /
• pp.103-152
• /
• 2000

English contract law has traditionally taken the view that it is not the duty of the parties to a contract to give information voluntarily to each other. In English law, one of the principal distinctions between insurance contract law and general contract law is the existence of the doctrine of utmost good faith in insurance law. The doctrine gives rise to a variety of duties, some of which apply before formation of the contract while others apply post-formation. This article is, therefore, designed to analyse the overall structure and problems of the doctrine of utmost good faith in English marine insurance law. The results of analysis are as following : First, the requirement of utmost good faith in marine insurance law arises from the fact that many of the relevant circumstances are within the exclusive knowledge of the assured and it is impossible for the insurer to obtain the facts to make a appropriate calculation of the risk that he is asked to assume without this information. Secondly, the duty of utmost good faith provided in MIA 1906, s. 17 has the nature as a bilateral or reciprocal, overriding and absolute duty. Thirdly, the Court of Appeal in Skandia held that breach of the pre-formation duty of utmost good faith did not sound in damages since the duty did not arise out of an implied contractual term and the breach did not constitute a tort. Instead, the Court of Appeal held that the duty was an extra-contractual duty imposed by law in the form of a contingent condition precedent to the enforceability of the contract. Fourthly, the scope of the duty of utmost good faith is closely related to the test of materiality and the assured is required to disclose only material circumstances subject to MIA 1906, s. 18(1) and 20(1). The test of materiality, which had caused a great deal of debate in English courts over 30 years, was finally settled by the House of Lords in Pan Atlantic and the House of Lords rejected the 'decisive influence' test and the 'increased risk' test, and the decision of the House of Lords is thought to accept the 'mere influence' test in subsequent case by the Court of Appeal. Fifthly, the insurer is, in order to avoid contract, required to provide proof that he is induced to enter into the contract by reason of the non-disclosure or misrepresentation of the assured. Sixthly, the duty of utmost good faith is, in principle, terminated before contract is concluded, but it is undoubtful that the provision under MIA 1906, s. 17 is wide enough to include the post-formation duty. The post-formation duty is, however, based upon the terms of marine insurance contract, and the duty lies entirely outside s. 17. Finally, MIA 1906, s. 17 provides expressly for the remedy of avoidance of the contract for breach of the duty. This means rescission or retrospective avoidance of the entire contract, and the remedy is based upon a fairly crude 'all-or-nothing' approach. What is needed in English marine insurance law is to introduce a more sophiscated or proportionate remedy.

• 통상정보연구
• /
• 제12권3호
• /
• pp.79-98
• /
• 2010

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) in 1999. In 2000 and 2002, this Act was also Amended. UCITA provides a comprehensive set of rules for licensing computer information, whether computer software or other clearly identified forms of computer information. Computerized databases and computerized music are other examples of computer information that would be subject to UCITA. It would also govern access contracts to sites containing computer information, whether on or off the Internet. UCITA would not govern contracts, even though they may be licensing contracts, for the traditional distribution of movies, books, periodicals, newspapers, or the like. Part 8 of UCITA provides a remedy structure somewhat modeled on that of Article 2 but adapted in significant respects to the different context of a computer information transaction. For example, 808 of UCITA recognizes the focus in a license context for a licensor's remedy should properly be on recovery for benefit conferred or for lost profit, rather than on damage measurement by a substitute transaction, where the license is non-exclusive so additional transactions are permitted and there is very little cost in reproduction of the information and its redistribution. Section 816 of UCITA also contains very important limitations on the generally recognized common law right of self-help as applicable in the electronic context.

• 무역상무연구
• /
• 제61권
• /
• pp.139-163
• /
• 2014

Recently with making of 'The Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012(hereunder CIA)', the UK revised the duty of disclosure especially with the consumer insurance contract. According to the CIA, if the misrepresentation was careless, the insurer may have the three options based upon what the insurer would have done had the consumer taken care to answer the question accurately; a compensatory remedy, avoidance of the insurance contract or, amendment of the contract. I realized that the establishment of CIA has been exposed to pro-actively relieve the breach of Warranty and Disclosure, Representations as far as required by the Global Insurance market. It was found that it is expected to bring significant changes in UK Insurance Act system of the 21st century, and prepares competition from neighboring countries. On the other hand, in the common law system, countries under MIA(1906) are trying to address the breach of warranty and Disclosure, Representations, except the UK cannot completely adhere with a positive attitude.

• Journal of Korea Trade
• /
• 제25권2호
• /
• pp.152-177
• /
• 2021

Purpose - This study analyses the excepted requirement and burden of proof of the carrier due to unseaworthiness through comparison between the marine transport contract and marine insurance contract. Design/methodology - This study uses the legal analytical normative approach. The juridical approach involves reviewing and examining theories, concepts, legal doctrines and legislation that are related to the problems. In this study a literature analysis using academic literature and internet data is conducted. Findings - The burden of proof in case of seaworthiness should be based on presumed fault, not proved fault. The burden of proving unseaworthiness/seaworthiness should shift to the carrier, and should be exercised before seeking the protections of the law or carriage contract. In other words, the insurer cannot escape coverage for unfitness of a vessel which arises while the vessel is at sea, which the assured could not have prevented in the exercise of due diligence. The insurer bears the burden of proving unseaworthiness. The warranty of seaworthiness is implied in hull, but not protection and indemnity policies. The 2015 Act repeals ss. 33(3) and 34 of MIA 1906. Otherwise the provisions of the MIA 1906 remain in force, including the definition of a promissory warranty and the recognition of implied warranties. There is less clarity about the position when the source of the loss occurs before the breach of warranty but the actual loss is suffered after the breach. Nonetheless, by s.10(2) of the 2015 Act the insurer appears not to be liable for any loss occurring after the breach of warranty and before there has been a remedy. Originality/value - When unseaworthiness is identified after the sailing of the vessel, mere acceptance of the ship does not mean the party waives any claims for damages or the right to terminate the contract, provided that failure to comply with the contractual obligations is of critical importance. The burden of proof with regards to loss of damage to a cargo caused by unseaworthiness is regulated by the applicable law. For instance, under the common law, if the cargo claimant alleges that the loss or damage has been caused by unseaworthiness, then he has the burden of proof to establish the followings: (i) that the vessel was unseaworthy at the beginning of the voyage; and that, (ii) that the loss or damage has been caused by such unseaworthiness. In other words, if the warranty of seaworthiness at the inception of the voyage is breached, the breach voids the policy if the ship owner had prior knowledge of the unseaworthy condition. By contrast, knowingly permitting the vessel to break ground in an unseaworthy condition denies liability only for loss or damage proximately caused by the unseaworthiness. Such a breach does not, therefore, void the entire policy, but only serves to exonerate the insurer for loss or damage proximately caused by the unseaworthy condition.

• Journal of Korea Trade
• /
• 제24권8호
• /
• pp.101-120
• /
• 2020

Purpose - The buyer's right to withhold performance is a useful and important self-help remedy to protect himself from the seller's breach of contract, and it is also the coercive means to induce the seller to perform his part of contract. However, the buyer's exercise of such a right often exposes himself to the risk of breaching the contract. This is generally due to his ignorance when he is entitled to the right and also uncertainties inherent in the law. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to examine what the requirements should be fulfilled before the buyer exercises the right for the seller's actual breach of contract. Design/methodology - In order to achieve the purposes of the study, it executes a comparative study of the rules as to the requirements for the buyer's right to withhold performance for the seller's actual non-performance under the CISG and the CESL. It mainly focuses on performance due, the seller's non-performance, the buyer's readiness to perform and the requirement of notice. Findings - The main findings of this comparative study can be summarized as follows: Although the CISG has no expressive provision for the buyer's general right to withhold performance for the seller's actual non-performance, it may be inferred from the general principles the CISG underlies, synallagmatic nature of the contract. In addition, it can be drawn by analogy from relevant provisions of the CISG. On the other hand, the CESL expressively provides that the buyer has a general right to withhold performance where the seller fails to tender performance or perform the contract. Therefore, it seems that the position of CESL is rather easier and more apparent to allow the buyer to withhold performance for the seller's non-performance. Originality/value - Most of the existing studies on the right to withhold performance under the CISG have centered on the right to withhold performance for an anticipatory breach of contract. On the other hand, there have been few prior studies on the right to withhold performance for the actual nonperformance during a contractual period of performance. Therefore, this paper examined the requirements for the buyer's right to withhold performance under the CISG and the CESL in a comparative way for the seller's actual breach of obligation. In this conclusion, it may provide practical and legal considerations and implications for business people who are not certain about the right to withhold performance.

• 무역상무연구
• /
• 제42권
• /
• pp.163-186
• /
• 2009

On April 11, 1980, the "United Nations on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods" ("CISG") was prepared by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and approved by a diplomatic conference in Vienna providing uniform law for international sales of goods. It took effect as of March 1, 2005, in Korea. It is set forth on the seller's remedies for breach by the buyer Section III (Art. 61 - 65) under the CISG. In this study, the focus is only on the seller's notice fixing additional final period for performance (Art. 63) and the right to avoid the contract (Art. 64), with examination on some relevant foreign arbitral awards rendered by the ICC and the CIETAC together. Article 63 provides that the seller may fix an additional period of time for reasonable length for performance by the buyer of his obligation. It was found from the above arbitral awards that the concept of 'reasonable length' should be decided on a case-by-case basis, given the specific circumstances in the case [Art. 63(1)]. It is provided that unless the seller has received a notice that he will not perform within the period so fixed, the seller may not, during that period, resort to any remedy for breach of contract in accordance with Article 63(2). Article 64(1) provides the means and grounds for avoidance of the contract, which can be avoided 1) when the breach of the buyer amounts to a fundamental breach of contract, or 2) when the additional period of time is fixed by the seller, unless the buyer declares that he will not perform so within the period of fixed time. As we examined in the above arbitral awards, it was held that the contract is avoided when the seller sends the final notice stating that he will avoid the contract, after the expiration of the additional period of time fixed by the seller in the ICC award. On the contrary, it was held that the contract should be deemed to be avoided exactly when the expiration of additional period noted in the avoidance notice is elapsed in the CIETAC award. Article 64(2) sets time limits for avoidance.