• Strategy21
• /
• s.32
• /
• pp.123-159
• /
• 2013

The purpose of this research paper is to re-valuate the factors that affected the Royal Navy's rearmament and preparation for war by conducting analysis on the discussion held in the Britain on the strategic priorities and Navy's coping measures adopted during the interwar period. After the end of the WWI, each of the military arms of the Britain faced significant difficulty in securing budget and increasing their military power all throughout the interwar period, and the Navy was not an exception. The WWII that got started on September 1939 was the turning point in which this difficulty led to full-fledged crisis. Immensely many criticisms followed after the war and problems were identified when it comes to the Royal Navy's performance during the war. This type of effort to identify problem led to the attempt to analyze whether Royal Navy's preparation for war and rearmament policy during interwar period were adequate, and to identify the root causes of failure. Existing studies sought to find the root cause of failed rearmament from external factors such as the deterioration of the Britain itself or pressure from the Treasury Department to cut the budget for national defense, or sought to detect problems from the development of wrong strategies by the Navy. However, Royal Navy's failed preparation for the war during interwar period is not the result of one or two separate factors. Instead, it resulted due to the diverse factors and situations that the Britain was facing at the time, and due to intricate and complex interaction of these factors. Meanwhile, this research paper focused on the context characterized by 'strategic selection and setting up of priorities' among the various factors to conduct analysis on the Navy's rearmament by linking it with the discussion held at the time on setting up strategic priorities, and sought to demonstrate that the Navy Department's inadequate counter-measures developed during this process waned Royal Navy's position. After the end of WWI, each of the military arms continued to compete for the limited resources and budget all throughout the interwar period, and this type of competition amidst the situation in which the economic situation of Britain was still unstable, made prioritization when it comes to the allocation of resources and setting up of the priorities when it comes to the military power build-up, inevitable. Amidst this situation, the RAF was able to secure resources first and foremost, encouraged by the conviction of some politicians who were affected by the 'theory of aerial threat' and who believed that curtailing potential attack with the Air Force would be means to secure national security at comparatively lower cost. In response, Navy successfully defended the need for the existence of Navy despite the advancement of the aerial power, by emphasizing that the Britain's livelihood depends on trade and on the maintenance of maritime traffic. Despite this counter-measuring logic, however, Navy's role was still limited to the defense of overseas territory and to the fleet run-off instead of sea traffic route production when it comes to the specific power build-up plan, and did not understand the situation in which financial and economic factors gained greater importance when it comes to the setting up of strategic priorities. As a result, Navy's plan to build its powers was met with continual resistance of the Treasury Department, and lost the opportunity to re-gain the status of 'senior service' that it had enjoyed in the past during the competition for strategic prioritization. Given that the strategic and economic situation that Korea faces today is not very different from that of the Britain during the interwar period, our Navy too should leverage the lessons learned from the Royal Navy to make the effort to secure viable position when it comes to the setting of priorities in case of national defense strategy by presenting the basis on why maritime coping should be prioritized among the numerous other threats, and by developing the measures for securing the powers needed effectively amidst the limited resources.

• Journal of Korean Society for Quality Management
• /
• v.23 no.3
• /
• pp.1-19
• /
• 1995

This study sets a purpose to realize what top managements in companies think as critical success factors of QM, using CSF(Critical Success Factors) method. The methodology of this study consists of literature research and empirical analysis using data collected from interviewing and questionnaire. Medium and small sized manufacturing companies are the subject of this study. Following CSFs of QM are found. (1)Management philosophy of attaching great importance to customer and customer satisfaction. (2)Creation of atmosphere that attach great importance to technology. (3)Philosophy of honesty and faithfulness. (4)Positive thinking and creation of atmosphere that help with each other. (5)Rearmament of entrepreneur spirit. (6)Need on recognition of partnership between labor and management. (7)Participation and will of top management. (8)Principle of Participation of entire members. (9)Harmony of innovation and continuous improvement. (10)Establishment of overall quality-related system. A Recognition of need on ISO-9000 series.

• Convergence Security Journal
• /
• v.19 no.4
• /
• pp.35-41
• /
• 2019

Considering North Korea's strategy, North Korea's top hitting target in the event of a war is likely to be the main goal of the air force runway to neutralize the air force. As a countermeasure, there are emergency runway construction and runway emergency recovery operations. However, emergency runway construction is mainly intended for emergency landing and fueling and rearmament. The emergency runway restoration operation has also several limitations considering North Korea's threatening missile level, recovery time, and so on, so it cannot respond quickly to the North's runway bombing. In this study, we first describe the threat of North Korea's missiles and their air defense capabilities. Then the concept and limitations of the mobile runway, which is the next generation countermeasure, are presented.

• Korean journal of communication and information
• /
• v.56
• /
• pp.219-236
• /
• 2011

Since the end of the $19^{th}$ century, Korean English-language newspapers have been published in Korea to inform readers about Korea and Korean people's point of view concerning world problems. Among them was the Korean Republic (KR), the former name of the Korea Herald, founded on August $15^{th}$, 1953 (Korean Liberation Day from Japanese colonial rule). This newspaper was started especially to report on international affairs, just after the Armistice agreement was signed on July $27^{th}$, 1953, at the initiative of the first president of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee. He vehemently expressed his and the Korean people's opinion about Korean problems in world politics where big powers were dominating and deciding small countries' destinies. This paper is written to show that Korean English-language newspapers were used as tool of public diplomacy not only for the readers of target countries but also for Korean readers, well before the media diplomacy theory became popular several decades later. In the deplorable world situation where Korea was colonized and divided into halves by the wills of the super powers, the Korean media participated actively via dialogue in English to solve the Korean problem. This paper studies the editorials of the KR for one year, the year just after its foundation. Vis-a-vis the United States, the KR defended its political system of free democracy by insisting on the Korean people's hopes, the reunification of the peninsula and acquiring American assistance in economic and military areas. Regarding Japan, Korea had doubt about its expansionist policy by way of rearmament. First, the Korean government tried to defend its territorial waters, including Dokdo Island. As for multi-lateral relationships, Korea was concerned about the spread of communism to its territory in the world where socialism was dominating.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
• /
• s.4
• /
• pp.351-379
• /
• 2006

Former ministers of national defense and foreign affairs, intellectuals such as former and incumbent professors, and various NGO groups are demanding the South Korean government to stop promoting independence in operational control which is currently held by the United States Armed Forces in Korea commander. Although the Korea should exercise operational control independently in the future, orientation on the direction which should be taken under consideration in promoting this transfer should be assumed. First of all, South Korea must sufficiently examine the criticisms and dissenting opinions, and reflect them in promoting independence in operational control. From now on, the South Korean government should reflect the opinions of experts in operational control, and must promote the transfer with national consensus. Unilateral enforcement of the transfer may cause serious errors and aggravate conflicts Second, ROKA's exercise of independence in operational control should take place only after gaining restraint on North Korea's attack against the South, and the issues on nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction(WMD) has been resolved, and a peace regime has been reached. Furthermore, exercise of independence in wartime operational control should be promoted only if there is a guarantee that international trust and the military collaboration will be restored to a level beyond the present state. Third, the USFK and the Korean-US alliance is providing South Korea with national security, not to mention tremendous diplomatical, and economical benefits However, if the alliance between the two countries become weakened due to the exercise of the independence in operational control, we might suffer a great deal of loss. Even though reasonable justification and external independence may be gained through promoting independence in operational control, it should be promoted in a longitudinal manner because national security problems and conflicts may be intensified, and there is no actual profit in doing so. Fourth, if the Korean-US alliance becomes weakened and therefore the United States decides to discuss eastern-asia strategies, North Korea deterrence strategies, and Japanese rearmament issues with other neighboring countries, South Korea may become diplomatically isolated and a subordinate to surrounding countries, destroying the independence we have now instead of restoring it Therefore searching for means to reinforce international trust and collaboration between South Korea and the United States, and leaving ROKA’s independence in operational control as a long term objective would be a more realistic method.