• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.51 no.2
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• pp.463-478
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• 2019

The most important non-functional requirements for dependability of any Embedded Real-Time Safety Systems are safety, availability and reliability requirements. System architecture plays the primary role in achieving these requirements. Compliance with these non-functional requirements should be ensured early in the development cycle with appropriate considerations during architectural design. In this paper, we present an application of system architecture modeling for quantitative assessment of system dependability. We use probabilistic model checker (PRISM), for dependability analysis of the DTMC model derived from system architecture model. In general, the model checking techniques do not scale well for analyzing large systems, because of prohibitively large state space. It limits the use of model checking techniques in analyzing the systems of practical interest. We propose abstraction based compositional analysis methodology to circumvent this limitation. The effectiveness of the proposed methodology has been demonstrated using the case study involving the dependability analysis of safety system of a large Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR).

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 2005.05a
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• pp.737-738
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• 2005

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
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• 1996.11a
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• pp.91-96
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• 1996

The Dynamic Safety System (DSS) is a compute. based reactor protection system that has fail-safe nature and perform dynamic self-testing. In this paper, the implementation of DSS in PLC is presented for PWR. In order to choose adequate PLC implementation model of DSS, the reliability analysis is performed. The KO-RI unit 2 Nuclear power plant is selected as the reference plant, and the verification is carried out using the KO-RI unit 2 simulator FISA-2.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2005.11b
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• pp.110-112
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• 2005

Recently, the reactor trip in nuclear power plants has mostly occurred by the failure of secondary electrical facilities. Some kinds of technical standards or acceptable criteria are required to regulate those facilities. Therefore, in this paper the failures of secondary electrical facilities which cause reactor trip are analyzed, and the inspection technologies including guidelines for secondary electrical facilities are developed.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.19 no.38
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• pp.69-76
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• 1996

The Special safety systems are incorporated into the plant design to limit radioactive releases to the public in the event of accident. Wolsung 2 is better builted than Wolsung 1 by 84 design changes for new approval requirements, codes & standards changes and manufacturing changes etc. This paper analysed and discussed the design change items for nuclear reactor safety system and needs development of design engineering for digital protection system.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 1998.07b
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• pp.807-809
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• 1998

Plant Protection Systems(PPS) are those systems that initiate safety actions to mitigate the consequences of design basis events by sending signals to Reactor Trip Switch Gear System(RTSS) and Engineered Safety Features-Component Control Systems(ESF-CCS). This paper illustrates distinctive features and improved design concepts of Korea Next Generation Reactor(KNGR) based on the experience obtained through prototyping of PPS.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.39 no.3
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• pp.161-170
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• 2007

Metal fuel, which was abandoned in the 1960's in favor of oxide fuel, has since then proven to be a viable fast reactor fuel. Key discoveries allowed high burnup capability and excellent steady-state as well as off-normal performance characteristics. Metal fuel is a key to achieving inherent passive safety characteristics and compact and economic fuel cycle closure based on electrorefining and injection-casting refabrication.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.37 no.3
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• pp.273-278
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• 2005

Key concepts in South Korean nuclear safety regulation are safety and risk. Nuclear regulation in South Korea has required reactor designs and safeguards that reduce the risk of a major accident to less than one in a million reactor-years-a risk supposedly low enough to be acceptable. To date, in South Korean nuclear safety regulation has involved the establishment of many technical standards to enable administration enforcement. In scientific lawsuits in which the legal issue is the validity of specialized technical standards that are used for judge whether a particular nuclear power plant is to be licensed, the concept of uncertainty law is often raised with regard to what extent the examination and judgment by the judicial power affects a discretion made by the administrative office. In other words, the safety standards for nuclear power plants has been adapted as a form of the scientific technical standards widely under the idea of uncertainty law. Thus, the improvement of nuclear safety regulation in South Korea seems to depend on the rational lawmaking and a reasonable, judicial examination of the scientific standards on nuclear safety.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.38 no.2
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• pp.185-194
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• 2006

Transient operations for an integral type reactor, SMART-P, have been experimentally investigated using a thermal-hydraulic integral test facility, VISTA (Experimental Verification by Integral Simulation of Transients and Accidents), in order to verify the system design and performance of the SMART-P, a pilot plant of SMART. The VISTA facility was subjected to various accident conditions such as feedwater increase and decrease, loss of coolant flow, and control rod withdrawal accidents in order to elucidate the thermal-hydraulic responses following such accidents and finally to verify the system design of the SMARTP. Full functional control logics have been implemented in the VISTA facility in order to control the required control action for an accident simulation. As one of the sensitivity tests to verify the PRHRS performance, the effects of the initial water level in the compensation tank are experimentally investigated. When the initial water level is 16%, the water is quickly drained and nitrogen gas is then introduced into the PRHR system, resulting in deterioration of the PRHRS performance. It is thus found that nitrogen ingression should be prevented to ensure stable PRHRS operation.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.51 no.3
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• pp.676-682
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• 2019

After the Fukushima Daiichi accident, there has been an increasing preference for passive safety features in the nuclear power industry. Some passive safety systems require limited active components to trigger subsequent passive operation. Under very serious accident conditions, passive safety features could be rendered inoperable or damaged. This study evaluates (i) the performance and effectiveness of the passive safety features of iPOWER (innovative Power Reactor), and (ii) whether a severe accident condition could be reached if the passive safety systems are damaged, namely the case of heat exchanger tube rupture. Analysis results show that the reactor coolant system remains in the hot shutdown condition without operator actions or electricity for over 72 h when the passive auxiliary feedwater systems (PAFSs) are operable without damage. However, heat exchanger tube rupture in the PAFS leads to core damage after about 18 h. Such results demonstrate that, to enhance the safety of iPOWER, maintaining the integrity of the PAFS is critical, and therefore additional protections for PAFS are necessary. To improve the reliability of iPOWER, additional battery sets are necessary for the passive safety systems using limited active components for accident mitigation under such extreme circumstances.