• Journal of the Korean Society of Systems Engineering
• /
• v.16 no.2
• /
• pp.47-58
• /
• 2020

Most of the reactor trips in Korean NPPs related to core protection systems were caused not because of proximity of boiling crisis and, consequently, a damage in the core, but due to particular miscalculations or component failures related to the core protection system. The most common core protection system applied in Korean NPPs is the Core Protection Calculator System (CPCS), which is installed in OPR1000 and APR1400 plants. It generates a trip signal to scram the reactor in case of low Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) or high Local Power Density (LPD). However, is a reactor trip necessary to protect the core? Or could a fast power reduction be enough to recover the DNBR/LPD without a scram? In order to analyze the online calculation of DNBR/LPD, and the use of fast power reduction as trip avoidance methodology, a concept of CPCS with fast power reduction function was developed in Matlab® Simulink using systems engineering approach. The system was validated with maximum of 0.2% deviation from the reference and the dynamic deviation was maximum of 12.65% for DNBR and 6.72% for LPD during a transient of 16,000 seconds.

• Transactions of the Korean Society of Pressure Vessels and Piping
• /
• v.8 no.2
• /
• pp.14-20
• /
• 2012

Full load rejection capability of nuclear power plant depends primarily on steam dump capacity (SDCAP) and steam generator level control capability. Recently, Ulchin Units 1&2 have performed stretched power uprate (SPU) and replacement steam generator (RSG) projects, which increase the power by 4.5 percent. They change major design or operating parameters and especially reduces steam dump capacity at full power due to increase of the steam flow. The reduction of SDC after SPU results in degradation of heat removal capability in full load rejection transients. Therefore, we should perform evaluation to determine whether reactor trips occur in large load rejection transients. Uchin Units 1&2 have experienced full load rejection (FLR) three times from 2004 to 2010. Operating data from the plant occurrence of FLR at Ulchin Units 1&2 showed that steam generator (SG) level transients were limiting in point of reactor trip. However the plant had never reached reactor trip in the FLR and successfully continued in house load operation. The parameters and setpoints for the SG will be changed if the SG is replaced. Therefore, we evaluated the appropriateness of steam dump, main feedwater and steam generator water level control system preventing the plant from reactor trip in case of FLR by the parameter sensitivity study whether SG water level operated smoothly after SPU and RSG projects.

• Proceedings of the Korean Nuclear Society Conference
• /
• 1996.05b
• /
• pp.622-627
• /
• 1996

Detailed analysis of Feedwater Line Break (FLB) event for the fuel failure point of view are lack because the event was characterized as the increase in reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure. Up to now, the potential of the rapid system heatup case has been emphasized and comprehensively studied. The cooldown effects of FLB event is considered to be bounded by the Steam Line Break (SLB) event since the cooldown effect of SLB event is larger than that of the FLB event. This analysis provides a new possible path which can cause the fuel failure. The new path means that the fuel failure can occur under the heatup scenario because the Pressurizer Safety Valves (PSVs) open before the reactor trips. The 1000 MWe typical C-E plant FLB event assuming Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) at the turbine trip has been analyzed as an example and the results show less than 1% of the fuel failure. The result is well within the acceptance criteria. In addition to that, a study was accomplished to prevent the fuel failure for the heatup scenario case as an example. It is found that giving the proper pressure gap between High Pressurizer Pressure Trip (HPPT) analysis setpoint and the minimum PSV opening pressure could prevent the fuel failure.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
• /
• v.25 no.2
• /
• pp.276-284
• /
• 1993

The ABB-CE System-80 reactor power cutback system(RPCS) is designed to enable continuous operation of the reactor without trip in the events of the loss of one of the two main feedwater pumps and loss of load, and thus improves plant availability in a cost effective manner. In this study expansion of RPCS has been investigated for continuous reactor operation without trip in the event of an inward control element assembly(CEA) deviation including a single rod drop. Under the expanded function of RPCS the control system will provide a rapid core power reduction on demand by releasing CEAs to drop into the core and reduce the turbine power, if necessary, to follow the reactor power variation. This design feature which is included as the new design features to be incorporated in the ABB-CE System-80+ meets the EPRI advanced light water reactor(ALWR) requirements. For this study core analysis models of System-80+ have been developed to simulate the nuclear steam supply system(NSSS) response as well as the RPCS initiation of rapid CEA insertion. The results of this study demonstrate that the reactor trip can be avoided in the event of inward CEA deviation including a single rod drop by the RPCS initiation and thus the plant availability and capacity factor would be increased.

• Journal of the Ergonomics Society of Korea
• /
• v.26 no.1
• /
• pp.93-97
• /
• 2007

As many as 111 reactor trips have occurred for recent 5 years('01-'05), and 26 cases of them have occurred due to human error. The trend of human error rate didn't decrease in 2004, so KHNP started to make efforts to decrease human errors. In 2006 KHNP bench marked excellent foreign nuclear power plants and introduced human error prevention tools. In addition, KHNP created as many as 40 posters for human performance improvement. The posters are based on the about 500 real incident reports collected through K-HPES from 1995. Therror preventive tols for the poster. This paper explains design of the posters and their application.

• Journal of the Ergonomics Society of Korea
• /
• v.28 no.1
• /
• pp.37-51
• /
• 2009

The nuclear power industry in the world has recognized the importance of integrating non-technical and team skills training with the technical training given to its control room operators to reduce human errors since the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents. The Nuclear power plant (NPP) industry in Korea has been also making efforts to reduce the human errors which largely have contributed to 120 nuclear reactor trips from the year 2001 to 2006. The Crew Resource Management (CRM) training was one of the efforts to reduce the human errors in the nuclear power industry. The CRM was developed as a response to new insights into the causes of aircraft accidents which followed from the introduction of flight recorders and cockpit voice recorders into modern jet aircraft. The CRM first became widely used in the commercial airline industry, but military aviation, shipboard crews, medical and surgical teams, offshore oil crews, and other high-consequence, high-risk, time-critical industry teams soon followed. This study aims to develop a CRM training program that helps to improve plant performance by reducing the number of reactor trips caused by the operators' errors in Korean NPP. The program is; firstly, based on the work we conducted to develop a human factors training from the applications to the Nuclear Power Plant; secondly, based on a number of guidelines from the current practicable literature; thirdly, focused on team skills, such as leadership, situational awareness, teamwork, and communication, which have been widely known to be critical for improving the operational performance and reducing human errors in Korean NPPs; lastly, similar to the event-based training approach that many researchers have applied in other domains: aircraft, medical operations, railroads, and offshore oilrigs. We conducted an experiment to test effectiveness of the CRM training program in a condition of simulated control room also. We found that the program made the operators' attitudes and behaviors be improved positively from the experimental results. The more implications of the finding were discussed further in detail.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
• /
• v.52 no.1
• /
• pp.87-100
• /
• 2020

Performance shaping factors (PSFs) in a human reliability analysis (HRA) are one that may influence human performance in a task. Most currently applicable HRA methods for nuclear power plants (NPPs) use PSFs to highlight human error contributors and to adjust basic human error probabilities (HEPs) that assume nominal conditions of NPPs. Thus far, the effects of PSFs have been treated independently. However, many studies in the fields of psychology and human factors revealed that there may be relationships between PSFs. Therefore, the inter-relationships between PSFs need to be studied to better reflect their effects on operator errors. This study investigates these inter-relationships using two data sources and also suggests a context-based approach to treat the inter-relationships between PSFs. Correlation and factor analyses are performed to investigate the relationship between PSFs. The data sources are event reports of unexpected reactor trips in Korea and an experiment conducted in a simulator featuring a digital control room. Thereafter, context-based approaches based on the result of factor analysis are suggested and the feasibility of the grouped PSFs being treated as a new factor to estimate HEPs is examined using the experimental data.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
• /
• v.18 no.2
• /
• pp.97-106
• /
• 1986

System thermal-hydraulic parameters and simulated, using the best-estimate system code(RELAPS/MODl/NSC), based upon the sequence of events for the KNU1 (Korea Nuclear Unit 1) loss of offsite power transient at 77.5% power which occurred on June 9,1981. The results are compared with the actual plant transient data and show good agreements. After the flow coastdown following the trips of both reactor coolant pumps, the establishment of natural circulation by the temperature difference between the hot and the cold legs is confirmed. The calculated reactor coolant flowrate closely approximates the plant data indicating the validity of relevant thermal-hydraulic models in the RELAP5/MOD1/NSC. Results also show that the sufficient heat removal capability is secured by the appropriate supply of the auxiliary feedwater without the operation of S/G PORVs. In addition, a scenario accident at full power, based upon the same sequence of events described above, is also analysed and the results confirmed that the safety of KNU1 is secured by the appropriate operation of the S/G PORVs coupled with the supply of auxiliary feedwater which ensures sufficient heat removal capability. The characteristics of the non-safety related components such as the turbine stop valve closing time, S/G PORV settings etc. are recognized to be important in the transient analyses on a bestestimate basis.