• Strategy21
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• 통권40호
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• pp.190-215
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• 2016

As North Korea's asymmetric threats are growing, there have been numerous discussions to find out effective counter-measures and many official plans and procurements efforts have been established. However, discussions on ROK Navy's roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threats have been taken place very limitedly. Decision makers and military planners put enormous efforts in getting counter-measures, however, most of the options on the table are systems of Army and Air Force. This is true if one looks at components of Kill-Chain, KAMD, and KMPR. With worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula, it has been said by many commentators that ROK Navy needs to consider expanding its roles in countering against North Korea's asymmetric military threats. They asked ROK Navy to go beyond the mind-set that has confined Navy's roles in deterring North Korean naval threats. That is, ROK Navy should fight 'from the sea' as well as fight 'on the sea.' If ROK Navy begins to think about fight 'from the sea,' there would be many possibilities for the Navy to be a part of countering North Korea's asymmetric military threats. In order to pursue proactive roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threat, ROK Navy needs to consider various options. Massive missile forces, nuclear-propelled submarines, naval special forces may be some of them. With those measures, ROK Navy would launch massive and decisive attacks from the sea without risking survivability of our forces. Considering North Korean Navy's weakness, it is very probable that sea would be safer place than ground or sky. Expanding ROK Navy's roles and being a proactive deterrent forces against North Korean asymmetric threats would provide very reliable counter-measures to South Korean military. Thus, military planners should think how to take the best advantage of expanded ROK Navy's roles and capabilities against North Korean asymmetric threats.

• Strategy21
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• 통권42호
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• pp.258-292
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• 2017

This paper is designed to make a national strategic concept for the ROK's maritime security and to explore cooperation directions for the ROK Navy and Coast Guard in order to implement the newly-made maritime security strategic concept. As strategy is composed of three main categories(goals, ways, means), the goal of the ROK's maritime security strategy is 'Safe and Affluent Sea' and the way to realize the goal is the principle of cooperative leverage, and the means as tasks to implement the strategic concept are maritime safety, maritime security, and maritime stewardship. The concept of national fleet as used in the US is applied to promoting the cooperation between the ROK Navy and Coast Guard. Thus, under the newly-established maritime security strategic concept along with the national fleet model, followings are suggested as policy proposals for facilitating mutual cooperation between the ROK Navy and Coast Guard in dealing with not only traditional threats but also non-traditional treats at sea and from the sea as well. First, the ROK Navy and Coast Guard has been making efforts to enhance interoperability between the two sea services. However, the mutual cooperations have been focused mainly on areas on operational level rather than policy level. Therefore, the two sea services are recommended to enlarge exchanges and cooperation in policy areas. Second, there are still demands for further cooperation areas between the two sea services in command and communications. The interoperability in C2 between the two needs to be upgraded even to the areas of anti-terrorist activities ar sea, ASUW, ASW, maritime interdiction, etc. Third, mutual comparability between the two needs to be reflected in the maritime forces development to ensure the comparability in UNREP and other logistics areas. Fourth, the standardization of logistical materials and equipments is needed as a way of sustaining operational capability and logistical capacity for the ROK Navy and Coast Guard as well. Fifth, the ROK Navy and Coast Guard are recommended to participate more actively in international maritime cooperation activities such as PASSEX. Sixth, Complementary laws and regulations need further to be revised and to be newly made for collectively managing swiftly maritime accidents and natural disasters at sea.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.52-84
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• 2017

After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.

• Journal of Advanced Marine Engineering and Technology
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• 제37권8호
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• pp.969-976
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• 2013

본 연구의 목적은 개방회로 공기스쿠버와 표면공급 잠수체계의 제한사항을 개선하기 위해 테크니컬 잠수기술을 적용하는 방안을 제시하여 한국 해군의 해난구조 활동 효율성 향상에 도움이 되는 기초자료를 제공하기 위함이다. 연구방법으로는 기존의 개방회로 공기 스쿠버의 제한사항을 개선하기 위하여 테크니컬 잠수기술을 이론적으로 고찰하고 개방회로 공기 잠수와 나이트록스(Nitrox) 잠수, 재호흡기(Rebreather) 간 가용심도, 무감압 한계시간, 수중 체류 가능시간, 감압의 효율성 등을 미 해군 등 공신력 있는 기관의 기준에 따라 비교 분석하였다. 그 결과 보다 적합한 테크니컬 잠수기술의 도입 방안이 도출되었다. 본 연구의 결과는 일련의 제한사항이 따르나 장비도입 및 교육 등 그 적용에 따라 감압절차 및 해난구조 활동의 효율성 향상에 기여할 할 수 있을 것으로 판단된다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.63-98
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• 2012

Northeast Asia has a multi-layered security structure within which major economic and military powers both confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative activities in the economic sphere while competing one another in order to secure a dominant position in the politico-military arena. The multifarious threats, posed by the North Korea's nuclear development, territorial disputes, and maritime demarcation line issues demonstrate that Northeast Asia suffers more from military conflicts and strifes than any other region in the world. Specifically, major maritime security threats include North Korea's nuclear proliferation and missile launching problems as well as military provocations nearby the Northern Limit Line(NLL) as witnessed in the Cheonan naval ship and Yeonpyong incidents. The ROK Navy has been supplementing its firm military readiness posture in consideration of North Korea's threats on the NLL. It has performed superb roles in defending the nation and establishing the Navy advanced and best picked. It also has been conducive to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, secure the sea lanes of communications, and establish regional stability and world peace. In order to effectively cope with the strategic environment and future warfares, the ROK Navy needs to shift its military structure to one that is more information and technology intensive. In addition, it should consolidate the ROK-US alliance and extend military cooperative measures with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Evolved steadily for the last 60 years, the ROK-US alliance format has contributed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. In conclusion, this manuscript contends that the ROK Navy should strive for the establishment of the following: (1) Construction of Jeju Naval Base; (2) Strategic Navy Equipped with War Deterrence Capabilities; (3) Korean-type of System of Systems; (4) Structure, Budget and Human Resources of the Naval Forces Similar to the Advanced Countries; and (5) Strategic Maritime Alliance and Alignment System as well as Domestic Governance Network for the Naval Families.

• Strategy21
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• 통권41호
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• pp.294-332
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• 2017

The aim of this study is to find ways to apply the strategic communications to the Republic of Korea Navy. It may be a little bit late for the ROK Navy to accommodate the SC in these days because the adoption and implementation of the SC by the Combined Forces Command has already been begun. It was in 2007 when the SC was in place in the CFC. ROK's Ministry of National Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff have also mulled over the SC and begun to apply it in part in the annual exercises such as Key Resolve command post drills and Foal Eagle field training exercise, etc. For the ROK Navy, in addition to those exercises, it is faced with further areas like North Korean maritime provocations and other maritime incidents where its version of SC is needed. As noted, the SC is not intended to deter or defend directly those provocations and incidents, but aims to create conditions favorable to the achievement of the navy's strategic objectives. The ROK Navy has to establish a SC planning center and implementing organizations within the Headquarters to be consistent with its above organizations such as MND, JCS, and CFC that have already applied the SC in part or in entirety. SC center and other related organizations need to be under the control of VCNO and the center needs to be located and administered by the policy division in N-5 at the HQs. The vision of the navy's SC is the winning without combats and the least damages in time of war. In other for the navy to reach the vision, the strategies to be executed are early establishment of SC implementing organizations, forming consensus over the need for the SC within the navy, strengthening core competencies to apply the SC, acquiring the SC experts and making doctrines on the SC. The SC, in addition, in the navy has to be planned and implemented in not only peace time and crisis time but also war time.

• Strategy21
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• 통권32호
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• pp.5-35
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• 2013

The purpose of this thesis is to suggest how to plan ROK(Republic of Korea) Navy's strategy concerning to JOAC(Joint Operation Access Concept) and ASB(Air-Sea Battle) concept of US(United States) armed forces. Since 2006, US armed forces has been developing CONOPS(Concepts of Operations), JOAC & ASB. These concepts will not only affect security environment for Korea Peninsula and West Pacific Area, but also will be affected to ROK Navy's Strategy. Therefore, Korea Navy has to consider and review those concepts and should discuss the way to secure peace of Korea Peninsula. JOAC & ASB have been developed for securing operational access ability of US armed forces against enemy forces. A2/AD(Anti-Access, Area-Denial) is the strategy of possible enemy forces against US forces' approaching into the operation area and impede operations within area. US forces had to overcome enemy's A2/AD strategy in coming century to protect national interest and sustain global leadership. The main concept of JOAC & ASB is "Cross-domain Synergy", which means 'to eliminate duplicate and improve joint operability containing space and cyber operation area.' Korea Navy's acceptance of JOAC & ASB without any revising is not a rational choice. Without the amendment some problems can be occurred by the Korea navy's acceptance for the original version of JOAC & ASB. Those are "Missing differences of operation environment between Korea and US", "Impediment from neighbor nations, especially PRC (People's Republic of China)", and "Impediment inside from Korea armed forces". Therefore, Korea Navy has to evaluate and find out the way to solve for JOAC & ASB to apply for their strategy and minimise those possible problems above. This thesis is expected to be the solution.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.85-119
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• 2013

This paper asks whether the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy should continue to focus on building ocean-going naval ships when it faces the threats of North Korean provocations in littoral areas. My position is that the ROK Navy should keep pursuing ocean-going capabilities. I provide explanations why it should do so from the perspectives of three important dimensions: capability, doctrine, and organizational identity. First, I argue that the distinction between a littoral navy and an ocean-going navy is an unnecessary dichotomy. It may lead to inefficiency in national security. The military posture should be designed in a way that it can address all external threats to national security regardless of whether they are from North Korea or not. Such capability is the one that the ROK Navy has tried to acquire with the 'Blue Water Navy' initiative since the 1990s. Second, also from the perspective of lately developed military doctrines that emphasize jointness and precision strike capability, ocean-going capabilities such as the mobile task fleet program have become a must, not an option, given today's security situations on and around the Korean peninsula. Lastly, I draw attention to the fact that the 'Blue Water Navy (BWN)' initiative meant more than just capability to the ROK navy. The BWN represents the ROK navy's organizational identity that the navy has defined since the 1980s as it emphasized promoting national interest and international standing as part of its organizational essence. Furthermore, the phrase 'blue water navy' took on symbolic meanings to the people that are associated with South Korean-ness including sovereignty, national pride, standing in the world and hopes for the future. Since 1990s, many scholars and experts have made the case for the necessity of improving South Korea's naval capability based on different rationales. They emphasized the protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), the economic value of the sea, the potential danger associated with territorial disputes over islands, and increasing naval power of neighboring countries since the end of the Cold War. This paper adds to this debate by trying to explain the matter with different factors including naval doctrines and organizational identity. Particularly, this paper constitutes a unique endeavor in that it incorporating constructivist elements (that is, identity politics) in explaining a national security matter.

• Strategy21
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• 통권43호
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• pp.125-174
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• 2018

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the status of naval arms race in Northeast Asia. To this end, the scope of the research was limited to national security strategies, maritime strategies and naval strengthening of the United States, China, Russia and Japan. The major powers' active maritime strategies and naval arms race give some strategic implications to the Republic of Korea Navy as follows. First, China and Japan, unlike the past, are actively using submarines in offshore waters including the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the ROK Navy must successfully promote the Jangbogo-III-class submarine, which is currently constructed, and get a nuclear-powered submarine and P-8 MPA capable of long-range and long-time operations to enhance ASW capability. Second, North Korea's current building submarines capable of loading SLBMs and SLBMs are a new threat to the ROK Navy. The current building KAMD, which focuses on terminal phase defense, cannot effectively respond to North Korea's SLBMs and should be converted to a multi-layered defense system including SM-3 at a mid-course phase. Third, as China militarizes the South China Sea, the instability of the South China Sea is growing. Therefore, the ROK Navy should strengthen its maritime cooperation with the regional countries such as Japan and ASEAN navies to protect SLOC. In conclusion, the ROK Navy needs to build a strong naval power to keep in mind that the 21st century naval rivalry in Northeast Asia is accelerating. The navy must do one's best to protect national strategic and vital interests by strengthening cooperation with regional countries. South Korea is also accelerating its defense reforms in accordance with the pattern of future warfare and the ROK Navy do one's best to have a balanced naval capability capable of actively operating in the offshore waters.

• 한국산학기술학회논문지
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• 제21권11호
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• pp.420-426
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• 2020

본 연구에서는 효율적인 함정 시운전을 위하여 빅데이터 기법인 워드 클라우드를 활용하여 한미 해군의 시운전 목적과 주안점을 다각적으로 파악하여 다음과 같은 결과를 도출하였다. 첫째, 한미 해군 시운전 종목을 키워드 클렌징을 통해 추출된 단어를 비교한 결과 한국 해군은 시운전을 단일 장비에 대한 시험의 개념으로 수행하며, 미 해군은 시스템에 초점을 둔 통합 시운전을 진행한다는 것을 알 수 있었다. 둘째, 한미 해군 시운전 연관도 분석 결과 약 66.6%가 유사한 항목으로 분석되었으며, 그중 2종목 이상 중복된 종목이 112종목이었다. 한국 해군 시운전 종목 252종목 대비 44%가 중복된 종목으로 미 해군 시운전 종목으로 통합시 89종목(전체 35%)이 축소 가능하다고 분석되었다. 함정은 여러 장비가 동시 다발적으로 작동하는 복합 시스템이다. 현재 한국 해군 시운전과 같이 개별 장비의 기능, 성능 확인에 중점을 두고 수행하는 것은 시운전 대상이 지나치게 많아져 시운전 기간이 증가하게 된다. 또한, 그로 인한 일정 및 평가비용 증가로 필요한 예산이 필연적으로 증가한다. 향후 미 해군의 시운전과 같이 통합 시스템적인 평가를 통한 효율적이면서 정확한 시운전을 위하여 추가적인 연구가 필요하다고 판단된다.