• 제목/요약/키워드: ROK's Maritime Strategy

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북한의 핵, 탄도미사일 위협과 미국의 전략: 동맹국과의 경제적, 군사적 수단의 동기화를 통한 전략적 환경의 조성 (North Korean Nuclear & Ballistic Missile Threats and U.S. Strategy: Shaping the Strategic Environment by Synchronizing Sticky and Sharp Power with Allies)

  • 문종화
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권37호
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    • pp.242-274
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    • 2015
  • 2015년 5월 수중발사 탄도미사일(SLBM) 발사시험을 통해 북한은 전 세계의 이목을 또 다시 집중시켰다. 북한은 2013년 제3차 핵실험을 감행한 이후 최근까지도 탄도미사일과 로켓 발사 등의 무력도발을 지속해 왔다. 이와 같은 북한의 무력도발은 한반도의 안정뿐만 아니라 미국 본토의 안보에도 매우 부정적인 영향을 미치고 있다. 지금까지 미국은 북한의 핵미사일 개발 저지를 위해 경제적 또는 군사적 방안들을 선별적으로 적용해 왔다. 그러나, 이러한 미국의 노력에도 불구하고 북한은 여전히 핵미사일을 개발하겠다는 꿈을 포기하지 않고 있는 것이 사실이다. 본 논문은 북한의 핵미사일 개발에 대한 미국의 대안적 전략(Alternative Strategy)을 제시하는데 그 목적이 있다. 필자는 대안적 전략 제시에 앞서 북한의 핵과 탄도미사일 개발현황을 내용(Contents)과 맥락(Context) 차원에서 분석하고 미 오바마 행정부의 대북전략을 비판적으로 검토하였다. 그리고 대안적 전략으로 동맹국과 함께 경제적(Sticky Power), 군사적(Sharp Power) 수단의 동기화(Synchronizing)를 통해 북한이 감당하기 힘든 전략적 환경을 조성(Shaping the Strategic Environment)하는 것이 '북한의 핵개발 포기' 라는 전략목표를 달성하는 방안 임을 강조하고 있다. 미국이 대안적 전략목표를 달성하기 위해서는 경제적 수단으로 ① 북한의 자금세탁 및 위조지폐 발행국 지정, ② 북한을 지원하는 모든 해외자산에 대한 제재조치, ③ 북한의 테러지원국 재지정, ④ 북한 제재를 위한 미국의 입법추진, ⑤ 대량살상무기 관련 금수품목의 확대를 적용함과 동시에 군사적 수단으로 ① 대량살상무기 비확산 활동 강화, ② 대탄도미사일 전략 개발 및 정보(ISR: Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance) 공유, 맞춤형 억제전략(TDS: Tailored Deterrence Strategy)의 구체화 등을 통한 한·미 군사 억제방안의 강화, 그리고 ③ SM-3, THAAD(Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) 등 한·미·일 3자간 MD(Missile Defense)체제의 구축 등을 동기화하여 적용해야만 할 것이다. 미국의 대안적 전략은 ① 북한의 핵미사일 개발에 대한 중국의 협력방지, ② 한·중간 경제관계의 악화, ③ 한·일간의 역사적 긴장관계라는 위험요소를 내포하고 있는 것 또한 사실이다. 따라서 미국이 대안적 전략목표인 '북한의 비핵화' 달성을 위해서는 이와 같은 위험요소를 완화시키는 노력도 병행되어야 할 것이다. 끝으로, 미국은 북한의 김정은이 핵미사일 개발 포기라는 상이한 방향의 전략적 결정을 할 경우에 대비하여 한·미 연합훈련의 보류, 북한에 대한 경제제재조치 해제 등 북한과의 협상 가능성도 열어두고 이에 대해서도 철저하게 준비해 나가야 할 것이다.

국가의 해양주권 수호를 위한 한국해군의 전력건설 방향 (The Construction Direction of the ROK NAVY for the Protection of Marine Sovereignty)

  • 신인균
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권30호
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    • pp.99-142
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    • 2012
  • Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

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천안함 폭침 이후 북한의 군사도발 양상과 전망 (Trends and Prospects of N. Korea Military Provocations After the Sinking of ROKS Cheon-an)

  • 김성만
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권34호
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    • pp.58-92
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    • 2014
  • Even after S. Korea took 5.24 Measure(24 May 2014), N. Korea has not stopped raising provocations such as the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, electronic and cyber attacks. To make matters worse, the communist country lunched long-range missiles(twice) and conducted 3rd nuclear test, escalating tensions which could possibly lead to an all-out war. Korean Government failed to respond properly. However, escalation into an all-out war was deterred by the CFC immediately carrying out its peacetime duty(CODA). The US made a rapid dispatch of its augmentation forces(Aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered submarine, strategic bomber, F-22) to the Korean Peninsula. In recognition of the importance of the Combined Forces Command, since May 2013 the Park Geun-Hye Administration has been pushing ahead with re-postponement of Wartime Operational Control Transfer(which initially meant the disassembling of the CFC as of 1 December 2015) More recently, there has been a series of unusual indicators from the North. Judging from its inventory of 20 nuclear weapons, 1,000 ballistic missiles and biochemical weapons, it is safe to say that N. Korea has gained at least war deterrence against S. Korea. Normally a nation with nuclear weapons shrink its size of conventional forces, but the North is pursuing the opposite, rather increasing them. In addition, there was a change of war plan by N. Korea in 2010, changing 'Conquering the Korean Peninsula' to 'Negotiation after the seizure of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area(GSMA)' and establishing detailed plans for wartime projects. The change reflects the chain reaction in which requests from pro-north groups within the South will lead to the proclamation of war. Kim, Jeong-Un, leader of N. Korean regime, sent threatening messages using words such as 'exercising a nuclear preemptive strike right' and 'burning of Seoul'. Nam, Jae-June, Director of National Intelligence Service, stated that Kim, Jung-Un is throwing big talks, saying communization of the entire Korean Peninsula will come within the time frame of 3 years. Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, shared an alarming message that there is a high possibility that the North will raise local provocations or a full-fledged war whenever while putting much emphasis on defense posture. As for the response concept of the Korean Government, it has been decided that 'ROK·US Combined Local Provocation Counter-Measure' will be adopted to act against local provocations from the North. Major provocation types include ▲ violation of the Northern Limit Line(NLL) with mobilization of military ships ▲ artillery provocations on Northwestern Islands ▲ low altitude airborne intrusion ▲ rear infiltration of SOF ▲ local conflicts within the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) ▲ attacking friendly ships by submarines. Counter-measures currently established by the US involves the support from USFK and USFJ. In order to keep the sworn promise, the US is reinforcing both USFK and USFJ. An all-out war situation will be met by 'CFC OPLAN5027' and 'Tailored Expansion Deterrence Forces' with the CFC playing a central role. The US augmentation forces stands at 690,000 troops, some 160 ships, 2,000 aircraft and this comprise 50% of US total forces, which is estimated to be ninefold of Korean forces. The CFC needs to be in center in handling both local provocations and an all-out war situation. However, the combat power of S. Korean conventional forces is approximately around 80% of that of N. Korea, which has been confirmed from comments made by Kim, Gwan-Jin, Defense Minister, during an interpellation session at the National Assembly. This means that S. Korean forces are not much growing. In particular, asymmetric capabilities of the North is posing a serious threat to the South including WMD, cyber warfare forces, SOF, forces targeting 5 Northwestern Islands, sub-surface and amphibious assault forces. The presence of such threats urgently requires immediate complementary efforts. For complementary efforts, the Korean Government should consider ① reinforcement of Korean forces; putting a stoppage to shrinking military, acquisition of adequate defense budget, building a missile defense and military leadership structure validity review, ② implementation of military tasks against the North; disciplinary measures on the sinking of ROKS Cheon-an/shelling of Yeonpyeong Islands, arrangement of inter-Korean military agreements, drawing lessons from studies on the correlation between aid for N. Korea, execution of inter-Korean Summit and provocations from the North, and ③ bolstering the ROK·US alliance; disregarding wartime operational control transfer plan(disassembling of CFC) and creation of a combined division.

한국형 원자력 추진 잠수함 도입방안 (Method's to introduce ROKN Nuclear Propulsion Submarines)

  • 장준섭
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권42호
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    • pp.5-52
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    • 2017
  • Debates about introducing nuclear submarines have been a main issue in Korea. The highest officials and the government has started to think seriously about the issue. Yet there were no certain decision to this issue or any agreements with US but it is still necessary to review about introducing nuclear submarines, the technologies and about the business. The reason for such issues are the highest officials of Korea to build nuclear submarine, nK's nuclear development and SLBM launching. ROKN's nuclear submarine's necessity will be to attack(capacity to revenge), defend(anti-SSBN Operation) and to respond against neighboring nation's threat(Russia, Japan, China). Among these nations, US, Russia (Soviet Union), Britain, France had built their submarines in a short term of time due to their industrial foundation regarding with nuclear propulsion submarines. However China and India have started their business without their industrial foundation prepared and took a long time to build their submarines. Current technology level of Korea have reached almost up to US, Russia, Britain and France when they first built their nuclear propulsion submarines since we have almost completed the business for the Changbogo-I,II and almost up to complete building the Changbogo-III which Korea have self designed/developed. Furthermore Korea have reached the level where we can self design large nuclear reactors and the integrated SMART reactor which we can call ourselves a nation with worldwide technologies. If introducing the nuclear submarine to the Korea gets decided, first of all we would have to review the technological problems and also introduce the foreign technologies when needed. The methods for the introduction will be developments after loans from the foreign, productions with technological cooperations, and individual production. The most significant thing will be that changes are continuous and new instances are keep showing up so that it is important to only have a simple reference to a current instances and have a review on every methods with many possibilities. Also developing all of the technologies for the nuclear propulsion submarines may be not possible and give financial damages so there may be a need to partially introduce foreign technologies. For the introduction of nuclear propulsion submarines, there must be a resolution of the international regulations together with the international/domestics resistances and the technological problems to work out for. Also there may be problem for the requirement fees to solve for and other tough problems to solve for. However nuclear submarines are powerful weapon system to risk everything above. This is an international/domestically a serious agenda. Therefore rather than having debates based on false facts, there must be a need to have an investigations and debates regarding the nation's benefits and national security.

국가 에너지안보 추진전략 분석에 관한 연구 - 혁신시스템 관점에서의 분석 및 추진전략을 중심으로 - (Study on the Energy Security Strategy of South Korea - Focused on the Innovation System Perspective -)

  • 최정환;이홍훈
    • 해양환경안전학회지
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    • 제21권6호
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    • pp.679-688
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    • 2015
  • 에너지자원의 안정적인 확보는 국가발전을 위한 가장 중요한 요소 중 하나이다. 본 연구는 혁신시스템 관점에서 우리나라의 에너지관련 정책결정시스템을 분석하고 그 문제점을 도출하였다. 혁신시스템의 구성요소 중 혁신주체 측면에서는 에너지의 안정적인 수송을 위한 전략적인 강화방안이 미흡하다는 한계를 가지고 있었으며, 연계측면에서는 국방영역을 제외한 혁신주체들 간의 연계는 비교적 양호하였으나 안보적 관점에서 중요한 역할을 담당하는 국방영역과 타 혁신주체들 간의 연계는 미흡한 것으로 분석되었다. 하부구조 측면에서는 에너지안보 관점에서 국방영역의 하부구조인 전력건설 논의가 미흡한 것으로 나타났으며, 마지막으로 제도적 측면에서는 에너지안보에 관한 국방영역의 역할에 대한 제도적 정립이 미흡하여 향후 국가 에너지안보와 관련된 거버넌스에서 국방영역의 참여가 제도적으로 명시될 필요가 있는 것으로 분석되었다.

한국전쟁의 교훈과 대비 -병력수(兵力數) 및 부대수(部隊數)를 중심으로- (The lesson From Korean War)

  • 윤일영
    • 안보군사학연구
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    • 통권8호
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    • pp.49-168
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    • 2010
  • Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

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세력균형(power balance)에서의 군사력 수준과 동북아시아에 주는 함의 (Balance of Power and the Relative Military Capacity - Empirical Analysis and Implication to North East Asia -)

  • 김명수
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권38호
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    • pp.112-162
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    • 2015
  • This study began to confirm or review the balance of power theory by applying scientific methods through experiential cases. Though there are several kinds of national power, this study supposes military power as a crucial power when it comes to war and peace. This research covered balance and imbalance through comparing relative military power between nations or nations' group. Comparison of relative military power can be achieved by statistically processing the values of which has been converted into the standard variables in same domain, then calculating the values of nation's power which has been synthesized different experiential factors. In addition, the criteria of experiential experiment is highly dedicated to European countries, USA, Japan prior to 1st and 2nd World War, as well as USA, Soviet Union and North East Asia during Cold War era. In addition, the balance of power theory has been redefined to review the action of the state upon the changes of power as mentioned in the theory. To begin with, the redefined theory states that relative level of military power between nations defines the consistency of peace and balance of power. If military power is enough to be on the range of level required to keep the power in equilibrium, peace and balance can be achieved. The opposite would unbalance the military power, causing conflicts. While the relative military level between nations change, nations seek to establish 'nations group' via military cooperation such as alliance, which also shift relative military power between nations group as well. Thus, in order to achieve balance of power, a nation seeks to strengthen its military power(self-help), while pursuing military cooperation(or alliance). This changes relative military power between nations group also. In other words, if there exists balance of power between nations, there is balance of power between nations group as well. In this theory, WWI and II broke out due to the imbalance of military force between nations and nations group, and reviewed that due to the balance of military force during the Cold War, peace was maintained. WWI was resulted from imbalance of military cooperation between two powerful states group and WWII was occurred because of the imbalance among the states. Peace was maintained from cooperation of military power and balance among the states during the Cold War. Imbalance among continental states is more threatening than maritime states and balance of power made by army force and naval force also is feasible. Also the outcomes of two variables are found military power balanced ratio of military power for balance is 67% when variable ratio of balance is 100% and standard value for balance is 0.86. Military power exists in a form of range. The range is what unstabilized the international system causing nations to supplement their military powers. These results made possible the calculation and comparison between state's military power. How balance of power inflicted war and peace has been studied through scientific reviews. Military conflict is highly possible upon already unbalanced military powers of North East Asian countries, if the US draws its power back to America. China and Japan are constantly building up their military force. On the other hand, Korean military force is inferior so in accordance to change of international situation state's survival could be threatened and it is difficult to achieve drastic increase in military force like Germany did. Especially constructing naval force demands lots of time; however but has benefit that naval force can overcome imbalance between continental states and maritime states.

한국 해군의 북극해 진출과 발전방안에 대한 고찰: 작전환경(SWOT) 분석을 중심으로 (Development Plan of R.O.K. Naval forces to prepare Tasks in the Arctic Ocean: Based on Operational Environment(SWOT) Analysis)

  • 지영
    • 해양안보
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    • 제1권1호
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    • pp.311-343
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    • 2020
  • 지구온난화의 영향으로 2035년 이후 북극해가 대부분 개방될 것으로 예측된다. 그리고 북극해 개방 시에는 북유럽까지 항해 거리·비용 감소, 북극권 자원 해상운송, 아시아의 허브항으로서 간접이익 창출 등 많은 국가이익이 기대되고 있다. 이에 따라 미지의 영역이던 북극해에서 국가이익을 확보하고, 국민의 자유로운 활동을 보장하기 위해 정부도 구체적인 정책을 수립하여 추진 중이다. 해군도 북극해 관련 국가정책을 군사적으로 뒷받침하려면, 지금부터 역할과 계획을 구체화해야만 한다. 북극해에서 지원 임무를 수행하기 위해 해군력은 고유 작전특성(기동성, 융통성, 지속성, 현시성, 투사성)을 발휘하여야 하며, 이를 준비하는 과정에서 긍정적·부정적 영향을 미칠 수 있는 내·외부 작전환경(OE)을 먼저 분석할 필요가 있었다. 이는 해군 내부의 강점(S)과 약점(W), 외부의 기회(O)와 위협(T)으로 구분되는데, 각 환경요인들을 연계(S-O, S-T, W-O, W-T)하여, 작전특성을 구현할 수 있는 발전방안을 도출하고자 하였다. 해군은 경험해보지 못한 추운 원해에서 임무를 수행하기 위해 다음의 노력을 기울여야 할 것이다. 첫째, 정부 정책과 발맞추어 해군의 단계적인 추진계획(로드맵)을 작성하고, 둘째, 국내·외 교육훈련 프로그램과 해외 연합훈련에 적극적으로 참여함으로써 전문인력을 양성해야 한다. 셋째, 국내의 우수한 특수선박 조선기술과 4차 산업혁명 신기술을 적용하여 극지 작전용 무장·장비·물자를 확보하는 한편, 광활한 북극해 상 전력공백을 해소하기 위해 연합작전 역량과 군사신뢰도를 증진하면서, 북극권 내 기항지를 마련할 필요가 있다. 끝으로, 북극권 진출 후 군사적·비전통적 위협(전염병, 재난, 인명구조 등)에 대응하며, 다양한 성과를 창출할 수 있도록 사전 준비를 해나가야 할 것이다.

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