• Strategy21
• /
• 통권34호
• /
• pp.5-25
• /
• 2014

On July 3~4, 2014, the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit to Seoul might be seen as a step on the path toward strategic outcomes for both country. For South Korea, Seoul shrewdly retains some degree of self-reliance by balancing between ROK-China strategic cooperative partnership relationship and ROK-US alliance. For China, Beijing appears to put its interests on the Korean Peninsula increasingly within China's larger geopolitical influence. To what extent can ROK-China relationship maintain futuristic strategic cooperative partnership between them? As we observed joint press communiques of the Chinese President Xi Jinping's state visit on July 3, 2014, four agendas of bilateral relationship between Seoul and Beijing can be identified: intractable rivalry between the two great powers, North Korea nuclear issues, disparities of their displeasure with Japan denying the past wrongdoing and enhancing its military capabilities and Chinese imposing of its core interests on its Korea policy. With these evolving strategic environments, however, China and the ROK appear justifiably be pleased with the state of their relations: their strategic cooperative partnership is the cornerstone of peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific or Indo-Pacific region and continues to grow broader and deeper.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권32호
• /
• pp.5-35
• /
• 2013

The purpose of this thesis is to suggest how to plan ROK(Republic of Korea) Navy's strategy concerning to JOAC(Joint Operation Access Concept) and ASB(Air-Sea Battle) concept of US(United States) armed forces. Since 2006, US armed forces has been developing CONOPS(Concepts of Operations), JOAC & ASB. These concepts will not only affect security environment for Korea Peninsula and West Pacific Area, but also will be affected to ROK Navy's Strategy. Therefore, Korea Navy has to consider and review those concepts and should discuss the way to secure peace of Korea Peninsula. JOAC & ASB have been developed for securing operational access ability of US armed forces against enemy forces. A2/AD(Anti-Access, Area-Denial) is the strategy of possible enemy forces against US forces' approaching into the operation area and impede operations within area. US forces had to overcome enemy's A2/AD strategy in coming century to protect national interest and sustain global leadership. The main concept of JOAC & ASB is "Cross-domain Synergy", which means 'to eliminate duplicate and improve joint operability containing space and cyber operation area.' Korea Navy's acceptance of JOAC & ASB without any revising is not a rational choice. Without the amendment some problems can be occurred by the Korea navy's acceptance for the original version of JOAC & ASB. Those are "Missing differences of operation environment between Korea and US", "Impediment from neighbor nations, especially PRC (People's Republic of China)", and "Impediment inside from Korea armed forces". Therefore, Korea Navy has to evaluate and find out the way to solve for JOAC & ASB to apply for their strategy and minimise those possible problems above. This thesis is expected to be the solution.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권41호
• /
• pp.108-152
• /
• 2017

This paper aims to analyze hegemonic competition and the role of naval power. To this end the paper is composed of four chapters titled introduction, the role of naval power in the hegemonic competition, the role of naval power in the East Asia, and the lessons and implications for the Korean Peninsula. Since the modern era, the hegemonic competition in the East Asian region has been the intrusion and struggle process between the world system and the East Asian regional system, and the ocean between these two systems has become the goal and means of supremacy(hegemony). Currently, the hegemonic competition between the US and China consists of systemic competition at the global level and marine competition at the regional level. When South Korea is forced to make strategic choices in the course of the US-China hegemonic competition, naval power will be the first factor to be considered. The ROK is asymmetrically maintaining a deep dependency relationship with the United States in terms of security and China in relation to the economy. And while the ROK's national economic power is acquired from the ocean, the ROK's military power is imbalanced because it is centered on the ground forces. These international relations and asymmetric-unbalanced resources distribution will not be able to effectively cope with the hegemonic competition between the US and China in the future, and will limit Korea's strategic choice. Since naval power and forces are the prerequisites for the hegemonic competition or the maintenance of supremacy we must construct balanced naval forces(naval power) that are not subordinate to the ground forces at the national strategic level for the future of the country.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권39호
• /
• pp.140-162
• /
• 2016

The construction of Jeju Naval Base was finally completed and donated to the Republic of Korea Navy on February 26th this year. There is no doubt that the new base will contribute to the substantial augmentation of Korea's naval power and maritime security. However, we should note that the new naval base took a long and hard twenty-three years to be completed. In the 21st century, Korea should adopt a new strategy that can fulfill the security requirements of Korea for the new age of international relations. The 21st century is characterized by globalization, and in the world of globalization, a national boarder has become meaningless. In the late 20th century, after the Cold War, trade between countries have greatly increased and so did the importance of the seas. Having transformed from an agricultural country into a commercial country, Korea went from a continental state to a maritime state. Korea has become the 9th largest trading state, and obviously, the importance of the sea has become significant. Korea's national strategic focus needs to be on the sea for national survival. Thus, since the 1990s, the Korean Navy has planned to build the Jeju Naval Base. Jeju, due to its geopolitical characteristics, is extremely important to the 21st century Korea's economy and national security. Jeju is the starting point of the sea route that reaches out to the world, and at the same time, the ending point of the sea route that heads towards Korea. Jeju is located in the center of Northeast Asia and thus, Jeju Naval Base is extremely important for the area's security and order. Jeju Naval Base will be very useful not only for the maritime security of Korea, but also for keeping peace and order in Northeast Asia. Jeju Naval Base was the minimal effort against the six sea route security threats towards Korea. The six sea route threats are: 1) Threat from North Korea; 2) China's Threat towards Korea's sovereignty; 3) China's treat towards Korea's fishery; 4) Threat from Japan; 5) Threat towards Korea's sea routes; 6) Threat from recent phenomena of isolationism of the United States. Jeju Naval Base is built for both warships and civilian ships--such as cruise ships--to use. Just like the United States' Pearl Harbor, Jeju Naval Base will become not only the largest military base, but a beautiful tourist site.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권36호
• /
• pp.94-120
• /
• 2015

The Asia-Pacific Region has emerged as a arena of geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. The Obama administration of the U.S. had laid out the concept of rebalancing strategy toward the region, concentrating its 60 percent of Naval Forces to the region till 2020 and consolidating its network of allies and partners. Whereas Chinese leader Xi Jinping also put forward the concept of new type of major power relations concerning its relations with the U.S. and a concept of 'the Asian Community of Common Destiny' aiming at a more intensified mutual relation among countries in the region. In doing so, Asia-Pacific region gradually became the arena where mutual competition and cooperation between the U.S. and China has crossfired. As a close ally to the U.S. and a partner to Japan, South Korea should develop trilateral naval cooperation by holding joint naval drill with the aim of humanitarian support and disaster relief. At the same time, Seoul also should make efforts to proceed mutual confidence building with Beijing by deepening military-to-military cooperation. These policy options will be helpful to enhance Seoul's security posture in the region.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권41호
• /
• pp.52-84
• /
• 2017

After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권38호
• /
• pp.83-111
• /
• 2015

In these days, 1949 revolt of admirals has a variety of evaluations. In 1949, many people thought that revolt of admirals is simply disobedience to Secretary of Defense. Revolt of admirals was considered that Navy was defeated to Air force. At that time, many people didn't put too much meaning this case. But at long last, the confidential documents about revolt of admirals opened to the public. This historic event's value was re-evaluated. Many researches were progressed in USA, On the other hand only some researches were progressed in Korea. So I try to study this topic and discover another meaning. Then, I will apply this lesson that obtained through study to our Korea Navy.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권36호
• /
• pp.33-58
• /
• 2015

In 1996, China, Japan and the ROK all became the party to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Since then, the UNCLOS has been a fundamental basis for the resolution and management of maritime disputes amongst them. However, there still remain acrimonious disputes in the region. Resources nationalism and the revival of geopolitics aggravates the disputes particularly on sovereignty over disputed islands, maritime delimitation and the legal nature of military activities in other States' Exclusive Economic Zones. Under the circumstances, why have the demands for the conclusion of a regional agreement been raised in this region? A desirable regional agreement regarding ocean affairs should be compatible with the rights and obligations under the UNCLOS, a universal norm regarding ocean affairs. This paper will propose a desirable regional agreement by adopting an incremental approach.

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권41호
• /
• pp.232-260
• /
• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

• Strategy21
• /
• 통권44호
• /
• pp.352-376
• /
• 2018

Through this research, the current state of naval coordination and guidance of shipping is reviewed whereupon which a suggestion is made for a novel role which satisfies the needs of the people and the country asked of the Navy. Taking into consideration the dynamic security environment, the developing relationship between the two nations on the Korean peninsula, and the influence that the Republic of Korea has on maritime security, it is made more urgent that the Navy takes a proactive course of action in terms of naval coordination and guidance of shipping. The current form of Korean naval coordination and guidance of shipping is adapted from the logical and flexible concepts of NCAPS and NCAGS and is one of many tasks that the Republic of Korea Navy must perform. However, when the Republic of Korea Navy develops blue-water capabilities with the ambitions of protecting its people and their way of life, naval coordination and guidance of shipping could potentially become one of the primary functions of the Republic of Korea Navy that the it must champion. Already, there are indications that foreign navies are, through many developments and commitment towards naval coordination and guidance of shipping, protecting its people and states' interests wherever is necessary. In the case of Chile, its Navy has taken the helm of naval coordination and guidance of shipping and has integrated various maritime organizations including the coast guard and the National Customs Service for the sake of maintaining regional maritime security, showing immediate force if necessary. Presently, as the Republic of Korea Navy looks to be a global naval power, it is important that a reprioritization of the Navy's mission is undertaken, all the while sustaining military readiness posture on the Northern Limit Line. It cannot be any more emphasized how crucial thorough military readiness posture is as a natural stance against the enemy. That being said, contributing towards international maritime security is consistent with the nation's standing. It is a fact that maritime security has been conceptualized and developed merely as a study within the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, the Republic of Korea Navy, and other governmental organizations, forces, and academia. Naval cooperation and guidance of shipping suggested by this research as a practical operational field is a concrete solution to what once was an abstract concept. To stand firm on its status as a maritime nation, the Republic of Korea must establish a Maritime Security Organization within its Navy and develop the appropriate doctrines. Attaining experts, developing doctrines, and cultivating the capability to deploy maritime forces will allow for the Republic of Korea to execute a primary role in keeping international maritime security and naval coordination and guidance of shipping. To fully achieve its latent potential necessitates the Republic of Korea Navy to expedite the introduction of naval coordination and guidance of shipping concepts and to establish the appropriate doctrines, operation plans, and organizations.