• 자원ㆍ환경경제연구
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• 제25권3호
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• pp.351-376
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• 2016

본 논문은 공기업과 사기업이 혼재된 혼합복점시장을 대상으로 환경오염을 고려한 최적 오염세와 후생효과를 분석하였다. 상품차별화된 시장에서 두 기업이 생산량 경쟁과 가격 경쟁을 동시 게임과 순차 게임으로 진행하는 경우를 각각 분석한 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 생산량 경쟁이나 가격 경쟁 또는 동시 게임이나 순차 게임에 관계없이 최적 오염세는 항상 한계오염비용보다 작다. 둘째, 최적 오염세의 크기를 비교하면 생산량 경쟁에서는 사기업 선도모형에서 가장 높고, 가격 경쟁에서는 공기업 선도모형에서 가장 높다. 셋째, 동시 게임과 사기업 선도 모형에서 생산량 경쟁이 가격 경쟁보다 환경을 악화시키는 반면, 공기업 선도모형은 가격 경쟁이 생산량 경쟁보다 환경을 악화시킨다. 마지막으로 동시 게임이나 공기업 선도모형에서 가격 경쟁이 생산량 경쟁보다 후생을 높이는 반면, 사기업 선도모형은 생산량 경쟁이 가격 경쟁보다 후생을 높인다.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• 제24권2호
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• pp.53-67
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• 2020

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to study strategic trade policies under international process research and development (R&D) competition with or without market leaders for free trade and a subsidy regime and compare the effects of R&D subsidies and export subsidies on the equilibrium levels of firm profit and social welfare. Design/methodology - For the analysis, we use previous work by Haaland and Kind (2008) and construct a differentiated goods duopoly model, wherein two firms compete via quantity in a third-country market for free trade and the subsidy regime. We consider simultaneous-move quantity competition when the two firms choose their quantities simultaneously and sequential-move quantity competition when they choose their quantities sequentially. The results are compared to those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004), who studied export subsidies. Findings - The following are the findings. First, the results of firm preference orderings regarding firm position from Dowrick (1986) and Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) may not hold in our model when the firms' strategies are strategic substitutes under free trade. Second, the preference rankings under Cournot competition for free trade and a subsidy regime are the same as those in the strategic trade policy of export subsidy. Third, except for the cases of too close substitutes and complements, the results of firm and government preferences regarding firm position are different from those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) in that Stackelberg leadership in a subsidy regime is advantageous when the goods are substitutes but is disadvantageous when the goods are complements. Moreover, the equilibrium level of firm profit is the highest in the Cournot-Nash play when the goods are substitutes in a subsidy regime. Fourth, except for the cases of too close substitutes and complements, the results of firms' and their respective governments' trade regime preferences are similar to those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) in that a Stackelberg leader firm and government prefer free trade if the goods are substitutes and prefer a subsidy regime if the goods are complements. Furthermore, a Stackelberg follower firm and government strongly prefer a subsidy regime to free trade. Originality/value - By analyzing the effects of R&D subsidies and export subsidies in international markets, we can find similarities and differences between them in international markets.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• 제7권6호
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• pp.145-155
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• 2020

This study analyzes the degree of competition in the oil refinery market in Korea, which is considered an oligopoly market. The price of gasoline and diesel and the quantity of supply are used to identify the market competition. We also analyze whether the oil tax reduction policy has affected market competition. The competitiveness of the market was examined using monthly data from 2008 to 2019. Bresnahan-Lau method was employed to estimate the degree of competition in the oil refinery market, which is frequently used in the industrial studies. The analysis shows that the gasoline and diesel markets seem close to a perfect competitive market. Also, the tax cut has weakened market competition. In other words, the monopolistic power has increased in the market, so consumers have not benefit from the price cuts as much as tax cuts. Although the oil refinery market where four major companies are competing, the government's monitoring and price disclosure system help the market to be highly competitive as much as a perfect competition market. The tax cut, in the high oil price era, has a negative effect on the competition because of an information asymmetry about the price-setting process between suppliers and consumers.

• 보건행정학회지
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• 제6권2호
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• pp.14-42
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• 1996

민간 시장에서의 경쟁의 실패는 일반적으로 정부개입과 규제의 대표적인 근거를 제공한다. 하지만 보건의료분야는 정보의 비대칭성, 의료보험의 보편화, 고가의료기술 및 장비에 의한 비용상승 등과 같은 특수성으로 인하여, 정부가 단순히 충분한 의료공급자나 병원의 수를 보장함으로써 가격의 하락과 서비스 양의 증가와 같은 경쟁의 효과를 기대하기 힘들다. 본 논문은 경쟁과 규제와 관련한 보건의료의 특수성과, 보건의료분야에서 경쟁이 소비자 후생에 미치는 영향에 관한 이론 및 실증분석의 결과들을 고찰한다. 나아가 경쟁과 규제가 조화된 지속가능한(sustainable) 보건의료체계를 위해, 병원설비투자의 직접적인 규제로부터 규제를 통해 경쟁을 촉진시키는 인센티브규제(incentive regulation)로서의 지불보상제도 그리고 필요한 정보의 제공을 통한 시장기능의 회복에 이르는, 정부가 집행할 수 있는 효과적인 정책도구들을 분석한다.

• 한국가구학회지
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• 제17권2호
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• pp.35-47
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• 2006

In 1990s, with the rapid development of the design part and the change of perception, various design competitions in a way to encourage the design industry have repeatedly implemented and abolished. They played positive roles of developing designs and nurturing talents. On the contrary, they caused a lot of problems of standardization of design, loss of identification of competitions, deterioration of the quality of design. Especially, though too many competitions are holding, the level of quality cannot catch up with the quantity, resulting in numerous side-effects. In the field of Furniture Design, many competitions are just an one time events and disappeared. Therefore, it is very difficult to keep the tradition of prestigious competition, playing the adverse role in the development of furniture design and lowering the will of creativeness of designers. In this study, I compared and analyzed the current issues and problems of Gyeonggi Furniture Good Design Contest, one of the representative competition as the national scale competition as of 2006, with examples from home and abroad to find out the positive and developmental methods. At the same time, I provided the ways that can be helpful in the design through the ways to facilitate competition and proposals of desirable competitions.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제39권6호
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• pp.562-576
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• 2013

Power TAC (Power Trading Agent Competition) is an agent-based simulation for competitions between electricity brokering agents on the smart grid. To win the competition, agents obtain electricity from the electricity wholesale market among the power plants. In this operation, a key to success is balancing the demand of the customer and the supply from the plants because any imbalance results in a significant penalty to the brokering agent. Given the bidding on the wholesale market requires the price and the quantity on the electricity, this paper proposes four different price estimation strategies: exponentially moving average, linear regression, fuzzy logic, and support vector regression. Our evaluations with the competition simulation show which strategy is better than which, and which strategy wins in the free-for-all situations. This result is a crucial component in designing an electricity brokering agent in both Power TAC and the real world.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제5A권4호
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• pp.396-402
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• 2005

In an electricity market with imperfect competition, participants devise bidding plans and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is analyzed by using bi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제54권4호
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• pp.199-204
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• 2005

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of bidding and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium(NE) is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare(SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• 제어로봇시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 제어로봇시스템학회 1992년도 한국자동제어학술회의논문집(국제학술편); KOEX, Seoul; 19-21 Oct. 1992
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• pp.90-95
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• 1992

Authors have developed the method of selecting the efficient variant of designing a systems or products from a some number of competition variants in the conditions of vagueness of the initial information. Registration of information vagueness degree concerning the quantity index values is carried out of the expense of giving to the expert the possibility of using different methods of index evaluation numerical evaluations with physical scale; phrases of limited language; and points evaluation. Using of this method and software is important for marketing research, for systems of quality control of products.

• 유통과학연구
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• 제5권2호
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• pp.17-34
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• 2007

한국 제약산업은 제약회사의 수와 거래선의 수가 많고, 다품종 소량생산체제이며 동일성분의 경쟁품이 많은 실정이다. 이러한 실정 하에서 통합물류가 물류원가 절감 및 효율적인 배송에는 적절한 방안이라고 할 수 있으나 기업마다 다른 배송 조건 문제, 다품종 소량주문의 적기 배송 문제 등 회사 특유의 서비스 제공 등에 한계가 있어서 경쟁적 매출증가에 문제점이 있다 하겠다. 이와 같이 물류원가는 절감해야하고 영업효율성은 증대시켜야 하는 두 가지 문제를 두고 다음과 같은 대처방안을 제시하고자 한다. 첫째, 제약회사 간 품목 공동마케팅 실시. 둘째, 규모가 비슷한 3개 회사 이하 합동 배송실시. 셋째, 매출이 큰 제품은 도매상과 유통 일원화 협약. 넷째, 도매상이 제약 물류 서비스하도록 준비. 다섯째, 거래선의 협조 등이다. 결론적으로 한국제약산업에서 통합물류가 필요하지만 산업의 특성상 중소제약회사는 완전 통합물류는 매출이 감소할 것이라는 가정하에 그 시행이 어려울 것으로 판단되는 것이다.