• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.351-376
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• 2016

This study examines optimal emission taxes and welfares in mixed duopoly markets where public and private firms produce differentiated goods and emit pollutions. Both comparing quantity and price competitions and comparing simultaneous and simultaneous games provides the followings findings: First, irrespective of competition modes between quantity and price competitions or simultaneous and sequential games, the optimal emission tax is always lower than marginal environmental damage. Second, emission tax under private leadership is the highest in quantity competition while that under public leadership is the highest in price competition. Third, environmental damage under Cournot and private leadership is worsened in quantity competition while that under public leadership is worsened in price competition. Finally, welfare under Bertrand and public leadership is improved in price competition while that under private leadership is improved in quantity competition.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.53-67
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• 2020

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to study strategic trade policies under international process research and development (R&D) competition with or without market leaders for free trade and a subsidy regime and compare the effects of R&D subsidies and export subsidies on the equilibrium levels of firm profit and social welfare. Design/methodology - For the analysis, we use previous work by Haaland and Kind (2008) and construct a differentiated goods duopoly model, wherein two firms compete via quantity in a third-country market for free trade and the subsidy regime. We consider simultaneous-move quantity competition when the two firms choose their quantities simultaneously and sequential-move quantity competition when they choose their quantities sequentially. The results are compared to those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004), who studied export subsidies. Findings - The following are the findings. First, the results of firm preference orderings regarding firm position from Dowrick (1986) and Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) may not hold in our model when the firms' strategies are strategic substitutes under free trade. Second, the preference rankings under Cournot competition for free trade and a subsidy regime are the same as those in the strategic trade policy of export subsidy. Third, except for the cases of too close substitutes and complements, the results of firm and government preferences regarding firm position are different from those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) in that Stackelberg leadership in a subsidy regime is advantageous when the goods are substitutes but is disadvantageous when the goods are complements. Moreover, the equilibrium level of firm profit is the highest in the Cournot-Nash play when the goods are substitutes in a subsidy regime. Fourth, except for the cases of too close substitutes and complements, the results of firms' and their respective governments' trade regime preferences are similar to those of Balboa, Daughety and Reinganum (2004) in that a Stackelberg leader firm and government prefer free trade if the goods are substitutes and prefer a subsidy regime if the goods are complements. Furthermore, a Stackelberg follower firm and government strongly prefer a subsidy regime to free trade. Originality/value - By analyzing the effects of R&D subsidies and export subsidies in international markets, we can find similarities and differences between them in international markets.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.6
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• pp.145-155
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• 2020

This study analyzes the degree of competition in the oil refinery market in Korea, which is considered an oligopoly market. The price of gasoline and diesel and the quantity of supply are used to identify the market competition. We also analyze whether the oil tax reduction policy has affected market competition. The competitiveness of the market was examined using monthly data from 2008 to 2019. Bresnahan-Lau method was employed to estimate the degree of competition in the oil refinery market, which is frequently used in the industrial studies. The analysis shows that the gasoline and diesel markets seem close to a perfect competitive market. Also, the tax cut has weakened market competition. In other words, the monopolistic power has increased in the market, so consumers have not benefit from the price cuts as much as tax cuts. Although the oil refinery market where four major companies are competing, the government's monitoring and price disclosure system help the market to be highly competitive as much as a perfect competition market. The tax cut, in the high oil price era, has a negative effect on the competition because of an information asymmetry about the price-setting process between suppliers and consumers.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.14-42
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• 1996

On rationale for government intervention is the failure of competition in the market. Health care markets are characterized by such unique aspects as information asymmetry, prevalence of insurance, and cost-increasing competition based on the adoption of costly medical technology. Therefore, government policy to guarantee a sufficient number of providers in markets may not lead to socially beneficisal outcomes such as higher quantity and lower price. This paper examines the unique nature of health services and its implications for competition, the evidence that competition may not reduce health care ex[enditures, and policy tools that government can use to encourage competition which contributes to supporting a sustainable health care system.

• Journal of the Korea Furniture Society
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.35-47
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• 2006

In 1990s, with the rapid development of the design part and the change of perception, various design competitions in a way to encourage the design industry have repeatedly implemented and abolished. They played positive roles of developing designs and nurturing talents. On the contrary, they caused a lot of problems of standardization of design, loss of identification of competitions, deterioration of the quality of design. Especially, though too many competitions are holding, the level of quality cannot catch up with the quantity, resulting in numerous side-effects. In the field of Furniture Design, many competitions are just an one time events and disappeared. Therefore, it is very difficult to keep the tradition of prestigious competition, playing the adverse role in the development of furniture design and lowering the will of creativeness of designers. In this study, I compared and analyzed the current issues and problems of Gyeonggi Furniture Good Design Contest, one of the representative competition as the national scale competition as of 2006, with examples from home and abroad to find out the positive and developmental methods. At the same time, I provided the ways that can be helpful in the design through the ways to facilitate competition and proposals of desirable competitions.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.39 no.6
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• pp.562-576
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• 2013

Power TAC (Power Trading Agent Competition) is an agent-based simulation for competitions between electricity brokering agents on the smart grid. To win the competition, agents obtain electricity from the electricity wholesale market among the power plants. In this operation, a key to success is balancing the demand of the customer and the supply from the plants because any imbalance results in a significant penalty to the brokering agent. Given the bidding on the wholesale market requires the price and the quantity on the electricity, this paper proposes four different price estimation strategies: exponentially moving average, linear regression, fuzzy logic, and support vector regression. Our evaluations with the competition simulation show which strategy is better than which, and which strategy wins in the free-for-all situations. This result is a crucial component in designing an electricity brokering agent in both Power TAC and the real world.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.4
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• pp.396-402
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• 2005

In an electricity market with imperfect competition, participants devise bidding plans and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is analyzed by using bi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.4
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• pp.199-204
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• 2005

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of bidding and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium(NE) is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare(SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• 제어로봇시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 1992.10b
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• pp.90-95
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• 1992

Authors have developed the method of selecting the efficient variant of designing a systems or products from a some number of competition variants in the conditions of vagueness of the initial information. Registration of information vagueness degree concerning the quantity index values is carried out of the expense of giving to the expert the possibility of using different methods of index evaluation numerical evaluations with physical scale; phrases of limited language; and points evaluation. Using of this method and software is important for marketing research, for systems of quality control of products.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.17-34
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• 2007

The Korean pharmaceutical industry has many pharmaceutical companies and business acquaintances, small quantity batch production and a lot of competition products having same ingredient. Under such a situation, an integrated distribution is said to be proper to lower distribution costs and deliver effectively: However, each business has different delivery conditions, timely delivery of small quantity batch order and other particular services, etc to have problems of competition of turnover increase. The study suggests measures below to lower distribution costs and to elevate sales business efficiency. First, Joint marketing of pharmaceuticals between pharmaceutical companies. Second, Joint delivery of three or less companies having similar business scales. Third, An agreement with wholesale distributors of unified distribution of pharmaceuticals being sold much. Fourthly, Wholesale distributors' pharmaceuticals distribution services. Fifthly, Cooperation of business acquaintance. In summary, the Korean pharmaceutical industry needs an integrated distribution system. Considering characteristics of the industry, however, the small pharmaceutical companies are thought to be difficult to accept the integrated distribution because complete integrated distribution may reduce sales.