• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.45 no.1
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• pp.33-68
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• 2023

The present article investigates empirically whether non-reciprocal trade preferences (NRTPs) offered by QUAD countries (Canada, the European Union, Japan, and the United States) to developing countries have helped to promote economic growth in the beneficiary countries. Two main blocks of NRTPs are considered here: Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) programs and other trade preferences programs. The analysis used a set of 90 beneficiary countries of NRTPs that are concurrently recipients of development aid over the period of 2002-2018. Using the two-step system generalized method of moments, the analysis indicated that while a higher degree of utilization of each of these two blocks of NRTPs has been associated with a high economic growth rate, development aid enhances this positive effect. This highlights the need for donors to support a development strategy based on the provision of both development aid and NRTPs if they are to help beneficiary countries to promote economic growth. Finally, when the positive economic growth effect of the utilization of NRTPs is higher, the result is a greater country's share of exports (under preferential tariffs) to QUAD countries out of their total merchandise exports.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.13
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• pp.699-733
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• 2000

This article analyzes the state-of-play of WTO dispute settlement for first four and a half years. Remarkable points found on this analysis are as follows: First, the Quad consisting of the United States, the European Community (EC), Canada and Japan has participated in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism more frequently than any other WTO member. Second, among developing country members some leading countries such as Korea, Brazil and India have relied actively upon the mechanism to claim and defend their rights and obligations under the WTO rules. Third, bilateral dispute settlements generally have been preferred to multilateral dispute settlements by the panel or Appellate Body. Fourth, observation of the Appellate Body proceedings well shows WTO members' strategy to use every process available to them. Fifth, the provisions of GATT 1994 have been most frequently invoked by the members. GATS and TRIPS Agreement disputes are mainly involved in developed countries, in particular the U.S. and the EC. Sixth, very high winning ratio in the panel and Appellate Body process indicates that complaining parties review the possibility to get favorable rulings even before referring to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and prepare for the case very thoroughly. Seventh, roughly speaking, disputes were settled within two or three years. Therefore, seeking bilateral dispute settlement can be more advantageous to a complaining party than referring to a panel or an arbitrator because of low costs and short time period in dispute settlement. Finally, the DSB approved retaliatory actions for winning complaining parties against the defending parties who had rejected implementation of its rulings and recommendations. In conclusion, it can be said that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism has been operated very successfully for the first four and a half years. It is hoped that continued study on state-of-play of WTO dispute settlement mechanism will be contributory to improved national interest of Korea.