• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.47 no.2
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• pp.43-59
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• 2016

This study investigated the difference of the effects of public loan programs in fishery industry on management performance from a balanced score card (BSC) perspective depending on the type of loan, scale of fund, period of support and business category, using the financial data of fisheries firms having the balance of loan at the end of 2014. The key factors influencing credit rating change were also analyzed after public loan support. From a integrative perspective, results show that the firms supported by working fund have higher management performance than the firms supported by facility fund. The firms received large scale fund showed higher management performance than the firms received small scale fund. While management performance was decreasing or slowing down over time after financial support, management performance of the firms supported by facility fund improved over time. From a non-financial perspective, the firms received facility fund invested more in education and growing perspective than the firms received working fund. As the size of fund increased, the investment in education, growing, internal process and customer increased. Personnel expenses and employee benefits for education and growing has increased over time. However, the firms with facility fund restricted the expenses of education, personnel expenses and employee benefits as time goes by. Because the effects of public loan on credit rating of fisheries corporations have no statistical significance, it has become known that the financial support of public loan program has no influence on the change of credit rating of fisheries corporations. This study attempted performance analysis from a BSC perspective which combine factors of non-financial perspective with factors of financial perspective. Findings from this study suggest the direction of microscopic performance analysis of public loan in fishery industry.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.37 no.3 s.72
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• pp.45-63
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• 2006

A number of public loans with lower interests and other tax benefits have been provided for farmers and fishermen. However, much of those loans have been accumulated as non-performing. The result is that a large part of fisheries debts are now on the verge of default, Those loans, that fail to pay interests, keep rapidly growing like a time bomb. Now something has to be done before it burst. Firstly, the government must clean up the debts caused by government's mismanagement in the past. The past debt must be repaid or written off by the government since its guarantee was committed several times in guidelines regarding public loans. As such a measure, the government can greatly enlarge its capital contribution to the Credit Guarantee Fund for Farmers and Fishermen and Loss Guarantee fund for Policy Loan. It would greatly help to compensate local branches of fisheries cooperatives for their loss incurred from carrying public loans. In the past, the government used to roll over old debts of fishermen with new debts whenever maturity came. It ends up growing the size of non - performing loans. For this reason, it is not delay of the debt payment, but its write - off that fishery society needs a lot. Secondly, the loan authorities must lower overall risk in providing public loans for fishermen in the future. The whole process must be thoroughly reviewed and changed to provide and manage government loans. To facilitate this, fisheries cooperative must stop being just a public agent, rather take a bigger responsibility in selecting, and checking loan beneficiaries, and securing debt repayment. Incentives must be arranged properly enough to induce fisheries cooperatives to treat public loans just like their own business. Finally, the so - called 'special account of policy loan in fisheries industry' must be set up to enhance the transparency and to check the performance of public loans programs.