This study employed the Gini coefficient decomposition analysis to classify and examine fishery household income inequality according to income sources. The raw data from the Fisheries Economic Survey by the National Statistical Office were used for the analysis after equalization according to the recommended method of the OECD. In particular, the Gini coefficient was decomposed by classifying with and without public subsidies, and the contribution, correlation, and marginal effect by income source were presented.As a result of the analysis, the inequality of fishing income and non-fishing income of fishermen was worsening, and the inequality of transfer income was continuously easing. Among them, fisheries subsidies have been analyzed to have the greatest contribution to the Gini coefficient of gross income and the highest relative marginal effect, although distribution inequality has been alleviated. On the other hand, other subsidies, including public pensions, were found to have the opposite contribution, correlation, and marginal effect to fisheries subsidies. The results of this analysis showed that even within public subsidies, the contribution to income redistribution might differ depending on the nature of the subsidy. In addition, in the case of other public subsidies, it can be seen that the transition from selective welfare to universal welfare occurs.
Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
/
v.11
no.5
/
pp.1829-1837
/
2010
During the last year, public expenditures which provided the central and local governments for boosting research and development (R&D) activities of the private sector has been constantly increasing. 17 percent of public total R&D expenditure supported to private sector and 9 percent of R&D expenditure in service sector were public R&D funding. However, studies evaluating the impact of public R&D subsidies are quite few. The aim of this study empirically investigate the average effects of public R&D subsidies on the innovation activities in private sector, specifically those engaged in Korean service firms by using Propensity Score Matching(PSM) method. The effect of R&D subsidies is derived from either qualitative and quantitative outcomes of innovation activities, which is defined as the difference between innovation outcome of the treatment group (receiving R&D subsidies) and that of the control group (non receiving R&D subsidies) after the matching method. As a result of empirical analysis, government R&D grants stimulate only firm-first innovation outcomes in service firms. It is represent that public R&D subsidies cannot be contributed to level of national innovation and the total amount of national innovation activities but can enhance firm competitiveness from increasing firm-first innovation activities.
Journal of the Korean Society of Fisheries and Ocean Technology
/
v.53
no.4
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pp.456-470
/
2017
We propose some countermeasures needed to cope with fortifying international regulations for fisheries subsidies. The government should rigorously select the recipients of fisheries subsidies to ensure that they are not engaged in ineffective projects by resorting to subsidies. On the other hand, the government should make the individual applicant's application for the subsidies easier by exempting them from the submission of a burdensome feasibility report. As for the strengthening regulatory international movements against the fisheries subsidies, we can consider the following countermeasures. One is not to designate and provide prohibitive subsidies in such a way that violates international norms. The other one is to reform the domestic fisheries subsidies system in Korea with the following points considered. It should be considered that fisheries subsidies, which can be categorized as the actionable subsidies, should not be granted to the items that can be exported but to the items that can be used for domestic consumption or processing. In the case of non-actionable subsidies, the subsidies are mainly allowed for promotion of public-sector research and development, regional development, and adaptation to new environmental regulations. Thus, the non-actionable subsidies should be designated in the consideration of the allowances for these activities.
This paper attempts to investigate how and why the additionality effects occur in the case when a firm receives government subsidy as opposed to counterfactual situation. To demonstrate this, we selected 12 SMEs(small and medium enterprises) firms in Daejeon area and have conducted multiple case studies. In order to analyse the multiple cases of firms, we classified firms innovative activities into three stages which are composed of input, behaviour and output stages and related various factors. Furthermore, we investigated the differences according to types of firms and stages of firm growth. Empirical results show that various input, behaviour and output additionality effects exist when firms receive public subsidies. Compared to companies in the growth and mature stages, startup phase companies depend on government subsidy extensively and they use public subsidies strategically to develop new product and to change their strategic direction. The attitude of firms to use government subsidies is different according to their types and stage of growth as well.
Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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v.3
no.1
/
pp.31-46
/
1978
Consider a time interval during which the demand for trips is fixed (e.g. the rush hour period). The traveller has a choice between various public modes, whose travel times and fares are fixed, and the automobile mode, for which travel time and cost depend on the volume of traffic flow on those roads, which are subject to congestion. We consider the equilibrium in terms of a representative travellerm, who choses for any trip the mode and route with the least combined money and time cost. When several (parallel) model or routes are chosen, then the combined cost of money and time must be equal among these. Our problem is first, to find the optimal flows of cars and of public mode carriers on the various links of their networks and second the optimal fares for trips by the variousmodes. The object is to minimize the total operating costs of the carriers and car plus the total time costs to travellers. The optimal fares are related to, but not identical with the dual variables of the underlying Nonlinear Program. They are equal to these dual variables only in the case, when congestion tolls on trips or on the use of specific roads are collected from automobile users. When such tolls are not collected, they must be passed on as subsidies to travellers using competing modes. The optimal fares of public modes are then reduced by the amounts of these subsidies. Note that subsidies are not a flat payment to public carriers, but are calculated on the basis of tickets sold. Fares and subsidies depend in general on tile period considered. They will be higher during periods of higher demand. When the assumption of fixed trip demand is relaxed, this tare system is no longer best, but only second best since too much traffic will, in general, be generated. The Free Rider Theorem states the following : Suppose road tolls can be charged, so that a best pricing system for public modes is posssible. Then there may exist free rides on some routes and modes, but never on a complete round trip.
During the last year, we had a very severe situation with the strike of physicians working in medical facilities. From that time, many politicians and scholars insisted on the expansion of public hospitals to enhance the public role in the medical care sector. They think that private medical facilities work for profit motivation and that the high proportion of private to whole facilities is an obstacle to the public function of medical care under social insurance system. They found that one of the reasons for failing to prevent the physicians' strike was the high proportion of private facilities. Others insisted that the strike was not a good reason for the expansion of public hospitals. The physicians' strike was a very rare case, and it is not a good basis for generalization of the discussion of public hospitals. Last year almost all apprentice physicians in public facilities took part in the strike, and consequently the public hospitals also lost the role of public function. They view this increasing involvement of government in the medical sector as improper and the cause of inefficiencies. In this paper we review the debate over the expansion of public facilities. To clarify the debate, we review traditional criteria for the role of government in a market system and to apply these criteria to medical care. There are two traditional areas where government Is acknowledged to have a role in a market system: market imperfections and market failure. Where market imperfections and market failure exist, there may be a role for government. The justifications for government intervention are consumer protection and the existence of externalities. One of externalities is to provide medical care for the poor. The appropriate measures to provide medical owe to the poor can be sought in both demand and supply side subsidies. National health insurance is a method of demand subsidies and establishment of public hospitals is a method of supply side subsidies. Under the National Health Insurance System, the expansion of public hospitals is not an appropriate subsidy policy.
This paper evaluates the effects of the Basic Subsidy Program provided to families with infants cared for in private day care centers. There has been a discrepancy in the price and quality level between public and private day care centers. Public day care centers which receive government support in their labor costs are able to maintain relatively higher quality at lower price than their private counterparts, while the majority of children are cared for at private day care centers. To reduce the gap of the price and quality of care between public and private day care centers by improving the quality and decreasing the price of private day care centers, the Basic Subsidy Program was introduced in 2006 to the private day care centers. The subsidies mainly aim to improve the quality and the accessibility of child care, and encourage mothers' labor supply. For this purpose, the provision of the Basic Subsidy Program imposed prerequisites to the care providers including minimum wage and four major insurances for teachers, and child-staff ratio. I examine whether the subsidies improve the quality of care, help mothers balancing work and family, and increase satisfaction with child care from mothers' perspective. Since the outcome variables that measure the quality of care are difficult to obtain, I instead use the input variables for quality production. Child-staff ratio, teachers' welfare, and care environment are considered. The relationship between these variables and the introduction of subsidies is examined. The 2004 National Survey of Child Care and Education and the 2004 National Survey of Day Care Centers are used for the base data set. To reflect the outcomes after the Basic Subsidy Program, equivalent data sets for households and care providers are constructed by the KDI Data Analysis Unit. Using these nationally representative data sets, information regarding child care is collected. The findings show that the subsidies contribute to the quality of care improving the input variables of quality production. The welfare of teachers is improved, and the child-staff ratio significantly decreases. As a result, the usage of private day care centers greatly increases even though the price level rarely changes. However, mothers' satisfaction with child care are rarely affected by the subsidies. Although the subsidies with no eligibility criteria enlarge the recipients, the actual effects to increase maternal labor supply or to improve satisfaction is limited. Given this findings, I suggest some modifications of subsidies to raise the effectiveness of the subsidy program.
This study analyzed the impact of direct and indirect subsidies on profitability in general hospitals in Korea. The data were collected from medical institution accounting information disclosure system of 270 general hospitals from 2016 to 2018. The analysis index used the ratio of net profit to business revenue for profitability, and Subsidies index the ratio of subsidies to business revenue(state subsidies for facility investment purposes, Fund related to essential business, research revenue and contribution revenue). According to the study, the ratio of state subsidies, which are direct subsidies, was very high at 57.30 percent for public institution hospitals. ratio of Fund related to essential business, which is a tax reduction effect with indirect subsidies, had the highest at 6.69 percent for Private University Hospitals. which are Indirect subsidies for deficit or operational assistance, research revenue ratio had the highest 2.8 percent for National University Hospitals, contribution revenue ratio had the highest 36.4 percent for public institutions. As a result of looking at the impact of subsidies on profitability, Nation University Hospitals had the lower the ratio of Fund related to essential business and the ratio of research revenue, the higher the net profit ratio of Business revenue. Medical Corporation Hospitals and Foundation Hospitals had the higher the ratio of Fund related to essential business to business revenues, the higher the net profit ratio of business revenue. These results mean that profitability may fluctuate depending on the utilization of funds related to essential business.
Journal of agricultural medicine and community health
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v.46
no.4
/
pp.266-279
/
2021
Objectives: The purpose of the study was to classify the health and medical service affairs of local governments, and to analyze the proportions of non-matching fund by local governments and central government subsidies for local government health budget. Methods: First of all, health affairs of local governments were classified to categories based on health-related laws and previous studies by review of the authors. In order to specify the scale of local government-led health affairs, we allocated 1,916 budget units into 6 main and 24 sub categories of the health and medical service affairs of local governments for the 2020 health budget of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province. For each categories, we compared the total amounts and the percentages of the 'central government subsidies', 'local government budget - matching fund', and 'local government budget - non-matching fund'. Results: The total health budget of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province accounts for 1.2% of the total budget. Of the total health budget of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province, the proportion of central government subsidies was 39.6% and the proportions of local government budget-matching fund and non-matching fund were 33.8% and 26.6%, respectively. The proportions of non-matching fund by provincial and basic local governments were 37.3% and 19.9%, respectively. Conclusion: In order for local governments to deal with the health problems of residents, it is necessary to secure and spend more local government budget(i.e., non-matching fund by local government) for health affairs in their administrative jurisdiction.
This study is about effects of government R&D subsidies program participation factor for SMEs R&D performances. Currently, Government R&D subsidies program has been operating in various forms, and each company subsidies, facilities, equipment, personnel and training have been supported. Each of the companies is also involved with various factor of support to participate in the subsides program. Therefore, This study verifies the hypotheses that after government R&D subsidies program of project implementation, various participation factor of companies have an effect positive impact on business management skills of administrative performance. Also, This study verifies the hypothesis of an influence on the R&D investment and the technological capability of technical performance. Through such a analysis results will help to carry out guide for strategic R&D performance management of government R&D subsidies program participation companies.
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