• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.235-251
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• 2004

China's Marine Industry are growing up gradually as China's economy has advanced. Also China's Sipping Industry has been advanced. China Sipping Company is going to become a top 5 of world marine industry. China's Marine Industry has supervised and controled a manager under the mechanism of market economy. China's Marine Industry has been changed from the state-owned marine enterprise affected by government and government has effected on the formation of the board of directors and manager. So, the supervision function of the board of directors was reduced. The executive' role is emphasized when possessing the state-owned enterprise through disposal or auction, or when inducing the participation of foreign attraction. It is desirable for the Chinese director and officer to prepare for the claims internationally due to the international economic actions, , westernization of the public's consciousness about the compensation for damage followed by the increasing national income, and to prepare the increasing demand of cases due to increasing lawyers.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.95-131
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• 2012

This study examines whether the executive turnover and the executive resignation during the term of office affect the performance of Korean state-owned enterprises. The executive turnover in the paper means the comprehensive change of the executives which includes the change after the term of office, the change after consecutive terms and the change during the term of office. The 'resignation' was named for the executive change during the term of office to distinguish from the executive turnover. The study scope of the paper is restrained to the comprehensive executive change itself irrespective of the term of office and the resignation during the term of office. Therefore the natural change of the executive after the term of office or the change after consecutive terms is not included in the study. Spontaneous resignation and forced resignation are not distinguished in the paper as the distinction between the two is not easy. The paper uses both the margin of return on asset and the margin of return on asset adjusted by industry as proxies of the performance of state-owned enterprises. The business nature of state-owned enterprise is considered in the study, the public nature not in it. The paper uses the five year (2004 to 2008) samples of 24 firms designated as public enterprises by Korean government. The analysis results are as follows. First, 45.1% of CEOs were changed a year during the sample period on the average. The average tenure period of CEOs was 2 years and 3 months and 49.9% among the changed CEOs resigned during the term of office. 41.6% of internal auditors were changed a year on the average. The average tenure period of internal auditors was 2 years and 2 months and 51.0% among the changed internal auditors resigned during the term of office. In case of outside directors, on average, 38.2% were changed a year. The average tenure period was 2 years and 7 months and 25.4% among the changed internal directors resigned during the term of office. These statistics show that numerous CEOs resigned before the finish of the three year term in office. Also, considering the tenure of an internal auditor and an outside director which diminished from 3 years to 2 years by an Act on the Management of Public Institutions (applied to the executives appointed since April 2007), it seems most internal auditors resigned during the term of office but most outside directors resigned after the end of the term. Secondly, There was no evidence that the executives were changed during the term of office because of the bad performance of prior year. On the other hand, contrary to the normal expectation, the performance of prior year of the state-owned enterprise where an outside director resigned during the term of office was significantly higher than that of other state-owned enterprises. It means that the clauses in related laws on the executive dismissal on grounds of bad performance did not work normally. Instead it can be said that the executive change was made by non-economic reasons such as a political motivation. Thirdly, the results from a fixed effect model show there were evidences that performance turned negatively when CEOs or outside directors resigned during the term of office. CEO's resignation during the term of office gave a significantly negative effect on the margin of return on asset. Outside director's resignation during the term of office lowered significantly the margin of return on asset adjusted by industry. These results suggest that the executive's change in Korean state-owned enterprises was not made by objective or economic standards such as management performance assessment and the negative effect on performance of the enterprises was had by the unfaithful obeyance of the legal executive term.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.1-39
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• 2013

Considering the relationship between state-owned enterprise (SOE) CEOs and political circles, this study examines the performance impacts of CEO's succession type, board chair separation, and industry expertise and finance expertise of CEOs and outside directors. I propose the definition of political independence in SOE CEOs based on the independence in appearance that might affect general people's perception. It means that there are no relationships or circumstances that might affect SOE CEO's judgment, activity, and report. The definition is able to overcome the limitations of the prior research that could not discover the CEOs who were affiliated to political circles because the research just distinguished the CEOs following their pre-jobs. This study focused on the performance impacts of political independence impaired CEO as well as the CEO's impacts on the relationship between the performance and other corporate governance variables. I selected as dependent variables the average return on asset as operating income divided by total assets and the average customer satisfaction rate evaluated by Korean government during the first three years following the year of the events of explanatory variables. My theory and evidence from the various CEO's personal background and financial information from SOEs in Lee Myung-bak Administration and Rho Moo-hyun Administration suggest the following important things. First, the analysis based on whether or not a SOE CEO keeps political independence shows that a political independence impaired CEO made a significantly negative impact on customer satisfaction rate. Second, the separation between a board chair and a CEO in SOEs introduced by Korean Act on Management of Public Institutions made a significantly positive impact on customer satisfaction rate. However, the positive impact of the board chair separation was removed in a political independence impaired CEO's SOE. Third, outside director's industry expertise made a significantly positive impact on return on asset. However, the positive impact of the outside director's industry expertise was removed in a political independence impaired CEO's SOE. Fourth, the comparison between Lee Myung-bak Administration and Roh Moo-hyun Administration on the corporate governance and performance of SOEs shows that the ratio of political independence impaired CEO was significantly higher in Lee Administration and the ratio of outside director's industry expertise and finance expertise were respectively significantly higher in Roh Administration. Based on these results, I suggested a few policy alternatives for CEO's improved political independence and requirements for executive's expertise in SOEs.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.71-103
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• 2009

Considering the expenditure size of public institutions centering on public enterprises, about 28% of Korea's GDP in 2007, public institutions have significant influence on the Korean economy. However, still in the new government, there are voices of criticism about the need of constant reform on public enterprises due to their irresponsible management impeding national competitiveness. Especially, political controversy over appointment of executives such as CEOs of public enterprises has caused the distrust of the people. As one of various reform measures for public enterprises, this study analyzes the effect of internal governance structure of public enterprises on their managerial performance, since, regardless of privatization of public enterprises, improving the governance structure of public enterprises is a matter of great importance. There are only a few prior researches focusing on the governance structure and managerial performance of public enterprises compared to those of private enterprises. Most of prior researches studied the relationship between parachuting employment of CEO and managerial performance, and concluded that parachuting produces negative effect on managerial performance. However, different from the results of such researches, recent studies suggest that there is no relationship between employment type of CEOs and managerial performance in public enterprises. This study is distinguished from prior researches in view of following. First, prior researches focused on the relationship between employment type of public enterprises' CEOs and managerial performance. However, in addition to this, this study analyzes the relationship of internal auditors and managerial performance. Second, unlike prior researches studying the relationship between employment type of public corporations' CEOs and managerial performance with an emphasis on parachuting employment, this study researches impact of employment type as well as expertise of CEOs and internal auditors on managerial performance. Third, prior researchers mainly used non-financial indicators from various samples. However, this study eliminated subjectivity of researchers by analyzing public enterprises designated by the government and their financial statements, which were externally audited and inspected. In this study, regression analysis is applied in analyzing the relationship of independence and expertise of public enterprises' CEOs and internal auditors and managerial performance in the same year. Financial information from 2003 to 2007 of 24 public enterprises, which are designated by the government, and their personnel information from the board of directors are used as samples. Independence of CEOs is identified by dividing CEOs into persons from the same public enterprise and persons from other organization, and independence of internal auditors is determined by classifying them into two groups, people from academic field, economic world, and civic groups, and people from political community, government ministries, and military. Also, expertise of CEOs and internal auditors is divided into business expertise and financial expertise. As control variables, this study applied foundation year, asset size, government subsidies as a proportion to corporate earnings, and dummy variables by year. Analysis showed that there is significantly positive relationship between independence and financial expertise of internal auditors and managerial performance. In addition, although business expertise and financial expertise of CEOs were not statistically significant, they have positive relationship with managerial performance. However, unlike a general idea, independence of CEOs is not statistically significant, but it is negatively related to managerial performance. Contrary to general concerns, it seems that the impact of independence of public enterprises' CEOs on managerial performance has slightly decreased. Instead, it explains that expertise of public enterprises' CEOs and internal auditors plays more important role in managerial performance rather than their independence. Meanwhile, there are limitations in this study as follows. First, in contrast to private enterprises, public enterprises simultaneously pursue publicness and entrepreneurship. However, this study focuses on entrepreneurship, excluding considerations on publicness of public enterprises. Second, public enterprises in this study are limited to those in the central government. Accordingly, it should be carefully considered when the result of this study is applied to public enterprises in local governments. Finally, this study excludes factors related to transparency and democracy issues which are raised in appointment process of executives of public enterprises, as it may cause the issue of subjectivity of researchers.