본고(本稿)서는, 최근 자유금융학파(自由金融學派)와 신화폐경제학과(新貨幣經濟學科)들의 등장으로 화폐(貨幣) 금융문제(金融問題)에서의 자유경쟁(自由競爭) 및 자유방임주의적(自由放任主義的) 사고가 새롭게 확산되고 있는 시점(時點)에서, 정부(政府) 및 중앙은행(中央銀行)의 화폐(貨幣) 금융개입(金融介入)의 이론적(理論的) 근거(根據)와 그에 관련된 논쟁(論爭)을 다음의 6가지 논거(論據)들을 중심으로 개관해 보았다 : (1) 자유금융하(自由金融下)의 銀行券(은행권) 초과발행(超過發行) 가능성(可能性), (2) 화폐사용에 있어서의 외부경제효과(外部經濟效果)와 화폐제도의 공공재적(公共財的) 성격(性格) (3) 화폐발행업무의 규모(規模)의 경제(經濟)와 자연독점적(自然獨占的) 성격(性格), (4) 실물부문(實物部門)의 불안정성(不安定性)과 거시안정화정책(巨視安定化政策)의 필요성, (5) 은행금융시장(銀行金融市場)의 불안정성(不安定性)과 은행파산(銀行破産)의 외부효과(外部效果), (6) 소액거래자(少額去來者) 및 예금자(預金者)의 보호(保護) 이러한 논거들에 의하면 외부화폐(外部貨幣)(outside money)의 공급은 전형적인 공공재이론(公共財理論)이나 기술적(技術的) 독점주장(獨占主張)이 적용되는 경우이기 때문에 외부화폐제도(外部貨幣制度)의 유지에 있어서 정부(政附)나 중앙은행(中央銀行) 독점(獨占) 및 개입(介入)이 불가피하고 또한 바람직하지만, 내부화폐(內部貨幣)(inside money)제도(制度)의 경우는 적절한 최소한의 안전장치만 강구된다면 최근의 자유금융학파(自由金融學派) 및 신화폐경제학과(新貨幣經濟學科)들의 주장과 같이 사적(私的) 자유경쟁(自由競爭)이 보다 활성화되도록 하는 것이 바람직할 것으로 판단된다 . 한편 외부화폐제도(外部貨幣制度)에의 개입(介入)에 따른 (정부(政府) 및) 중앙은행(中央銀行)의 거시통화정책기능(巨視通貨政策機能)은 물론, 보다 자유화(自由化)된 내부화폐제도하(內部貨幣制度下)에서도 중앙은행(中央銀行)의 최종대여자기능(最終貸與者機能)과 미시적(微視的) 감독기능(監督機能)은 동(同) 제도(制度)의 안전성(安全性)을 유지하기 위해 중요한 역할을 할 것으로 보인다.
토지국유원칙(土地國有原則)을 표방(標榜)하고 "공사(公私) 공리(共利)"를 기본원칙(基本原則)으로 하고 있었던 고려조(高麗朝)의 시전과제도(柴田科制度)도 집권력(執權力)의 약화(弱化)로 인(因)하여 조만간(早晩間), 붕괴(崩壞)되고 말았던 것이나 임지제도(林地制度)에 있어서는 분묘설정(墳墓設定)의 자유(自由)와 개간장려(開墾奬勵)를 이용(利用)한 삼림(森林)의 광점(廣占) 및 전시과제도(田柴科制度)로 인(因)한 시지(柴地)의 수조권위양(收租權委讓)으로 유래(由來)된 사적수조권(私的洙組權)이 결부(結付)된 삼림(森林)의 사점현상등(私占現象等)이 점차(漸次) 발전(發展)하여 고려중기(高麗中期)의 국정해지기이후(國政解地期以後)에는 대부분(大部分)의 삼림(森林)이 권력층(權力層)의 사점지(私占地)로 화(化)하여 왔었다. 고려조(高麗朝)의 모든 제도(制度)를 그대로 계승(繼承)한 이조(李朝)는 건국후(建國後) 국가소용(國家所用)의 삼림확보(森林確保)를 위(爲)한 삼림수용(森林收用)의 제도확립(制度確立)이 긴요(緊要)하였음으로 전국(全國)의 삼림(森林)을 국가권력(國家權力)에 의(依)하여 공수(公收)하고 국가(國家)와 궁실소용이외(宮室所用以外)의 모든 삼림(森林)은 사점(私占)을 금(禁)한다는 "시장사점금지(柴場私占禁止)"의 제도(制度)를 법제화(法制化)하였고 도성주변(都城周邊)의 사산(四山)을 금산(禁山)으로 함과 아울러 우량(優良)한 임상(林相)의 천연림(天然林)을 택(擇)하여 전조선용재(戰漕船用材)와 궁실용재(宮室用材)의 확보(確保)를 위(爲)한 외방금산(外方禁山)으로 정(定)하고 그 금양(禁養)을 위(爲)하여 산직(山直)을 배치(配置)하였다. 그리고 연병(練兵)과 국왕(國王)의 수렵(狩獵)을 위(爲)한 강무장(講武場)과 관용시장(官用柴場), 능원부속림(陵園附屬林)의 금벌(禁伐), 금화(禁火)를 제정(制定) 등(等) 필요(必要)에 따라 수시(隨時)로 삼림(森林)을 수용(收用)하였으나 고려조이래(高麗朝以來)로 권력층(權力層)에 의(依)하여 사점(私占)되어온 삼림(森林)을 왕권(王權)으로 모두 공수(公收)하지는 못하였던 것이다. 이조초기(李朝初期)에 있어서의 집권층(執權層)은 그 대부분(大部分)이 고려조(高麗朝)에서의 권력층(權力層)이었던것 임으로 그들은 이미 전조시대(前朝時代)로부터 많은 사점림(私占林)을 보유(保有)하고 있었던 것이고 따라서 그들이 권력(權力)을 장악(掌握)하고 있는 한(限) 사점림(私占林)을 공수(公收)한다는 것은 어려운 일이었으며 그들은 오히려 권력(權力)을 이용(利用)하여 사점림(私占林)을 확대(擴大)하고 있었던 것이다. 또 왕자(王子)들도 묘지(墓地)를 빙자(憑藉)하여 주(主)로 도성주변(都城周邊)의 삼림(森林)을 광점(廣占)하고 있던 터에 성종(成宗)의 대(代) 이후(以後)로는 왕자신(王自身)이 금령(禁令)을 어기면서 왕자(王子)에게 삼림(森林)을 사급(賜給)하였음으로 16세기말(世紀末)에는 원도지방(遠道地方)에 까지 왕자(王子)들의 삼림사점(森林私占)이 확대(擴大)되었고 이에 편승(便乘)한 권신(權臣)들의 삼림사점(森林私占)도 전국(全國)으로 파급(波及)하였다. 임진왜란후(壬辰倭亂後)에 시작(始作)된 왕자(王子)에 대(對)한 시장절급(柴場折給)은 삼림(森林)의 상속(相續)과 매매(賣買)를 합법화(合法化)시켰고 이로 인(因)하여 봉건제하(封建制下)에서의 사유림(私有林)을 발생(發生)시키게 된 것이다. 그리하여 권신(權臣)들도 합법적(合法的)으로 삼림(森林)을 사점(私占)하게 되었고 따라서 이조시대(李朝時代) 임지제도(林地制度)의 기본(基本)이었던 시장사점금지(柴場私占禁止)의 제도(制度)는 건국초(建國初)로부터 실행(實行)된 일이 없었으며 오로지 국가(國家)의 삼림수용(森林收用)을 합법화(合法化)시키는 의제(擬制)에 불과(不過)하였던 것이다. 금산(禁山)은 그 이용(利用)과 관리제도(管理制度)의 불비(不備)로 인(因)하여 산하주민(山下住民)들의 염오(厭惡)의 대상(對象)이 되었음으로 주민(住民)들의 고의적(故意的)인 금산(禁山)의 파괴(破壞)는 처음부터 심(甚)하였고 이로 인(因)하여 국가(國家)에서는 용재림확보(用材林確保)를 위(爲)한 금산(禁山)의 증설(增設)을 거듭하였으나 관리제도(管理制度)의 개선(改善)이 수반(隨伴)되지 않았음으로 금산(禁山)의 황폐(荒廢)는 더욱 증대(增大)되었다. 영조(英祖)는 정국(政局)을 안정(安定)시키기 위(爲)하여 경국대전이후(經國大典以後) 남발(濫發)된 교령(敎令)과 법령(法令)을 정비(整備)하여 속대전(續大典)을 편찬(編纂)하고 삼림법령(森林法令)을 정비(整備)하여 도성주변(都城周邊)의 금산(禁山)과 각도(各道) 금산(禁山)의 명칭대신(名稱代身) 서기(西紀) 1699년(年) 이후(以後) 개칭(改稱)하여온 봉산(封山)의 금양(禁養)을 강화(强化)시키는 한편 사양산(私養山)의 권한(權限)을 인정(認定)하는 등(等) 적극적(積極的)인 육림정책(育林政策)을 퍼려하였으나 계속적(繼續的)인 권력층(權力層)의 삼림사점광대(森林私占廣大)는 농민(農民)들로부터 삼림(森林)을 탈취(奪取)하였고 농민(農民)들 이 삼림(森林)을 상실(喪失)함으로써 국가(國家)의 육림장려등(育林奬勵策)은 효과(効果)를 나타내지 못하였던 것이다. 임진왜란후(壬辰倭亂後)의 국정해이(國定解弛)로 인(因)한 묘지광점(墓地廣占), 왕자(王子)에 대(對)한 삼림(森林)의 절급(折給) 권세층(權勢層)에 대(對)한 산림사점(森林私占)은 인허(認許)하는 입안문서(立案文書)의 발행등(發行等)으로 법전상(法典上)의 삼임사점금지조항(森林私占禁止條項)은 사문화(死文化)되었고 이조말기(李朝末期)에 있어서는 사양산(私養山)의 강탈(强奪)도 빈발(頻發)하고 있음을 볼수 있다. 이와 같이 이조시대(李朝時代)의 시장사점금지조항(柴場私占禁止條項)은 오로지 농민(農民)에게만 적용(適用)되는 규정(規定)에 불과(不過)하였고 이로 인(因)하여 농민(農民)들의 육림의욕(育林意慾)은 상실(喪失)되었으며 약탈적(掠奪的)인 삼림(森林)의 채취이용(採取利用)은은 금산(禁山), 봉산(封山) 및 사양산(私養山)을 막론(莫論)하고 황폐(荒廢)시키는 결과(結果)를 자아냈으며 권력층(權力層)의 삼림점탈(森林占奪)에 대항(對抗)한 송계(松契)의 활동(活動)으로 일부(一部) 공산(公山)이 농민(農民)의 입회지(入會地)로서 보존(保存)되어왔다. 그럼에도 불구(不拘)하고 일제(日帝)는 이조말기(李朝末期)의 삼림(森林) 거의 무주공산(無主公山)이 었던것처럼, 이미 사문화(死文化)된 삼림사점금지조항(森林私占禁止條項)을 활용(活用)함으로써, 국가림(國有林)으로 수탈(收奪)한후(後) 식민정책(植民政策)에 이용(利用)하였던 것이나, 실제(實際)에 있어서 이조시대(李朝時代)의 삼림(森林)은 금산(禁山), 봉산(封山), 능원부속림등(陸園附屬林等)의 관금지(官禁地)와 오지름(奧地林)을 제외(除外)하고는 대부분(大部分)의 임지(林地)가 권세층(權勢層)의 사유(私有) 내지(乃至)는 사점하(私占下)에 있었던 것이다.
Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.