• ETRI Journal
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• v.32 no.4
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• pp.512-519
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• 2010

A cooperative model is presented to enable sharing of the spectrum with secondary users. Compared with the optimal model and competitive model, the cooperative model could reach the maximum total profit for secondary users with better fairness. The cooperative model is built based on the Nash equilibrium. Then a conceding factor is introduced so that the total spectrum required from secondary users will decrease. It also results in a decrease in cost which the primary user charges to the secondary users. The optimum solution, which is the maximum total profit for the secondary users, is called the collusion state. It is possible that secondary users may leave the collusion state to pursue the maximum of individual profit. The stability of the algorithm is discussed by introducing a vindictive factor to inhabit the motive of deviation. In practice, the number of secondary users may change. Adaptive methods have been used to deal with the changing number of secondary users. Both the total profit and fairness are considered in the spectrum allocating. The shared spectrum is 11.3893 with a total profit of 65.2378 in the competitive model. In the cooperative model, the shared spectrum is 8.5856 with the total profit of 73.4963. The numerical results reveal the effectiveness of the cooperative model.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.14 no.9
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• pp.21-30
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• 2023

Purpose: Focusing on the role of the special contract to collaborate the supply chain operations, this study investigates how the revenue sharing contract affects the performance of Vendor Managed Inventory (VMI). Research design, data, and methodology: The optimization model is formulated to represent two stage supply chain system where the supplier and retailer manage the operations to maximize their own profits. Three supply chain models including the traditional system, VMI, and VMI with revenue sharing contract are compared in the numerical examples. Results: According to the numerical analysis, the entire supply chain system has greater profit under VMI than the traditional system, while VMI alone sacrifices the supplier's profit. With the proper sets of revenue share ratio and wholesale price discount rate, VMI with revenue sharing contract results in the increased profit for both supplier and retailer compared with VMI alone as well as the traditional system. Conclusions: The numerical examples imply that VMI, when it is combined with the revenue sharing contract, can be the effective collaboration program that satisfies every supply chain member. To make VMI with revenue sharing contract to be fair to all supply chain members, they need to agree on the appropriate contract content.

• Journal of Korean Society for Quality Management
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• v.46 no.4
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• pp.959-972
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• 2018

Purpose: This study developed a simulation model that incorporates the uncertainty of demand and yield to obtain optimized results for supply chain coordination within environmental constraints. The objective of this study is to examine whether yield management for perishable products can achieve the goal of supply chain coordination between a single buyer and a single supplier under a variety of environmental conditions. Methods: We investigated the efficiency of a revenue-sharing contract and a wholesale price contract by considering demand and yield uncertainty, profit maximizing ratio, and success ratio. The implications for environmental variation were derived through a comparative analysis between the wholesale price contract and the revenue-sharing contract. We performed Monte Carlo simulations to give us the results of an optimized supply chain within the environments defined by the experimental factors and parameters. Results: We found that a revised revenue-sharing contracting model was more efficient than the wholesale price contract model and allowed all members of the supply chain to achieve higher profits. First, as the demand variation (${\sigma}$) increased, the profit of the total supply chain increased. Second, as the revenue-sharing ratio (${\Phi}$) increased, the profits of the manufacturer gradually decreased, while the profits of the retailer gradually increased, and this change was linear. Third, as the quality of yield increased, the profits of suppliers appear to increased. At last, success rate was expressed as the profit increased in the revenue-sharing contract compared to the profit increase in the wholesale price contract. Conclusion: The managerial implications of the simulation findings are: (1) a strategic approach to demand and yield uncertainty helps in efficient resource utilization and improved supply chain performance, (2) a revenue-sharing contract amplifies the effect of yield uncertainty, and (3) revised revenue-sharing contracts fetch more profits for both buyers and suppliers in the supply chain.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.177-196
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• 2008

The megatrend of convergence in finance, telecommunication, and service industries is being spread over the whole industry. It has generated various kinds of contractual alliance or joint venture. Our paper builds a theoretical model for the profit sharing between two firms that participate in a joint venture. The model shows how the profit sharing rule affects the incentives of the participants, and, eventually, the efficiency. We derive the first-best solution of the profit sharing, where no incentive distortion exists. Then, we compare the incentive-affecting cases with the first best outcome, and assess the efficiency and the fairness of distribution. Our analysis shows that if we properly design the decision-making structure on transfer price and production quantity, we can reach the socially optimal efficiency.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.115-147
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• 2003

This paper scrutinizes the robustness of the profit-sharing findings first employing an original panel data on the Employee Welfare Fund over the period from 1992 to 2000. In examining the effects of profit-sharing schemes on labor productivity, it controls for simultaneity among profit-sharing, production factors, and productivity using both the two-stage least squares procedure and the lagged variable method. The empirical results show that an increase in firm's contribution to the Employee Welfare Fund is associated with capital-embodied and disembodied productivity enhancement, which is both statistically and economically highly significant. The empirical results are in contrast with predictions of both agency and transaction cost theories, and they imply that more tax benefits and financial incentives for expansion of the Employee Welfare Fund should be required to get productivity gains.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.1-13
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• 2009

This paper presents a coordinated planning model of price-dependent demand for a single-manufacturer and a single-retailer. The demand is assumed to be normally distributed, with its mean being price dependent. The manufacturer and retailer coordinate with each other to jointly and simultaneously determine the retail selling price and the retailer order quantity to maximize the joint expected total profit. This model is then compared to a 'returns' policy model where manufacturer buys back unsold items from the retailers. It is shown that the optimal total profit is higher for coordinated planning model than that for the returns policy model, in which the retail price is set by the retailer. A compensation or profit sharing scheme is then suggested and it is shown that the coordinated model with profit sharing yields a 'win-win' situation. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the profit patterns for both linear and nonlinear demand functions. The coordinated planning model, in addition, has a lower optimal price than for a returns policy model, which would result in higher sales, thus expanding the markets for the whole supply chain.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.42 no.4
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• pp.106-115
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• 2019

A sharing economy has emerged through today's trust-building mechanisms, and a sharing economy is called a future economic model through a positive future market prospect. In this context, while the overseas sharing economic business is becoming a global trend, the domestic sharing economic business is busy following the global trend. The purpose of this study is to investigate the development direction of sharing economic business in Korea. First, the sharing economic cases of 50 oversea and domestic businesses were analyzed by time series analysis. Next, a cross-country analysis to analyze the business distribution and KCERN's sharing economic model through sharing economic cube model was conducted. Finally, profit model analysis through business case study and the relationship between the derived factors were investigated. As a result of the analysis, this study found comparative trends between overseas and domestic including differences in cultural and institutional environments and profit models. This study suggested directions for domestic sharing economy business.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.73-82
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• 2006

Supply chain management (SCM) has been regarded as one of the most critical issues in the current business environment. Moreover, supply chain partnerships between suppliers and buyers in SCM have had a significant impact on supply chain performance. In this paper, we conduct a quantitative analysis for supplier-buyer's profit sharing and pricing policies based on supply chain partnerships. For this purpose, we assume that a two echelon supply chain with a single supplier and a single buyer is given and the buyer faces deterministic demand which is not only a function of buyer's selling price, but also strictly decreasing, concave, and twice differentiable function. Then we will prove the following. Firstly, without supply chain partnerships, there exist supplier and buyer's selling prices per unit such that their total profits are maximized, under the assumption that buyer's order quantity is exactly equal to the demand buyer faced. Secondly, buyer's selling price per unit which maximizes supply chain's total profit with supply chain partnerships is lower than buyer's selling price per unit which maximizes buyer's total profit without supply chain partnerships. Thirdly, given supplier's selling price per unit. buyer's total profit without supply chain part nerships is greater than that with supply chain partnerships, whereas the opposite case happens for supplier's total profit. Finally, there exists supplier's selling price per unit which makes the maximum total profits for both supplier and buyer with supply chain partnerships greater than those obtained for any given supplier's selling price per unit without supply chain partnerships.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.320-329
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• 2010

As software producers have tried to keep their profit against illegal piracy, contents producers also want to protect their contents from unlawful sharing among users. Some researchers uncovered that the regulation on the unlicensed contents is not the best policy to maximize their profit mainly due to network effect but this issue has been still controversial. In this paper, we develop a model to investigate the effect of regulation against unlicensed contents sharing on the profit of contents producers and present the optimal condition to maximize profit of contents producers under the regulation and non-regulation of unlicensed contents. As a result, we analyzed that the firm's payoff under the regulation on unlicensed contents is not always greater than the payoff under the non-regulation because of network externality. If the additional utility from off-line purchase of type P consumers (who enjoy the additional benefit of off-line purchase) is large enough, then the firm's payoff is maximized without regulation.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.14 no.12
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• pp.1549-1558
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• 2011

In this paper, we address the problem of bandwidth sharing among multiple primary users and multiple secondary users in a cognitive radio network. In cognitive radio networks, effective spectrum assignment for primary and secondary users is a challenge due to the available broad range of radio frequency spectrum as well as the requisition of harmonious coexistence of both users. To handle this problem, firstly, Bertrand game model is used to analyze a spectrum pricing in which multiple primary users emulate with each other to acquire maximal profit. After that, we employ Cournot game to model the spectrum sharing of secondary users to obtain optimal profit for each user also. Simulation results show that our scheme obtains optimal solution at Nash equilibrium.