• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.75-94
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• 2009

The process of obtaining third-party financing contacts was analyzed via a two-stage game model: a "signaling game" for the first stage,and a "principal-agent model" for the second stage. The two-stage game was solved by a process of backward induction. In the second stage game, the optimal effort level of the energy saving company (ESCO), the optimal compensation scheme of the energy user, and the optimal payoffs for both parties were derived for each subgame. The optimal solutions forthe different subgames were then compared with each other. Our main finding was that if there is some restriction on ESCO's revenue (e.g. a progressive sales tax) that causes ESCO's revenue toincrease at a decreasing rate, then the optimal sharing ratio is uniquely determined at a level of strictly less than one under a linear compensation scheme, i.e. a unique balance exists. Subgames have a unique equilibrium arrived at separately for each situation,. Within this equilibrium, energy users accept energy audit proposals from H-type ESCOs with high levels of technology, but reject proposals from L-type ESCOs with low levels of technology. While L-type ESCOs cannot attain profits in the third-party financing market, H-type ESCOS can pocket the price differential between L-type and H-type audit fees. Accordingly, revenues in an H-type ESCO equilibrium increase not only in line with the technology of the ESCO inquestion, but also faster than in an L-type equilibrium due to more advanced technology. At the same time, energy users receive some positive payoff by allowing ESCOs to perform third-party financing tasks within their existing energy system without incurring any extra costs.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.12 no.20
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• pp.123-138
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• 1989

The primary objective of the agency research in the game theory lives in the maintenance of Pareto is optimal condition for the optimal incentive contract. The basic concepts which are related to this objective are reviewed in connection with the general assumptions to model it, the moral hazard and adverse selection which arised from the information asymmetry, and finally the problem of risk distribution. The demand for auditing and the role of auditor have been addressed by ASOBAC. Issues which an auditor is explicitly introduced in a principal-agent framework have been addressed in this paper. These issues must be confronted to appropriately with the auditor, and to achieve an adequate understanding of optimal confronting arrangement with the auditor. The first step in introducing an auditor into this analysis is to examine the game-theoretic foundation of such a expended agency model. The Mathematical program formulated may not yield solution that are resonable. This arises because the program may call for the auditor and manager to play dominated Nash equilibra in some subgame. The nontrivial natures of the subgame implies that randomized strategies by the auditor and manager nay be of crucial importance. The possibilities for overcoming the randomized strategy problem were suggested; change the rule of the game and or impose covexity condition. The former seems unjustifiable in on auditing context, and the latter promising but difficult to achieve. The discussion ended with an extension of the revelation principle to the owner manager-auditor game, assuming strategies. An examination of the restriction and improvement direction of the basic concept of agency theory was addressed in the later part of this paper. Many important aspects of auditor incentives are inherently multiple-agent, multiple-period, multiple-objectine, phenomena and require further analyses and researches.

• Journal of Convergence for Information Technology
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.93-98
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• 2017

To recover the capital market's confidence, interest in accounting ethics education has increased recently. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a simple classroom games for moral hazard problem and to analyze the results. This case study introduces the classroom games in which well-known experiment of principal-agent dilemma in experimental economics implemented accounting ethics education. This paper suggests that game lesson is effective and efficient way to understanding moral hazard problem. During the games, cause and effect of players' decision making react upon each other. This paper contributes to generating further discussion on accounting ethics education and providing practical implication.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.25 no.4
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• pp.763-783
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• 2015

Online customer reviews (i.e., electronic word-of-mouth) has gained considerable interest over the past years. However, a knowledge gap exists in explaining the mechanisms among the factors that determine the product sales in online retailing environment. To fill the gap, this study adopts a principal-agent perspective to investigate the effect of customer reviews and customer incentives on product sales in online retail stores. Two customer review factors (i.e., average review ratings and the number of reviews) and two customer incentive factors (i.e., price discounts and special shipping offers) are used to predict product sales in regression analysis. The sales ranking data collected from the video game titles at Amazon.com are used to analyze the direct effects of the four factors and the interaction effects between customer review and customer incentive factors to product sales. Result reveals that most relationships exist as hypothesized. The findings support both the direct and interaction effects of customer reviews and incentive factors on product sales. Based on the findings, discussions are provided with regard to the academic and practical contributions.