• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.19-30
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• 2016

This study provides a framework to assess network design under the regime of QoE (Quality of Experience). Our approach is expected to reveal the necessity of developing the QoE measures and applying this notion to network design, particularly in the mobile environment. Furthermore, our model shows the ample potential that both users and network providers are able to attain a win-win case by shifting the focus on network design and service operations from QoS (Quality of Service) to QoE. Since the former considers only relevant technological specifications, it may fail in capturing critical factors surrounding users, such as a context where the corresponding user is working on. For example, according to one study [13], the bit-rate, a widely employed QoS measure, shows inferior performance in provisioning network resources to the MOS (Mean Opinion Score), a representative QoE measure. Our framework develops the idea and construct a prototype to systematically assess network design and operations in terms of QoE. The proposed prototype aims at achieving a higher level of efficiency without severely deteriorating users' satisfaction level. We also provide some simulation results which support our idea. That is, reducing the chance of over-provisioning on the basis of the QoE paradigm results in a great flexibility. It may give price cut for users or postponement of network investment for providers or both. Our simulation results also seem robust irrespective of the forms of the QoS-QoE relationship.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.1
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• pp.125-146
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• 1989

This paper is examine the problems of U.S.-Korea Air Service Agreement and recommend some directions for its improvement under the rapidly changing circumstance and growing importance of Korean penisula. Since the provisional agreement of 1949, U.S. -Korea Air Service Agreement has consistently been favorable to U.S. side. Fair and equal opportunity is the principle and basis of the bilateral air agreement. Notwithstanding such principle, it is only the U.S. carriers who can freely enter into any market, under the discretion of business strategy, while Korean carrier can serve only three points including Honolulu. In an effort to recitify such serious imbalance, Korea continuousely requested additional rights and has given utmost efforts to accommodate requests made by U.S. carries without much success. When we review aviation market between Korea and U.S. under the present agreement, Korea is fully open to U.S. carries as they can connect from any or all points in the U.S. via any or all points in Korea and all points beyond Korea. Increased number of U.S. carriers are enjoying greater utilization of the opportunity accorded them. Four(4) U.S. carries now operate to Korea using thirteen(13) gateway points and about one hundred fifty(150) on-line points in the U.S. such imbalance can be well understood when we review the exchange of traffic rights between the U.S. and the Pacific rim countries. During the yeras following the 1978 agreement with Korea, the U.S. proceeded to sign liberal agreements with Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore and the Phillipines. In exchange, the U.S. granted the four Pacific rim countries substantially greater rights than were granted to Korea, although Korea was the first Asian nation to sign a pro-competitive aviation agreement which granted U.S. carriers unrestricted market access and pricing flexibility. Moreover, Korea ranks the 2nd trading and tourist partner to the U.S. among the Pacific rim countries (Japan is the largest partner to the U.S. in terms of both trade and tourist market). In this paper such problems in the Korea-U.S. Air Services Agreement are analyzed in terms of historical perspective, U.S. Aviation policy, imbalance status in detail cases, discrimination to Korea comparing to other Asian countries, and theoretical application. And further it discusses current aviation issues between Korea and U.S. such as the ratification of 1980 MOU and various doing business issues of U.S. carriers in Korea. Finally, this paper concludes the analysis and suggests some directions to improve and rectify the problems and imbalance of U.S.-Korea Air Services Agreement in question.