• Journal of English Language & Literature
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• v.56 no.1
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• pp.47-64
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• 2010

It is unfair that environmental pragmatism has been regarded as a mouthpiece for industrial expediency and business boosterism. John Dewey's radical pragmatism known as 'Instrumentalism' has provoked ecological fundamentalists' criticism more vehemently than any other pragmatic philosophies. However, most of the presumptive misunderstandings of such critics as Holmes Rolston, J. Baird Calliott, Erich Katz, C. A. Bowers and many others come from their limited or reduced reading of Deweyan pragmatism. The following three aspects of Deweyan pragmatism can work out in opening up a dialogical space with those eco-centrist thinkers mentioned above. First, the concept of Dewey's 'primary experience' can articulate the foundationalist view of nature, which is often found in aboriginal cultures. Second, as Andrew Light points out, ecological essentialism can share its metaphilosophical position with the pragmatist epistemology. While Anthony Weston pursues pluralism, admitting that the foundationalism might be one of the efficient approaches to nature, Eric Katz is also clearly attracted to the metaphilosophical element in Weston's argument that anyone who attempts to claim the 'inherent value' of non-human nature never possibly avoids a pitfall of anthropomorphism. Lastly, in a more comprehensive perspective, Dewey's pragmatism shows a philosophical complexity, what Larry A. Hickman calls 'post-postmodernism.' a dynamic interaction between modernism and postmodernism. Significantly enough, the environmental version of this complexity can procure a meeting ground between foundationalist ecology and the pragmatic view of nature.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.22 no.8
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• pp.285-291
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• 2022

The current paper discusses the two most widespread and contradictory educational philosophies of classic German Idealism and modern American pragmatism. Their perspectives of what is truth and what is the best way to distinguish the reasoning idealists from the experienced pragmatists. The implementations of Idealism and pragmatism have affected the education process for several ages and reflect various social changes. The role of schools, educators, environment, teachers, and learners are not the same in both philosophies. However, on reviewing the chronological transmission from Plato's Idealism to Dewey's pragmatism, the resemblances and differences are elaborated here with examples. Furthermore, how these philosophies helped founding advocators for perennialism, essentialism, progressivism, and reconstructionism.

• Journal of English Language & Literature
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• v.58 no.2
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• pp.217-247
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• 2012

This essay attempts to read Melville's Moby-Dick as a prefiguration of American pragmatism, especially Jamesian version of it. Underlying this project is the assumption that the American Romance and James's pragmatism partake in the enduring tradition of American thoughts and imagination. Despite the commonality in their roots, the continuity between these two products of American culture has received few critical assessments. The American Romance has rarely been discussed in terms of American pragmatism in part because critics have tended to narrowly define the latter as a kind of relativistic philosophy equivalent to practical instrumentalism, political realism and romantic utilitarianism. Consequently, they have favored literary works in the realistic tradition for their textual analyses, while eschewing a more imaginative genre like the American Romance. My contention is that James's version of pragmatism is a future oriented pluralism which is unable to dispense with the power of imagination and the talent for seeing unforeseen possibilities inherent in nature and culture. James's pragmatism is in tune with the American Romance in that it savours the attractions of alternative possibilities created by the genre in which the imaginary world is imbued with the actual one. The pragmatic impulse in Moby-Dick finds its finest expression in the words and acts of Ishmael. Through this protean narrator, Melville renders the text of Moby-Dick symbolic, fragmentary and thereby pluralistic in its meaning. With his rhetoric of incompletion and by refraining from totalizing what he experiences, Ishmael shuns finality in truth and entices the reader to join his intellectual journey with a non-foundational notion of truth and meaning in view. Ishmael also envisages pragmatists' beliefs that experience is fluid in nature and the universe is in a constant state of becoming. Yet Ishmael as the narrator of Moby-Dick is more functional than foundational.

• Proceedings of the Korea Society of Design Studies Conference
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• 2003.11a
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• pp.8-9
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• 2003

• Journal of the Korean Society of Costume
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• v.38
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• pp.337-358
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• 1998

Underlying principles on the origin and establishment of the concept fo Right-and-Left (R-&-L) in Korean traditional costume is studied in this paper. Among Korean traditional costumes, ordinary and funeral costumes are considered in this study. Thed concept of R-&-L expanded into different elements of daily life among Korean people is also considered as a process of conceptual development : starting from astron-omy principle, then developed to pragmatism principle, and expanded to abstraction principle. No evidence on the case where the astro-omy principle was directly applied to was found in this study. In most cases, pragmatism and abstraction principles are observed as underly-ing principles. In ordinary costumes, pragmatism principle is the fundamental base for R-&-L through right-hand-use rule. Even though abstraction prin-ciple was found in some ordinary costumes, we believe that this was generated for adding more meanings in addition to the pragmatism principle. In funeral costumes, pragmatism principle was almost totally ignored unlike in ordinary costumes because the funeral rite was performed though formality with abstract thoughts. The abstraction principle was exercised with the form of simple-discrimination rule based on the dual system along with Yin-Yang related cultural rules such as‘Yang-left-and-Yin-right’or‘father-left-and-mother-right’. However, the case where‘left-male-and-right-female’rule is applied to was not found in this study.

• Journal of the Korean Home Economics Association
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• v.44 no.9
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• pp.1-8
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• 2006

The purposes of the present article are to suggest pragmatism as offering a philosophical paradigm for mixed methods research, to explain the fundamental principles of mixed methodology, and to present examples of research for understanding how to apply it to family studies. Mixed methods research is the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study. Mixed methodology has its roots in pragmatism, which is a new philosophical paradigm to criticize the traditional dualism and to endorse eclecticism and pluralism. The present article argues that mixed methods research has the potential to answer a broader and more complete range of research questions, and to provide strong evidence for a conclusion through convergence and corroboration of the qualitative and the quantitative methods.

• Journal of Korean Home Economics Education Association
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• v.19 no.1 s.43
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• pp.115-131
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• 2007

Philosophical and social backgrounds and inquiring into new direction of Practical Arts and Home Economics Education is done through this paper. The overall review of the related documents, records, books has been done, and research findings are presented as follows; Thought(Educational theory and Philosophy) for Korean Practical Arts Education is based on Learning to Labor, Practical Science and Pragmatism. Korean curriculum for Home Economics were originated in Confucianism background, which stressed the importance of different gender roles for men and women. However, Korean Home Economics based on Home Economics Subject Matter has been developed without philosophical base unlike that of American Pragmatism and Critical Theory. Therefore, scientific recognition in a section of value recognition was separated and developed so far. Thus, we could not answer to social missions about keeping values of life corresponding with changing environment I also observed the analysis of revision curriculum of the mentioned subject, and the changes of concepts of Work and Prasix, necessity of Home Economics Education for fixing about a basic life education and a basic life skill, and reinforcement of the function in Home. And then, new directions is proposed that the role of Home Economics Education in school be reinforced for the upcoming low birth rate and the aging society(high proportion of the aged people). Because Characters on correct values of children and youths might be nurtured in home foremost.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.123
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• pp.379-407
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• 2012

The main purpose of this paper is to make a case for the availability of pragmatist ethics by showing the differences between utilitarianism and pragmatism. In this paper, drawing on Dewey's view, I show that Bentham and Mill were doomed to failure because they both regarded moral conduct not as a process but as a fixed act, the remarkable differences between their views notwithstanding. Besides, I also show that pragmatism distinguishes itself from utilitarianism by its focus on the aspect of the amendment of a conduct rather than its attainment. Pragmatist ethics works on the assumption that moral conduct arises only in conscious experience. What pragmatists mean by consciousness is not an ability just given to haman, but a function emerging from the human interaction with his environment. Therefore, morality is extended from and restricted by experience, because it is grounded in concrete experience, but not in the transcendental nor a priori realm. Since pragmatism suggests the possibility of "ethics without principles" in that it works through the way which successfully rejects the traditional absolutist ethics, while avoiding the downslide to a nihilistic form of skepticism. Thus, it may serve as a third view that overcomes a seriously divergent situation of the current ethical arguments. In other words, starting from the very nature of experience, pragmatist ethics offers a 'bottom-up' ethics, instead of a 'top-down' one. This reconstructive reading of pragmatism away from utilitarianism is expected to offer a more comprehensive account of our moral experience in the pluralistic world of diverged values.

• JOURNAL OF ELECTRICAL WORLD
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• s.413
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• pp.60-64
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• 2011

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.120
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• pp.109-130
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• 2011

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Putnam's recent conception of ethics, and show that it gives rise to an ineluctable incoherence with his rationalism. This suggests that Putnam's philosophy has to be far more naturalized to make his new position cogent. Putnam recently has shown some explicit turn toward pragmatism a la James and Dewey under the name of "pragmatic pluralism." Putnam says that traditional ethics has presupposed some form of ontology in one way or another, which he sees is based on an unnecessary pursuit of a misleading conception of objectivity. Putnam tries to get rid of any notion of ontology in ethics, whereby we can talk about a third view which runs between traditional objectivism and nihilistic relativism. In this sense, he defines pragmatism as "fallibilism cum antiskepticism." Putnam's suggestion makes a good sense as far as it goes. However, his continuous transition toward pragmatism is critically impeded by his own adhesion to the normative conception of "reason." In this light, Putnam himself is wobbling between Kant and Dewey, just as he describes ethics is. Dewey's pragmatism does not have recourse to the very notion of reason to secure objectivity necessary to make sense of moral experience. Putnam needs to be far more naturalized to reach cogently where he espouses, and this can be done only by renouncing the normative conception of reason.