• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
• /
• no.35
• /
• pp.309-334
• /
• 2012

This study attempts to study in what form Folk Taoism in the late of $Chos{\breve{o}}n$ Dynasty has existed and discuss the contents and characteristics of ideological aspects forming the foundation of private Taoism. While Guan Yu Belief(關帝信仰) in the late of $Chos{\breve{o}}n$ Dynasty is a folk belief focusing on Guan Yu, Seoneumjeulgyo(善陰?敎) and Musangdan(無相壇) are religious groups with organization. In case of Seoneumjeulgyo(善陰?敎), 'Seoneumjeul' contains perspective of Tian(天觀) of Confucianism but the ascetic practice method is to practice by reciting the name of the Buddha and the targets of a belief are Gwanje, Munchang, Buwoo. This shows the unified phenomenon of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism of Folk Taoism in the late of $Chos{\breve{o}}n$ Dynasty. Guan Yu Belief started at the national level led by the royal family of $Chos{\breve{o}}n$ after Japanese Invasion of Korea in 1592 was firmly settled in non-official circles. Guan Yu in the late of $Chos{\breve{o}}n$ Dynasty is expressed as the incarnation of loyalty and filial piety as well as God controlling life, death and fate. As this divine power and empowerment were spreading as scriptures among people, Guan Yu Belief was settled as a target to defeat the evil and invoke a blessing. Seoneumjeulgyo is the religious group that imitated 'Paekryunsa(白蓮社)' of Ming Qing time of China. Seoneumjeulgyo emphasized 'sympathy' with God through chanting. And it expressed writing written in the state of religious ecstasy as 'Binan(飛鸞).' Binan is also called as revelation and means to be revealed from heaven in the state united with God. Seoneumjeulgyo pursued the state united with God through a recitation of a spell and made scriptures written in the state united with God as its central doctrine. Musangdan published and spread Nanseo(鸞書,Book written by the revelation from God) and Seonso(善書) while worshipping Sam Sung Je Kun(三聖帝君). The scriptures of Folk Taoismin the late of $Chos{\breve{o}}n$ Dynasty can be roughly divided into Nanseo(鸞書) and Seonso(善書). Nanseo is a book written by the revelation from God and Seonso is a book to the standards of good deeds and encourage a person to do them such as Taishangganyingbian(太上感應篇) and Gonghwagyuk(功過格). The characteristics of Folk Taoism in the late of $Chos{\breve{o}}n$ Dynasty are as follows. First, a shrine of Guan Yu built for political reasons played a central role of Folk Taoism in the late of $Chos{\breve{o}}n$ Dynasty. Second, specific private Taoist groups such as Temple $Myory{\breve{o}}nsa$ and Musangdan appeared in the late of $Chos{\breve{o}}n$ Dynasty. These are Nandan Taoism(鸞壇道敎) that pursued the unity of God through 'sympathy' with God. Third, private Taoism of $Chos{\breve{o}}n$ was influenced by the unity of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism with private Taoism in the Qing Dynasty of China and religious organization form etc. Fourth, the Folk Taoism scriptures of $Chos{\breve{o}}n$ are divided into Nanseo and Seonso and Nanseo directly made in $Chos{\breve{o}}n$ is expected to be the key to reveal the characteristics of Folk Taoism.

• (The) Research of the performance art and culture
• /
• no.41
• /
• pp.5-38
• /
• 2020

The current state of performance halls in South Korea is closely related to the performance art and culture of the nation as the culture of putting on and enjoying a performance is deeply rooted in public culture and arts halls representing each area at the local government level. Today, public culture and arts halls have multiple management purposes, and the subjects of their management are in the public domain including the central and local governments or investment and donation foundations in overwhelming cases. Public culture and arts halls thus have close correlations with the institutional aspect of cultural policies as the objects of culture and art policies at the central and local government level. The full-blown era of public culture and arts halls opened up in the 1980s~1990s, during which multi-purpose performance halls of a similar structure became universal around the nation. Public culture and arts halls of the uniform shape were distributed around the nation with no premise of genre characteristics or local environments for arts, and this was attributed to the cultural policies of the military regime. The Park Chung-hee regime proclaimed Yusin that was beyond the Constitution and enacted the Culture and Arts Promotion Act(September, 1972), which was the first culture and arts act in the nation. Based on the act, a five-year plan for the promotion of culture and arts(1973) was made and led to the construction of cultural facilities. "Public culture and arts" halls or "culture" halls were built to serve multiple purposes around the nation because the Culture and Arts Promotion Act, which is called the starting point of the nation's legal system for culture and arts, defined "culture and arts" as "matters regarding literature, art, music, entertainment, and publications." The definition became a ground for the current "multi-purpose" concept. The organization of Ministry of Culture and Public Information set up a culture and administration system to state its supervision of "culture and arts" and distinguish popular culture from the promotion of arts. During the period, former President Park exhibited his perception of "culture=arts=culture and arts" in his speeches. Arts belonged to the category of culture, but it was considered as "culture and arts." There was no department devoted to arts policies when the act was enacted with a broad scope of culture accepted. This ambiguity worked as a mechanism to mobilize arts in ideological utilizations as a policy. Against this backdrop, the Sejong Center for the Performing Arts, a multi-purpose performance hall, was established in 1978 based on the Culture and Arts Promotion Act under the supervision of Ministry of Culture and Public Information. There were, however, conflicts of value over the issue of accepting the popular music among the "culture and arts = multiple purposes" of the system, "culture ≠ arts" of the cultural organization that pushed forward its establishment, and "culture and arts = arts" perceived by the powerful class. The new military regime seized power after Coup d'état of December 12, 1979 and failed at its culture policy of bringing the resistance force within the system. It tried to differentiate itself from the Park regime by converting the perception into "expansion of opportunities for the people to enjoy culture" to gain people's supports both from the side of resistance and that of support. For the Chun Doo-hwan regime, differentiating itself from the previous regime was to secure legitimacy. Expansion of opportunities to enjoy culture was pushed forward at the level of national distribution. This approach thus failed to settle down as a long-term policy of arts development, and the military regime tried to secure its legitimacy through the symbolism of hardware. During the period, the institutional ground for public culture and arts halls was based on the definition of "culture and arts" in the Culture and Arts Promotion Act enacted under the Yusin system of the Park regime. The "multi-purpose" concept, which was the management goal of public performance halls, was born based on this. In this context of the times, proscenium performance halls of a similar structure and public culture and arts halls with a similar management goal were established around the nation, leading to today's performance art and culture in the nation.

• Korean small business review
• /
• v.33 no.4
• /
• pp.77-93
• /
• 2011

Since 2000, the employment rate of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) has dwindled while the creation of new jobs and the emergence of healthy SMEs have been stagnant. The fundamental reason for these symptoms is that the economic structure is disadvantageous to SMEs. In particular, the greater gap between SMEs and large enterprises has resulted in polarization, and the resulting imbalance has become the largest obstacle to improving SMEs' competitiveness. For example, the total productivity has continued to drop, and the average productivity of SMEs is now merely 30% of that of large enterprises, and the average wage of SMEs' employees is only 53% of that of large enterprises. Along with polarization, rapid industrialization has also caused anti-enterprise consensus, the collapse of the middle class, hostility towards establishments, and other aftereffects. The general consensus is that unless these problems are solved, South Korea will not become an advanced country. Especially, South Korea is now facing issues that need urgent measures, such as the decline of its economic growth, the worsening distribution of profits, and the increased external volatility. Recognizing such negative trends, the MB administration proposed a win-win growth policy and recently introduced a new national value called "ecosystemic development." As the terms in such policy agenda are similar, however, the conceptual differences among such terms must first be fully understood. Therefore, in this study, the concepts of win-win growth policy and ecosystemic development, and the need for them, were surveyed, and their differences from and similarities with other policy concepts like win-win cooperation and symbiotic development were examined. Based on the results of the survey and examination, the study introduced a South Korean model of win-win growth, targeting the promotion of a sound balance between large enterprises and SMEs and an innovative ecosystem, and finally, proposing future policy tasks. Win-win growth is not an academic term but a policy term. Thus, it is less advisable to give a theoretical definition of it than to understand its concept based on its objective and method as a policy. The core of the MB administration's win-win growth policy is the creation of a partnership between key economic subjects such as large enterprises and SMEs based on each subject's differentiated capacity, and such economic subjects' joint promotion of growth opportunities. Its objective is to contribute to the establishment of an advanced capitalistic system by securing the sustainability of the South Korean economy. Such win-win growth policy includes three core concepts. The first concept, ecosystem, is that win-win growth should be understood from the viewpoint of an industrial ecosystem and should be pursued by overcoming the issues of specific enterprises. An enterprise is not an independent entity but a social entity, meaning it exists in relationship with the society (Drucker, 2011). The second concept, balance, points to the fact that an effort should be made to establish a systemic and social infrastructure for a healthy balance in the industry. The social system and infrastructure should be established in such a way as to create a balance between short- term needs and long-term sustainability, between freedom and responsibility, and between profitability and social obligations. Finally, the third concept is the behavioral change of economic entities. The win-win growth policy is not merely about simple transactional relationships or determining reasonable prices but more about the need for a behavior change on the part of economic entities, without which the objectives of the policy cannot be achieved. Various advanced countries have developed different win-win growth models based on their respective cultures and economic-development stages. Japan, whose culture is characterized by a relatively high level of group-centered trust, has developed a productivity improvement model based on such culture, whereas the U.S., which has a highly developed system of market capitalism, has developed a system that instigates or promotes market-oriented technological innovation. Unlike Japan or the U.S., Europe, a late starter, has not fully developed a trust-based culture or market capitalism and thus often uses a policy-led model based on which the government leads the improvement of productivity and promotes technological innovation. By modeling successful cases from these advanced countries, South Korea can establish its unique win-win growth system. For this, it needs to determine the method and tasks that suit its circumstances by examining the prerequisites for its success as well as the strengths and weaknesses of each advanced country. This paper proposes a South Korean model of win-win growth, whose objective is to upgrade the country's low-trust-level-based industrial structure, in which large enterprises and SMEs depend only on independent survival strategies, to a high-trust-level-based social ecosystem, in which large enterprises and SMEs develop a cooperative relationship as partners. Based on this objective, the model proposes the establishment of a sound balance of systems and infrastructure between large enterprises and SMEs, and to form a crenovative social ecosystem. The South Korean model of win-win growth consists of three axes: utilization of the South Koreans' potential, which creates community-oriented energy; fusion-style improvement of various control and self-regulated systems for establishing a high-trust-level-oriented social infrastructure; and behavioral change on the part of enterprises in terms of putting an end to their unfair business activities and promoting future-oriented cooperative relationships. This system will establish a dynamic industrial ecosystem that will generate creative energy and will thus contribute to the realization of a sustainable economy in the 21st century. The South Korean model of win-win growth should pursue community-based self-regulation, which promotes the power of efficiency and competition that is fundamentally being pursued by capitalism while at the same time seeking the value of society and community. Already existing in Korea's traditional roots, such objectives have become the bases of the Shinbaram culture, characterized by the South Koreans' spontaneity, creativity, and optimism. In the process of a community's gradual improvement of its rules and procedures, the trust among the community members increases, and the "social capital" that guarantees the successful control of shared resources can be established (Ostrom, 2010). This basic ideal can help reduce the gap between large enterprises and SMEs, alleviating the South Koreans' victim mentality in the face of competition and the open-door policy, and creating crenovative corporate competitiveness. The win-win growth policy emerged for the purpose of addressing the polarization and imbalance structure resulting from the evolution of 21st-century capitalism. It simultaneously pursues efficiency and fairness on one hand and economic and community values on the other, and aims to foster efficient interaction between the market and the government. This policy, however, is also evolving. The win-win growth policy can be considered an extension of the win-win cooperation that the past 'Participatory Government' promoted at the enterprise management level to the level of systems and culture. Also, the ecosystemic development agendum that has recently emerged is a further extension that has been presented as a national ideal of "a new development model that promotes the co-advancement of environmental conservation, growth, economic development, social integration, and national and individual development."

• The Southeast Asian review
• /
• v.27 no.2
• /
• pp.37-76
• /
• 2017

$Nguy{\tilde{\hat{e}}}n$ Cư Trinh has two faces in the history of territorial expansion of Vietnam into the Mekong delta. One is his heroic contribution to the $Nguy{\tilde{\hat{e}}}n$ family gaining control over the large part of the Mekong delta. The other is his role to make the eyes of readers of Vietnamese history be fixed only to the present territory of Vietnam. To the readers, $Nguy{\tilde{\hat{e}}}n$ Cư Trinh's achievement of territorial expansion was the final stage of the nam $ti{\acute{\hat{e}}n$ of Vietnam. In fact, however, his achievement was partial. This study pays attention to the King $V{\tilde{o}}$ instead of $Nguy{\tilde{\hat{e}}}n$ Cư Trinh in the history of the territorial expansion in the Mekong delta. King's goal was more ambitious. And the ambition was propelled by his dream to build a new world, and its order, in which his new capital, $Ph{\acute{u}}$ $Xu{\hat{a}}n$ was to be the center with his status as an emperor. To improve my assertion, three elements were examined in this article. First is the nature of $V{\tilde{o}}$ Vương's new kingship. Second is the preparation and the background of the military operation in the Mekong Delta. The nature of the new territory is the third element of the discussion. In 1744, six years after this ascending to the throne, $V{\tilde{o}}$ Vương declared he was a king. Author points out this event as the departure of the southern kingdom from the traditional dynasties based on the Red River delta. Besides, the government system, northern custom and way of dressings were abandoned and new southern modes were adopted. $V{\tilde{o}}$ Vương had enough tributary kingdoms such as Cambodia, Champa, Thủy $X{\tilde{a}}$, Hoả $X{\tilde{a}}$, Vạn Tượng, and Nam Chưởng. Compared with the $L{\hat{e}}$ empire, the number of the tributary kingdoms was higher and the number was equivalent to that of the Đại Nam empire of the 19th century. In reality, author claims, the King $V{\tilde{o}}^{\prime}s$ real intention was to become an emperor. Though he failed in using the title of emperor, he distinguished himself by claiming himself as the Heaven King, $Thi{\hat{e}}n$ Vương. Cambodian king's attack on the thousands of Cham ethnics in Cambodian territory was an enough reason to the King $V{\tilde{o}}^{\prime}s$ military intervention. He considered these Cham men and women as his amicable subjects, and he saw them a branch of the Cham communities in his realm. He declared war against Cambodia in 1750. At the same time he sent a lengthy letter to the Siamese king claiming that the Cambodia was his exclusive tributary kingdom. Before he launched a fatal strike on the Mekong delta which had been the southern part of Cambodia, $V{\tilde{o}}$ Vương renovated his capital $Ph{\acute{u}}$ $Xu{\hat{a}}n$ to the level of the new center of power equivalent to that of empire for his sake. Inflation, famine, economic distortion were also the features of this time. But this study pays attention more to the active policy of the King $V{\tilde{o}}$ as an empire builder than to the economic situation that has been told as the main reason for King $V{\tilde{o}}^{\prime}s$ annexation of the large part of the Mekong delta. From the year of 1754, by the initiative of $Nguy{\tilde{\hat{e}}}n$ Cư Trinh, almost whole region of the Mekong delta within the current border line was incorporated into the territory of $V{\tilde{o}}$ Vương within three years, though the intention of the king was to extend his land to the right side of the Mekong Basin beyond the current border such as Kampong Cham, Prey Vieng, and Svai Rieng. The main reason was $V{\tilde{o}}$ Vương's need to expand his territory to be matched with that of his potential empire with the large number of the tributary kingdoms. King $V{\tilde{o}}^{\prime}s$ strategy was the variation of 'silkworm nibbling' and 'to strike barbarians by barbarians.' He ate the land of Lower Cambodia, the region of the Mekong delta step by step as silkworm nibbles mulberry leave(general meaning of $t{\acute{a}}m$ thực), but his final goal was to eat all(another meaning of $t{\acute{a}}m$ thực) the part of the Mekong delta including the three provinces of Cambodia mentioned above. He used Cham to strike Cambodian in the process of getting land from Long An area to $Ch{\hat{a}}u$ Đốc. This is a faithful application of the Dĩ Man $C{\hat{o}}ng$ Man (to strike barbarians by barbarians). In addition he used Chinese refugees led by the Mạc family or their quasi kingdom to gain land in the region of $H{\grave{a}}$ $Ti{\hat{e}}n$ and its environs from the hand of Cambodian king. This is another application of Dĩ Man $C{\hat{o}}ng$ Man. In sum, author claims a new way of looking at the origin of the imperial world order which emerged during the first half of the 19th century. It was not the result of the long history of Đại Việt empires based on the Red River delta, but the succession of the King $V{\tilde{o}}^{\prime}s$ new world based on $Ph{\acute{u}}$ $Xu{\hat{a}}n$. The same ways of Dĩ Man $C{\hat{o}}ng$ Man and $T{\acute{a}}m$ Thực Chi $K{\acute{\hat{e}}}$ were still used by $V{\tilde{o}}^{\prime}s$ descendents. His grandson Gia Long used man such as Thai, Khmer, Lao, Chinese, and European to win another man the '$T{\hat{a}}y$ Sơn bandits' that included many of Chinese pirates, Cham, and other mountain peoples. His great grand son Minh Mạng constructed a splendid empire. At the same time, however, Minh Mạng kept expanding the size of his empire by eating all the part of Cambodia and Cham territories.