• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.71-94
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• 1990

This paper reviews the rationale of monetary and banking intervention by an outside authority, either the government or the central bank, and seeks to delineate clearly the optimal limits to the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway in Korea as well as on a global scale. Furthermore, this paper seeks to establish an objective and balanced view on the role of the central bank, especially in light of the current discussion on the restructuring of Korea's central bank, which has been severely contaminated by interest-group politics. The discussion begins with the recognition that the modern free banking school and the new monetary economics are becoming formidable challenges to the traditional role of the government or the central bank in the monetary and banking sector. The paper reviews six arguments that have traditionally been presented to support intervention: (1) the possibility of an over-issue of bank notes under free banking instead of central banking; (2) externalities in and the public good nature of the use of money; (3) economies of scale and natural monopoly in producing money; (4) the need for macro stabilization policy due to the instability of the real sector; (5) the external effects of bank failure due to the inherent instability of the existing banking system; and (6) protection for small banknote users and depositors. Based on an analysis of the above arguments, the paper speculates on the optimal role of the government or central bank in the monetary and banking system and the optimal degree of monetary and banking deregulation. By contrast to the arguments for free banking or laissez-faire monetary systems, which become fashionable in recent years, monopoly and intervention by the government or central bank in the outside money system can be both necessary and optimal. In this case, of course, an over-issue of fiat money may be possible due to political considerations, but this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. On the other hand, the issue of inside monies based on outside money could indeed be provided for optimally under market competition by private institutions. A competitive system in issuing inside monies would help realize, to the maxim urn extent possible, external economies generated by using a single outside money. According to this reasoning, free banking activities will prevail in the inside money system, while a government monopoly will prevail in the outside money system. This speculation, then, also implies that the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway should and most likely will be limited to the inside money system, which could be liberalized to the fullest degree. It is also implied that it will be impractical to deregulate the outside money system and to allow market competition to provide outside money, in accordance with the arguments of the free banking school and the new monetary economics. Furthermore, the role of the government or central bank in this new environment will not be significantly different from their current roles. As far as the supply of fiat money continues to be monopolized by the government, the control of the supply of base money and such related responsibilities as monetary policy (argument(4)) and the lender of the last resort (argument (5)) will naturally be assigned to the outside money supplier. However, a mechanism for controlling an over-issue of fiat money by a monopolistic supplier will definitely be called for (argument(1)). A monetary policy based on a certain policy rule could be one possibility. More importantly, the deregulation of the inside money system would further increase the systemic risk inherent in the current fractional banking system, while enhancing the efficiency of the system (argument (5)). In this context, the role of the lender of the last resort would again become an instrument of paramount importance in alleviating liquidity crises in the early stages, thereby disallowing the possibility of a widespread bank run. Similarly, prudential banking supervision would also help maintain the safety and soundness of the fully deregulated banking system. These functions would also help protect depositors from losses due to bank failures (argument (6)). Finally, these speculations suggest that government or central bank authorities have probably been too conservative on the issue of the deregulation of the financial system, beyond the caution necessary to preserve system safety. Rather, only the fullest deregulation of the inside money system seems to guarantee the maximum enjoyment of external economies in the single outside money system.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.95-131
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• 2012

This study examines whether the executive turnover and the executive resignation during the term of office affect the performance of Korean state-owned enterprises. The executive turnover in the paper means the comprehensive change of the executives which includes the change after the term of office, the change after consecutive terms and the change during the term of office. The 'resignation' was named for the executive change during the term of office to distinguish from the executive turnover. The study scope of the paper is restrained to the comprehensive executive change itself irrespective of the term of office and the resignation during the term of office. Therefore the natural change of the executive after the term of office or the change after consecutive terms is not included in the study. Spontaneous resignation and forced resignation are not distinguished in the paper as the distinction between the two is not easy. The paper uses both the margin of return on asset and the margin of return on asset adjusted by industry as proxies of the performance of state-owned enterprises. The business nature of state-owned enterprise is considered in the study, the public nature not in it. The paper uses the five year (2004 to 2008) samples of 24 firms designated as public enterprises by Korean government. The analysis results are as follows. First, 45.1% of CEOs were changed a year during the sample period on the average. The average tenure period of CEOs was 2 years and 3 months and 49.9% among the changed CEOs resigned during the term of office. 41.6% of internal auditors were changed a year on the average. The average tenure period of internal auditors was 2 years and 2 months and 51.0% among the changed internal auditors resigned during the term of office. In case of outside directors, on average, 38.2% were changed a year. The average tenure period was 2 years and 7 months and 25.4% among the changed internal directors resigned during the term of office. These statistics show that numerous CEOs resigned before the finish of the three year term in office. Also, considering the tenure of an internal auditor and an outside director which diminished from 3 years to 2 years by an Act on the Management of Public Institutions (applied to the executives appointed since April 2007), it seems most internal auditors resigned during the term of office but most outside directors resigned after the end of the term. Secondly, There was no evidence that the executives were changed during the term of office because of the bad performance of prior year. On the other hand, contrary to the normal expectation, the performance of prior year of the state-owned enterprise where an outside director resigned during the term of office was significantly higher than that of other state-owned enterprises. It means that the clauses in related laws on the executive dismissal on grounds of bad performance did not work normally. Instead it can be said that the executive change was made by non-economic reasons such as a political motivation. Thirdly, the results from a fixed effect model show there were evidences that performance turned negatively when CEOs or outside directors resigned during the term of office. CEO's resignation during the term of office gave a significantly negative effect on the margin of return on asset. Outside director's resignation during the term of office lowered significantly the margin of return on asset adjusted by industry. These results suggest that the executive's change in Korean state-owned enterprises was not made by objective or economic standards such as management performance assessment and the negative effect on performance of the enterprises was had by the unfaithful obeyance of the legal executive term.

• (The) Research of the performance art and culture
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• no.22
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• pp.185-221
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• 2011

This study overseas compatriots in the North during the propagation and development of dance patterns and was going to be based, people living outside of the dance culture as a group of overseas Koreans, especially dance culture of Koreans in Japan, China are interested in and thought about the necessity of the study. Issues discussed in the literature of research results, autonomous community of Koreans in Japan ethnic Koreans and Chinese dance culture dance Choi Seung-hee starting point common was, two ethnic groups, directly or indirectly from the Choi Seung-hee learn to dance or have received specialized training to work, compiled by Choi Seung-hee Korea on the basis of basic dance training was learning the dance. In addition, specialized training and dance training institutions in the North Koreans in Japan Social Dance Group for the system, such as dance training in a separate place where talented people through the exhaust, to act in a professional troupes have maintained a system. In contrast, Chinese ethnic Koreans in Yanbian Autonomous University and Central University for Nationalities in the dance departments are stationed there, the transfer from the Joseon dance dance by educating gifted talents have been dispose, South Korea and similar aspects of the dance education system can be seen. Dance work based training and the tendency of Koreans in Japan in terms of social practice and dance in the North of basic training as basic training and specialized training, and work to represent the North korea's famous dance folk dance performances have been transmitted intact. In China, however, ethnic Koreans Choi Seung-hee compiled by borough basis and the work of the North korean dance training or specialized training received directly from her, she founded the dance student of Choi Seung-hee developed basic techniques of Chinese ethnic dance and ethnic Koreans in China, while receiving only Sewonaga dance training system as a deal on exchanges with the North Korean dance dancing free dance culture for creation peppered ethnic Koreans in China was formed. When passed down to the time, Koreans in Japan since the 1960s, society began to visit Pyongyang in the 1970s, subjected to a direct transfer, and education and through the 1990s, the North Koreans in Japan by inviting dancers and dance directly to basic training by getting education bukhanchum As can be seen in the spectacular aspects will have to reproduce. However, ethnic Koreans in China in the 1950s in districts in Beijing, Pyongyang and received direct guidance from Choi Seung-hee, Dancers from the North after Pyongyang rather than direct guidance on the occasion of his visit to China Dance Troupe was affected. On the other hand Korean dance since the 1990s, starting with Ethnic Koreans in China only began to absorb a different dance culture has been created. The same nation, yet living in the region and to configure the ethnic groups, the configuration of the system and political system, according to the North Dancing transfer process and the development pattern similar, but each of the identities to ensure their own traits with a dance culture, the formation and develop the arrival of You can find out. In other words, Koreans in Japan and Federation of Koreans in Japan under the control of social forces of the dance culture by Acculturation variation of dance culture, dance culture of the borough ethnic Koreans in China Acculturation by the voluntary and free borrowers were able to gauge the changes in development.