• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.185-191
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• 2015

This paper suggest the safety class communication board in order to design the safety network of the nuclear safety class controller. The reactor protection system use the digitized networks because from analog system to digital system. The communication board shall be provided to pass the required performance and test of the safety class in the digital network used in the nuclear safety class. Communication protocol is composed of physical layer(PHY), data link layer(MAC: Medium Access Control), the application layer in the OSI 7 layer only. The data link layer data package for the cyber security has changed. CRC32 were used for data quality and the using one way communication, not requests and not responses for receiving data, does not affect the nuclear safety system. It has been designed in accordance with requirements, design, verification and procedure for the approving the nuclear safety class. For hardware verification such as electromagnetic test, aging test, inspection, burn-in test, seismic test and environmental test in was performed. FPGA firmware to verify compliance with the life-cycle of IEEE 1074 was performed by the component testing and integration testing.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.374-384
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• 2012

Utilizing artificial noise (AN) is a good means to guarantee security against eavesdropping in a multi-inputmulti-output system, where the AN is designed to lie in the null space of the legitimate receiver's channel direction information (CDI). However, imperfect CDI will lead to noise leakage at the legitimate receiver and cause significant loss in the achievable secrecy rate. In this paper, we consider a delayed feedback system, and investigate the impact of delayed CDI on security by using a transmit beamforming and AN scheme. By exploiting the Gauss-Markov fading spectrum to model the feedback delay, we derive a closed-form expression of the upper bound on the secrecy rate loss, where $N_t$ = 2. For a moderate number of antennas where $N_t$ > 2, two special cases, based on the first-order statistics of the noise leakage and large number theory, are explored to approximate the respective upper bounds. In addition, to maintain a constant signal-to-interferenceplus-noise ratio degradation, we analyze the corresponding delay constraint. Furthermore, based on the obtained closed-form expression of the lower bound on the achievable secrecy rate, we investigate an optimal power allocation strategy between the information signal and the AN. The analytical and numerical results obtained based on first-order statistics can be regarded as a good approximation of the capacity that can be achieved at the legitimate receiver with a certain number of antennas, $N_t$. In addition, for a given delay, we show that optimal power allocation is not sensitive to the number of antennas in a high signal-to-noise ratio regime. The simulation results further indicate that the achievable secrecy rate with optimal power allocation can be improved significantly as compared to that with fixed power allocation. In addition, as the delay increases, the ratio of power allocated to the AN should be decreased to reduce the secrecy rate degradation.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.38A no.8
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• pp.733-738
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• 2013

In this paper, we consider a physical layer security of an amplify-and-forward (AF) transmission in a presence of an eavesdropper in a wiretap channel. The proposed wiretap channel consists of a source, a destination, a relay, and an eavesdropper. Specifically, we consider that the relay has multiple antennas to exploit a diversity gain and a receive/transmit antenna selection schemes are applied to maximize a signal-to-noise ratio. In a practical point of view, we focus on the practical scenario where the relay does not have any channel state information of the eavesdropper while performing an AF protocol at the relay. For a secrecy performance analysis, we analyze a secrecy outage probability of the proposed system in one-integral form and verify our analysis with the computer-based simulation.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.301-307
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• 2015

In this paper, we consider wiretap channels in the presence of an eavesdropper assuming spatially correlated MIMO(multiple-input multiple-output) channels, where we analyze a physical layer security performance of orthogonal space-time block code(OSTBC) using one-bit feedback assuming cross polarized antennas at each node. In this paper, we present a method to select a transmit-antenna group for OSTBC using one-bit feedback(O-OSTBC) and compare secrecy outage probabilities of various transmit-antenna grouping methods. Especially, we propose an efficient transmit-antenna grouping method by comparing secrecy outage probabilities of O-OSTBC and conventional OSTBC in highly correlated MIMO channels.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartC
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• v.13C no.1 s.104
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• pp.83-94
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• 2006

This paper describes ATM cell encipherment method using Rijndael Algorithm adopted as an AES(Advanced Encryption Standard) by NIST in 2001. ISO 9160 describes the requirement of physical layer data processing in encryption/decryption. For the description of ATM cell encipherment method, we implemented ATM data encipherment equipment which satisfies the requirements of ISO 9160, and verified the encipherment/decipherment processing at ATM STM-1 rate(155.52Mbps). The DES algorithm can process data in the block size of 64 bits and its key length is 64 bits, but the Rijndael algorithm can process data in the block size of 128 bits and the key length of 128, 192, or 256 bits selectively. So it is more flexible in high bit rate data processing and stronger in encription strength than DES. For tile real time encryption of high bit rate data stream. Rijndael algorithm was implemented in FPGA in this experiment. The boundary of serial UNI cell was detected by the CRC method, and in the case of user data cell the payload of 48 octets (384 bits) is converted in parallel and transferred to 3 Rijndael encipherment module in the block size of 128 bits individually. After completion of encryption, the header stored in buffer is attached to the enciphered payload and retransmitted in the format of cell. At the receiving end, the boundary of ceil is detected by the CRC method and the payload type is decided. n the payload type is the user data cell, the payload of the cell is transferred to the 3-Rijndael decryption module in the block sire of 128 bits for decryption of data. And in the case of maintenance cell, the payload is extracted without decryption processing.