• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2001년도 추계학술대회 논문집 전력기술부문
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• pp.60-62
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• 2001

This paper shows the optimal bidding strategy determination method using Nash equilibrium concept by defining bidding strategy vector. This vector is 2-dimension vector whose components are generation amount and generation cost. Thereby we are able to make all possible strategies and their's payoff table. And then we erase dominated strategies one by one so that we obtain Nash equilibrium, the optimal bidding strategy of generation bidding game.

• ETRI Journal
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• 제33권6호
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• pp.957-960
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• 2011

We present a fair and efficient solution for selfish readers with the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to mitigate the effects of RFID frequency interference. We compare the NBS with a solution derived by the max log-sum scheme that maximizes total utility and show that for selfish and rational readers, the NBS brings success in bargaining on resource allocation between readers unlike the max log-sum scheme, although the NBS has less total payoff compared to the max log-sum scheme.

• 산업경영시스템학회지
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• 제20권43호
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• pp.17-24
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• 1997

This research suggests an approach to reduce the physical distribution cost of production by analyzing data from real situations. The proposed approach re-layouts facilities according to the SLP(Systematic Layout Planning) method. An application result showed that the production lead time was reduced by 24% and the payoff period for facility re-layout was about ten months.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• 제17권1호
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• pp.75-83
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• 2015

In mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), nodes are mobile in nature. Collaboration between mobile nodes is more significant in MANETs, which have as their greatest challenges vulnerabilities to various security attacks and an inability to operate securely while preserving its resources and performing secure routing among nodes. Therefore, it is essential to develop an effective secure routing protocol to protect the nodes from anonymous behaviors. Currently, game theory is a tool that analyzes, formulates and solves selfishness issues. It is seldom applied to detect malicious behavior in networks. It deals, instead, with the strategic and rational behavior of each node. In our study,we used the dynamic Bayesian signaling game to analyze the strategy profile for regular and malicious nodes. This game also revealed the best actions of individual strategies for each node. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) provides a prominent solution for signaling games to solve incomplete information by combining strategies and payoff of players that constitute equilibrium. Using PBE strategies of nodes are private information of regular and malicious nodes. Regular nodes should be cooperative during routing and update their payoff, while malicious nodes take sophisticated risks by evaluating their risk of being identified to decide when to decline. This approach minimizes the utility of malicious nodes and it motivates better cooperation between nodes by using the reputation system. Regular nodes monitor continuously to evaluate their neighbors using belief updating systems of the Bayes rule.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제14권4호
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• pp.1817-1836
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• 2020

Network convergence is considered as one of the key solutions to the problem of achieving future high-capacity and reliable communications. This approach overcomes the limitations of separate wireless technologies. Efficient interface selection is one of the most important issues in convergence networks. This paper solves the problem faced by users of selecting the most appropriate interface in the heterogeneous radio-access network (RAN) environment. Our proposed scheme combines a hierarchical evaluation of networks and game theory to solve the network-selection problem. Instead, of considering a fixed weight system while ranking the networks, the proposed scheme considers the service requirements, as well as static and dynamic network attributes. The best network is selected for a particular service request. To establish a hierarchy among the network-evaluation criteria for service requests, an analytical hierarchy process (AHP) is used. To determine the optimum network selection, the network hierarchy is combined with game theory. AHP attains the network hierarchy. The weights of different access networks for a service are calculated. It is performed by combining AHP scores considering user's experienced static network attributes and dynamic radio parameters. This paper provides a strategic game. In this game, the network scores of service requests for various RANs and the user's willingness to pay for these services are used to model a network-versus-user game. The Nash equilibria signify those access networks that are chosen by individual user and result maximum payoff. The examples for the interface selection illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.

• 디자인학연구
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• 제18권2호
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• pp.79-90
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• 2005

본 연구는 인간의 상호관계성 혹은 인간의 사회화과정이 오늘날의 시각디자인에 어떻게 관여되고 있는가를 사회학적, 심리학적인 이론을 바탕으로 규명할 목적으로 작성되었다. 먼저 인간의 사회화에 대한 생리학과 철학, 그리고 심리학적인 근거를 고찰하였고 이들이 시각디자인에 구체적으로 어떻게 작용하는가를 사례연구를 통하여 분석하였으며, 분석된 결과를 결론으로 도출하였다. 문헌연구를 통하여 얻어낸 인간의 사회화과정의 심리요인은 성적쾌락추구를 비롯하여 11개로 정리되었고, 이를 도구 삼아 1994년부터 2003년까지 대한민국광고대상 수상작 40편의 인쇄매체광고디자인을 분석하였다. 분석된 결과는 생물학적인 기초로서의 적응가치와 문화적 각인항에 사례의 대부분이 반응하고 있었음이 발견되었고, 광고가 지니고 있는 기본적인 존립근거로는 사회적 불안심리로서의 상호불신과 대가행렬에 바탕을 두고 있었음이 발견되었다. 이는 앞으로의 광고 역시 오늘날과 같은 존재이유를 지니는 한, 적응가치, 문화적 각인, 사회학습, 모방학습 등에 기초할 수밖에 없음을 시사하는 것이다.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제22권3호
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• pp.209-222
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• 1997

In this paper, we study a bargaining order problem where one buyer sequentially bargains with two sellers whose reservation prices are unknown to the buyer but correlated. Our main question is who the buyer should bargain first with to maximize his expected payoff. This type of problem is widely applicable to business and political situations where one party negotiates with multiple parties sequentially. One of the most important element in a sequential bargaining is "linkage effect" which exists when the aggreement of the previous bargaining affects the outcome of the following bargaining. To examine "linkage effect", we assume that the sellers'objects are similar so that the sellers' reservation prices are correlated. In addition, to consider incomplete information aspect regarding reservation prices, it is assumed that the sellers' reservation prices are unknown to the buyer. That is, we deal with one sided incomplete information case. In our model, there are two stages in each of which the buyer meets one seller. Since we are concerned with the bargaining order, we consider two different bargaining orders. Using game theory, we find a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and compute the buyer's expected payoff for each bargaining order. Finally we identify the advantageous bargaining order for the buyer by comparing the expected payoffs obtained under two different bargaining orders. Our results are as follows: the advantageous bargaining order depends on the prior probability of the seller type. However, in general, the buyer should bargain first with the seller whose object is less valuable to the buyer. The basic reason for our result is that the buyer wants to experiment in the first stage to find out the sellers' reservation prices and in doing so, to minimize the experimental cost and maximize potential gain in case of negotiation failure in the first stage. in the first stage.

• 한국산학기술학회논문지
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• 제16권3호
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• pp.2178-2184
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• 2015

무선 네트워크기술의 발전으로 사용자들은 다양한 네트워크를 쉽게 사용하며 다양한 서비스를 이용할 수 있지만, 서비스 제공자들은 서비스의 질을 개선하고 네트워크 자원을 효율적으로 관리하여야 한다. 본 논문에서는 그레이 관계 분석(GRA)과 게임이론을 결합하여 효율 무선자원관리(RRM) 방안을 제시한다. 첫 번째 단계에서, GRA 방법을 이용하여 네트워크 선호도를 나타내는 GRC를 구하고, 두 번째 단계에서는 내쉬 균형점을 찾아 네트워크 제공자에게 최대 보상을 제공하는 서비스를 선택한다. 한 개의 WiMAX와 2개의 WLAN이 공존하는 이종 무선 환경에서, 4개의 응용서비스중 하나를 요청하는 서비스들을 처리하기 위해 게임은 반복적으로 수행하였다. 시뮬레이션 결과, WiMAX, WLAN 1과 WLAN 2의 게임에서, 각 경기자들은 각각 93, 90.6과 92.8로 최대 보수를 얻는 것을 알 수 있었다. 결과적으로 제안된 시스템은 이종 네트워크에서 사용자 서비스 요청이 있을 때, 네트워크 운용자의 보수를 최대로 할 수 있는 효과적인 자원관리 방법임을 알 수 있었다.

• 한국산림과학회지
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• 제80권3호
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• pp.287-295
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• 1991

국립공원(國立公園)을 포함한 자연휴양지(自然休養地)에서 과도한 개발에 따른 자원파괴나 무절제한 이용행위로 인한 환경오염현상은 Social Dilemma에 기인하는 현상으로 볼 수 있다. 자연휴양지(自然休養地)의 Social Dilemma는 공공자원(公共資源)인 산림휴양자원(山林休養資源)을 개발하고 관리하는 과정에서 발생하는 "개인의 이윤추구행위와 공공이익간의 갈등(葛藤)"을 말한다. Social Dilemma는 2가지 특성으로 요약된다. 첫째, 공동체의 구성원 각자가 자신의 이익만을 추구할 경우, 서로 협동하는 경우와 비교해서 더 큰 손해의 댓가를 치러야 하고, 둘째, 공동의 이익을 위해 협동을 하는 경우에는 구성원 각자는 더 큰 보상을 받게 된다. 국립공원(國立公園)에서 Social Dilemma의 해소방안(解消方案)은 크게 구조적(構造的)인 접근방법(接近方法)과 개별적(個別的)인 접근방법(接近方法)으로 구분되고, 구조적(構造的)인 접근방법(接近方法)에는 관리대표자(管理代表者)의 선출(選出), 선택적(選擇的) 보상제도(補償制度) 및 자원(資源)의 소유(所有)나, 관리(管理)를 개별화(個別化)하는 방법이 있으며, 개별적(個別的)인 접근방법(接近方法)에는 직접대화(直接對話)와 홍보(弘報) 및 교육적(敎育的)인 접근법이 포함된다. 본 연구에서는 실험실 연구와 공원현장실험연구의 결과를 Social Dilemma 이론에 의해 종합함으로써 자연휴양지자원에서의 Social Dilemma 이론의 적용을 위한 근거를 제시하였다.

• 로봇학회논문지
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• 제4권2호
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• pp.97-104
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• 2009

Recently, simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) approaches employing Rao-Blackwellized particle filter (RBPF) have shown good results. However, due to the usage of the accurate sensors, distinct particles which compensate one another are attenuated as the RBPF-SLAM continues. To avoid this particle depletion, we propose the strategic games to assign the particle's payoff which replaces the importance weight in the current RBPF-SLAM framework. From simulation works, we show that RBPF-SLAM with the strategic games is inconsistent in the pessimistic way, which is different from the existing optimistic RBPF-SLAM. In addition, first, the estimation errors with applying the strategic games are much less than those of the standard RBPF-SLAM, and second, the particle depletion is alleviated.