• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.11b
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• pp.60-62
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• 2001

This paper shows the optimal bidding strategy determination method using Nash equilibrium concept by defining bidding strategy vector. This vector is 2-dimension vector whose components are generation amount and generation cost. Thereby we are able to make all possible strategies and their's payoff table. And then we erase dominated strategies one by one so that we obtain Nash equilibrium, the optimal bidding strategy of generation bidding game.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.33 no.6
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• pp.957-960
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• 2011

We present a fair and efficient solution for selfish readers with the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) to mitigate the effects of RFID frequency interference. We compare the NBS with a solution derived by the max log-sum scheme that maximizes total utility and show that for selfish and rational readers, the NBS brings success in bargaining on resource allocation between readers unlike the max log-sum scheme, although the NBS has less total payoff compared to the max log-sum scheme.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.20 no.43
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• pp.17-24
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• 1997

This research suggests an approach to reduce the physical distribution cost of production by analyzing data from real situations. The proposed approach re-layouts facilities according to the SLP(Systematic Layout Planning) method. An application result showed that the production lead time was reduced by 24% and the payoff period for facility re-layout was about ten months.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.75-83
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• 2015

In mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs), nodes are mobile in nature. Collaboration between mobile nodes is more significant in MANETs, which have as their greatest challenges vulnerabilities to various security attacks and an inability to operate securely while preserving its resources and performing secure routing among nodes. Therefore, it is essential to develop an effective secure routing protocol to protect the nodes from anonymous behaviors. Currently, game theory is a tool that analyzes, formulates and solves selfishness issues. It is seldom applied to detect malicious behavior in networks. It deals, instead, with the strategic and rational behavior of each node. In our study,we used the dynamic Bayesian signaling game to analyze the strategy profile for regular and malicious nodes. This game also revealed the best actions of individual strategies for each node. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) provides a prominent solution for signaling games to solve incomplete information by combining strategies and payoff of players that constitute equilibrium. Using PBE strategies of nodes are private information of regular and malicious nodes. Regular nodes should be cooperative during routing and update their payoff, while malicious nodes take sophisticated risks by evaluating their risk of being identified to decide when to decline. This approach minimizes the utility of malicious nodes and it motivates better cooperation between nodes by using the reputation system. Regular nodes monitor continuously to evaluate their neighbors using belief updating systems of the Bayes rule.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.1817-1836
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• 2020

Network convergence is considered as one of the key solutions to the problem of achieving future high-capacity and reliable communications. This approach overcomes the limitations of separate wireless technologies. Efficient interface selection is one of the most important issues in convergence networks. This paper solves the problem faced by users of selecting the most appropriate interface in the heterogeneous radio-access network (RAN) environment. Our proposed scheme combines a hierarchical evaluation of networks and game theory to solve the network-selection problem. Instead, of considering a fixed weight system while ranking the networks, the proposed scheme considers the service requirements, as well as static and dynamic network attributes. The best network is selected for a particular service request. To establish a hierarchy among the network-evaluation criteria for service requests, an analytical hierarchy process (AHP) is used. To determine the optimum network selection, the network hierarchy is combined with game theory. AHP attains the network hierarchy. The weights of different access networks for a service are calculated. It is performed by combining AHP scores considering user's experienced static network attributes and dynamic radio parameters. This paper provides a strategic game. In this game, the network scores of service requests for various RANs and the user's willingness to pay for these services are used to model a network-versus-user game. The Nash equilibria signify those access networks that are chosen by individual user and result maximum payoff. The examples for the interface selection illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.

• Archives of design research
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• v.18 no.2 s.60
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• pp.79-90
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• 2005

The aim of this study was to investigate how the psychological factors of human interrelation or human socialization are associated with the visual design based on sociological and psychological theories. To accomplish this goal, human socialization was examined on the basis of physiology, philosophy, and psychology. Then a case study was employed to assess how they function in the area of visual design. In literature, the sources of psychological factors of human socialization were categorized into 11 items including the sexual hedonic pursuit. These items were used for the evaluation of 40 printed media advertisements, all of which were the winners of the Korea Advertising Awards from 1994 to 2003. As a result, it was revealed that most advertisements responded to the items of adaptive value and cultural imprinting as biological bases. Also, it was discovered that the existential foundation of advertising has been based on mutual distrust and the payoff matrix as a mind of social unrest. In conclusions, it was illustrated that future advertising will remain based on adaptive value, cultural imprinting, social learning, and imitation learning, as long as advertising continue to hold its reason for existence.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.209-222
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• 1997

In this paper, we study a bargaining order problem where one buyer sequentially bargains with two sellers whose reservation prices are unknown to the buyer but correlated. Our main question is who the buyer should bargain first with to maximize his expected payoff. This type of problem is widely applicable to business and political situations where one party negotiates with multiple parties sequentially. One of the most important element in a sequential bargaining is "linkage effect" which exists when the aggreement of the previous bargaining affects the outcome of the following bargaining. To examine "linkage effect", we assume that the sellers'objects are similar so that the sellers' reservation prices are correlated. In addition, to consider incomplete information aspect regarding reservation prices, it is assumed that the sellers' reservation prices are unknown to the buyer. That is, we deal with one sided incomplete information case. In our model, there are two stages in each of which the buyer meets one seller. Since we are concerned with the bargaining order, we consider two different bargaining orders. Using game theory, we find a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and compute the buyer's expected payoff for each bargaining order. Finally we identify the advantageous bargaining order for the buyer by comparing the expected payoffs obtained under two different bargaining orders. Our results are as follows: the advantageous bargaining order depends on the prior probability of the seller type. However, in general, the buyer should bargain first with the seller whose object is less valuable to the buyer. The basic reason for our result is that the buyer wants to experiment in the first stage to find out the sellers' reservation prices and in doing so, to minimize the experimental cost and maximize potential gain in case of negotiation failure in the first stage. in the first stage.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.2178-2184
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• 2015

With the development of wireless network technologies, mobile users may use various networks easily and expect more advanced services. On the other hand, it may bring on some problems with network resource management that should lead the service provider to improve the current service quality and manage the network resource efficiently. This paper proposes the optimized radio resource management (RRM) scheme that integrates the Grey Relational Analysis (GRA) and game theory. The first applies the GRA to determine the Grey Relation Coefficient (GRC) factors that represent the network preference, and the network provider then selects the requested service that provide maximum payoff through Nash Equilibrium. Six requested services that have one application service among four different types of service classes were considered and the game was played repeatedly. In WiMAX, WLAN 1 and WLAN 2 game, the maximum payoff of each players was 93, 90.6 and 92.8 respectively. The experimental results show that every requested service can be selected by the network provider. Consequently, the proposed radio resource management mechanism is more effective in heterogeneous wireless networks.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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• v.80 no.3
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• pp.287-295
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• 1991

Overuse and damage to natural resources from inappropriate visitor behavior is a type of social dilemmas faced by many recreation areas. Social dilemmas in natural recreation resource management are the conflict between the individual's own benefit and that of the collectivity. Social dilemmas may be defined by two properties : (1) Each individual in a group receives a higher payoff for a socially defecting choice than for a cooperative choice, regardless of others' choices, and (2) each individual receives a higher payoff if all group members cooperate than if all defect. There are two approaches to solve the social dilemmas in National Parks, the structural solutions and the individual solutions. Establishment of superordinate authority, selective incentives, and privatization of common resources are included in the structural approaches, while face-to-face interaction and communication among group members in the individual approaches. To aid in generalizing from specific results to other situation, data from laboratory and field experiments are interpreted in the light of social dilemma theory.

• The Journal of Korea Robotics Society
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.97-104
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• 2009

Recently, simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) approaches employing Rao-Blackwellized particle filter (RBPF) have shown good results. However, due to the usage of the accurate sensors, distinct particles which compensate one another are attenuated as the RBPF-SLAM continues. To avoid this particle depletion, we propose the strategic games to assign the particle's payoff which replaces the importance weight in the current RBPF-SLAM framework. From simulation works, we show that RBPF-SLAM with the strategic games is inconsistent in the pessimistic way, which is different from the existing optimistic RBPF-SLAM. In addition, first, the estimation errors with applying the strategic games are much less than those of the standard RBPF-SLAM, and second, the particle depletion is alleviated.