• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.225-241
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• 2020

Purpose - The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of the ratio of outside directors, especially the ratio of outside directors according to their tenure, on firm value. Design/methodology/approach - This study collected total 3,861 firm-year data about companies listed KRX KOSPI market in Korea. The Pooled Ordinary Least Square Model and Panel Fixed Effects Model were hired in order to analyze the data. Findings - First, it was found that the ratio of outside directors for total sample had no significant effect on firm value, and the estimation coefficient of dummy variable for the average tenure less than 3 years had a significant positive(+) effect on firm value. Second, the ratio of outside directors corresponding to the tenure of less than 3 years had a significant positive(+) effect on the firm value. On the contrary, the ratio of outside directors corresponding to the tenure of 3 years or more had a significant negative(-) effect on firm value. Third, the ratio of outside directors corresponding to the tenure for more than 6 years did not show any significant influence on firm value. Research implications or Originality - First, if other matters are not additionally considered, keeping the tenure of outside directors shortly on average could help to increase firm value. Second, in the case of firms facing the decision to reappoint outside directors for the first time, it is highly likely that the firm value would decrease on average, so careful decisionmaking considering various aspects is required. However, this study does not take into account the legal standards for the appointment of outside directors, diversity of outside directors, and the actual independence of outside directors according to other criteria in the analysis. Therefore, if these factors are considered, there is a possibility that the empirical analysis results of this study may show different patterns.

• Korean Association of Arts Management
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• no.55
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• pp.115-154
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• 2020

This paper examines the professional qualifications of the directors of important public art museums in Korea in comparison to museums outside Korea through analysis of the directors' primary qualifications, including academic background, major, career experience, and study abroad experience, as well as secondary qualifications, including length of tenure, age, gender, and alma mater, which can indirectly the hiring process for directors. The museums examined in this study are separated into three geographical categories - 1. Seoul, 2. the Seoul Metropolitan Area, and 3. locations in Korea outside the Seoul Metropolitan Area - to analyze how the influence of primary and secondary qualifications differs across geographies. Additionally, this study looks at how the professional qualifications of directors in Korea compare to the qualifications of directors outside Korea to identify the idiosyncrasies of the Korean system. It finds that directors in Korea, in general, have a shorter length of tenure, are older, are more likely to be female, and are less likely to be foreign than the directors of overseas museums. Experience-wise, directors in Korea often have experience working as art experts, artists, and art professors, but their backgrounds differ depending on the region in which they are working. Although directors in Korea have, across the board, studied abroad and graduated from prestigious universities, there are noticeable differences across the three geographical locations looked at. Notably, in Korea, the proportion of directors who majored in practical skills is high, while in the case of directors overseas, the proportion of those who majored in art history is high. In addition, while a high percentage of directors are graduates of Hongik University regardless of their museum's location, graduates of Seoul University are mainly concentrated in the Seoul and Seoul Metropolitan Areas. Museums outside the Seoul Metropolitan Area, on the other hand, often hire directors who have graduated from a nearby university. These differences mark a contrast between Korean museums and museums overseas, which generally hire directors who have graduated from prestigious universities, regardless of geographical location.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.95-131
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• 2012

This study examines whether the executive turnover and the executive resignation during the term of office affect the performance of Korean state-owned enterprises. The executive turnover in the paper means the comprehensive change of the executives which includes the change after the term of office, the change after consecutive terms and the change during the term of office. The 'resignation' was named for the executive change during the term of office to distinguish from the executive turnover. The study scope of the paper is restrained to the comprehensive executive change itself irrespective of the term of office and the resignation during the term of office. Therefore the natural change of the executive after the term of office or the change after consecutive terms is not included in the study. Spontaneous resignation and forced resignation are not distinguished in the paper as the distinction between the two is not easy. The paper uses both the margin of return on asset and the margin of return on asset adjusted by industry as proxies of the performance of state-owned enterprises. The business nature of state-owned enterprise is considered in the study, the public nature not in it. The paper uses the five year (2004 to 2008) samples of 24 firms designated as public enterprises by Korean government. The analysis results are as follows. First, 45.1% of CEOs were changed a year during the sample period on the average. The average tenure period of CEOs was 2 years and 3 months and 49.9% among the changed CEOs resigned during the term of office. 41.6% of internal auditors were changed a year on the average. The average tenure period of internal auditors was 2 years and 2 months and 51.0% among the changed internal auditors resigned during the term of office. In case of outside directors, on average, 38.2% were changed a year. The average tenure period was 2 years and 7 months and 25.4% among the changed internal directors resigned during the term of office. These statistics show that numerous CEOs resigned before the finish of the three year term in office. Also, considering the tenure of an internal auditor and an outside director which diminished from 3 years to 2 years by an Act on the Management of Public Institutions (applied to the executives appointed since April 2007), it seems most internal auditors resigned during the term of office but most outside directors resigned after the end of the term. Secondly, There was no evidence that the executives were changed during the term of office because of the bad performance of prior year. On the other hand, contrary to the normal expectation, the performance of prior year of the state-owned enterprise where an outside director resigned during the term of office was significantly higher than that of other state-owned enterprises. It means that the clauses in related laws on the executive dismissal on grounds of bad performance did not work normally. Instead it can be said that the executive change was made by non-economic reasons such as a political motivation. Thirdly, the results from a fixed effect model show there were evidences that performance turned negatively when CEOs or outside directors resigned during the term of office. CEO's resignation during the term of office gave a significantly negative effect on the margin of return on asset. Outside director's resignation during the term of office lowered significantly the margin of return on asset adjusted by industry. These results suggest that the executive's change in Korean state-owned enterprises was not made by objective or economic standards such as management performance assessment and the negative effect on performance of the enterprises was had by the unfaithful obeyance of the legal executive term.