Asia-Pacific Journal of Business (아태비즈니스연구)

KNU The Institute of Management & Economy Research (강원대학교 경영경제연구소)
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The Ratio of Outside Directors according to their Tenure and Firm Value

재임기간에 따른 사외이사 비율과 기업가치

  • Received : 2020.11.30
  • Accepted : 2020.12.21
  • Published : 2020.12.30
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Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of the ratio of outside directors, especially the ratio of outside directors according to their tenure, on firm value. Design/methodology/approach - This study collected total 3,861 firm-year data about companies listed KRX KOSPI market in Korea. The Pooled Ordinary Least Square Model and Panel Fixed Effects Model were hired in order to analyze the data. Findings - First, it was found that the ratio of outside directors for total sample had no significant effect on firm value, and the estimation coefficient of dummy variable for the average tenure less than 3 years had a significant positive(+) effect on firm value. Second, the ratio of outside directors corresponding to the tenure of less than 3 years had a significant positive(+) effect on the firm value. On the contrary, the ratio of outside directors corresponding to the tenure of 3 years or more had a significant negative(-) effect on firm value. Third, the ratio of outside directors corresponding to the tenure for more than 6 years did not show any significant influence on firm value. Research implications or Originality - First, if other matters are not additionally considered, keeping the tenure of outside directors shortly on average could help to increase firm value. Second, in the case of firms facing the decision to reappoint outside directors for the first time, it is highly likely that the firm value would decrease on average, so careful decisionmaking considering various aspects is required. However, this study does not take into account the legal standards for the appointment of outside directors, diversity of outside directors, and the actual independence of outside directors according to other criteria in the analysis. Therefore, if these factors are considered, there is a possibility that the empirical analysis results of this study may show different patterns.

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References

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