• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.1-34
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• 2017

This paper seeks to explore the effects of the board structure and director characteristics on the R&D investment of a company. The results from analyzing 95 Korean listed companies reveal that the directors' demographic characteristics substantially affect the R&D intensity. When the directors are younger, major in science or engineering, and have an experience of studying abroad, they tend to be supportive of R&D, thereby increasing the R&D expenditure. Particularly, the effects of insider directors are shown to be greater than those of outside directors, which implies that the Korean corporate boards are mainly operated by insiders. Furthermore, when the relative power of boards is greater than the management, the effects of inside directors, rather than overall directors, on R&D intensity are weakened.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.85-97
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• 2015

This study examined the effects of outside directors and CEO duality on acquisition strategies and performance of Korean firms in high-technology industry. Based on the resource dependence theory, we focused on the service and resource-dependence roles from board of directors in the process of decision-making of acquisition strategies. In addition, CEO opportunism behavior rises when CEO serves as chairperson of board and induces the negative effects on acquisition performance. Specifically, we investigated the interaction effects between outside directors ratio and CEO duality. For the period of 2004 to 2012, 246 acquisitions of Korean firms in high-technology industry were analyzed to test our intended hypotheses. Our results indicate that there exist positive relationship between outside director ratio and acquisition performance for Korean high-technology firms. Negative associations prevail between CEO duality and performance consequences of acquisitions. While outside director ratio has a positive effect on acquisition performance when there is a presence of CEO duality, negative effect prevail for outside director ratio on acquisition performance in the absence of CEO duality position to hold our interaction hypothesis. The favor of dual structure can be explained with implications referring to unity of command and strong leadership driven from CEO duality that enhances the resource dependence roles of board of directors in the context of high-technology industry acquisition behaviors rendered by Korean firms.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.12 no.8
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• pp.207-214
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• 2021

Existing studies have shown consistent results that a diversification discount phenomenon occurs, which means that the value of the company decreases as the degree of diversification of a company increases. Nevertheless, it is explained by the agency theory as a factor that continues to promote diversification by companies. And in order to solve the agency problem, it is important to form an effective governance structure. In order to solve these problems, this study aims to study how the directors' concurrent information affects the monitoring effect of the board of directors through this affects diversification.To this end, research was conducted on KOSPI companies for 6 years from 2011 to 2016.As a result of the analysis, in the case of the concurrent appointment of the CEO and the inside director, there was a positive (+) effect, but the significance could not be confirmed. In the case of adjunct appointments as outside directors, positive results were confirmed that were significant for diversification.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.131-177
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• 2006

This paper examines a simultaneous determination of corporate control mechanisms, and its effects on firm performance. The corporate control mechanisms considered include the following; insider shareholding, institutional shareholding, the board of directors, dividend policy, and capital structure. This paper applies a simultaneous equation methodology and investigates the interdependence among the corporate control mechanisms. In the first part, the paper finds that firm-level variations of control mechanisms are large across time although average variations are relatively small. These variations are related to one another, which is confirmed by Granger causality test based on dynamic panel autoregression model. More specifically insider shareholding, institutional shareholding and outside director ratio cause each other. With regard to interdependence among the control mechanisms, 2SLS(two stage least squares) regression results show that insider shareholding and institutional shareholding are substitutes while institutional shareholding acts as complements to the ratio of outside members in the board of directors. Then in the second part, the paper examines the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance. Firm performance, measured by Tobin's Q, has a positive association with leverage ratio while that has a negative relation to outside director ratio. This suggests that there may be a room for reforming corporate governance in Korea. Specifically it is necessary to enhance the independence of the outside directors.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.861-872
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• 2021

This study examines the relationship between board characteristics and capital structure. Data was collected from the annual reports of listed companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand, from 2015 to 2017, which totaled 1,264 firm-year observations. The study uses multiple regression analysis to analyses the data by using independent variables, including board size, outside directors, managerial ownership, CEO duality, frequency of board meetings, board experience, and gender to measure board characteristics and the total debt ratio for capital structure. Research findings show that the more independent the directors are, the lower the cost of debt financing is, as they control the management team more strictly about debt financing than directors with less independence do. Additionally, the results reveal that the higher the percentage of managerial ownership, the higher the level of leverage and debt financing, whereas board size and board meetings have a negative relationship to capital structure. Further research showed that firm size, growth opportunities and corporate governance rating all had a positive significant impact on capital structure. The findings of this study suggest that the presence of proper corporate governance leads to better funding mechanisms as it ensures that the company is in a better position to obtain external funding.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.23 no.6
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• pp.93-112
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• 2019

Purpose - First, this study contextually examines the governance codes of South Africa and South Korea. Second, it analyzes board features of South African (JSE) Mainboard and South Korean (KRX) KOSPI-listed companies. Design/methodology - This review is qualitative and uses data from the annual reports of the selected markets' companies, respective exchanges' official web sites and corporate governance-related web sites in order to examine the corporate governance practices in the two markets. In addition, Nvivo is employed in analyzing the content of the corporate governance codes of the selected countries. Findings - Our analysis indicates that the corporate governance codes of the two countries are evolving to keep up with the international trend of principles-based approach. The composition of the board of directors (BODs) of non-financial companies of both South Africa and South Korea shows no significant variation between the companies with regards to the executive (inside) and nonexecutive (outside) directors. On the contrary, there is a significant variation between South African and South Korean listed companies with respect to diversity. Originality/value - While previous studies are centered on the impact of governance codes on performance, this study intends to contextually evaluate the codes and features of South Africa and South Korea listed companies. This is essential and timely for regulators and policy makers given the importance of corporate governance features such as board independence and diversity in recent times.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.13 no.1
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• pp.365-373
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• 2022

The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of concurrent appointment as a director on the quality of the internal accounting management system (IACS). For analysis, 9,343 KOSPI & KOSDAQ company-year data from 2014-2019, excluding the financial industry, were used. As a result of the analysis, it was confirmed that the quality of IACS decreased as the number of multiple positions in the director increased. Although there is a difference in the roles of inside and outside directors, it was found that the quality of IACS decreases equally as the number of board members. According to the business hypothesis, this can be said to be the result of the agency problem within the company because directors, who were more busy with concurrent positions as directors, did not put sufficient effort into their work. This study suggests that information on the concurrent position of directors can be a new indicator that reflects the characteristics of the board in evaluating the effectiveness of corporate governance.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.173-188
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• 2016

The introduction and operation of compensation committee can affect managers' incentive-compensation system. In this context, The purpose of this paper examines whether managers' pay-performance sensitivity is affected by the quality of the compensation committee(compensation committee size, the proportion of outside directors on the compensation committee, the proportion of directors with 2 or more non additional board seats on the compensation committee) To test this hypothesis, we use a sample of 260 firm-year observations between 2001-2013. The results are as follows. Firstly, we find that no significant relevance between the compensation committee size and pay-performance sensitivity. But the proportion of outside directors on the compensation committee and the proportion of directors with 2 or more non additional board seats on the compensation committee is positively associated with both pay-earnings based performance sensitivity and pay-stock based performance sensitivity. Secondly, we find that the integration quality of the compensation committee is positively associated with both pay-earnings based performance sensitivity and pay-stock based performance sensitivity. Overall, our analysis suggests that compensation committee are important mechanism in the design of efficient incentive-compensation system.

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.99-125
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• 2002

Fisheries cooperative requires dual characteristics in performing its original function. Economic characteristic as an business enterprise and democratic characteristic as cooperative entity need to complete its objectives and survive in the complex rapidly-changing environment. After IMF crisis, fisheries cooperative received enormous government's financial support and credit-business department is perfectly under government's control. Regional fisheries cooperative also faces business failure, therefore pure cooperative movement can't save the fisheries cooperative. Economic characteristic as an business enterprise is more emphasized than democratic characteristic as cooperative entity in recent years. The theory of corporate ownership and governance can be applied to explain the ownership and governance of fisheries cooperative because fisheries cooperative is now similar to an business enterprise. During the IMF crisis the board, the auditors and the minority shareholders in business enterprise were revealed to be powerless against the mighty influence of controlling shareholders. Unconstrained discretion exercised by those controlling shareholders not only led to the firms'insolvency, but also brought down the country's financial system. During the past few years, Korea has experienced many institutional changes regarding its corporate governance structure. The introduction of outside directors, the strengthening of minority shareholders' rights, and enhanced accounting transparency are achieved to improve the efficiency of economic system. Investors, including institutional and individual, also seem to be more aware of governance issues now. Credit-business department of fisheries cooperative is recommended to introduce the institutions same as the case of the corporate governance structure. Fisheries cooperative except economic and credit-business department requires other prescriptions because it is emphasized as democratic cooperative entity. But we should be careful to interpret the ownership and governance structure because they are products of nations, eras and organizations.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.12
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• pp.223-231
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• 2020

This research aims to examine (1) the effect of carbon emission disclosure on firm value, (2) the effect of good corporate governance on firm value, (3) the mediating role of financial performance between carbon emission disclosure and firm value, and (4) the mediating role of financial performance between good corporate governance and firm value. The research sample includes 43 mining, agro, and manufacturing firms listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange over the 2015-2017 period. Carbon emission disclosure is measured by an indicator of the Global Reporting Initiative Series of Environmental Aspect. Good corporate governance is measured by the corporate governance score of shareholder rights, boards of directors, outside directors, audit committee and internal auditor, and disclosure to investors. Financial performance is measured by return on assets, while firm value is measured by Tobin's Q. Data analysis uses the structural equation modeling. The result shows carbon emission disclosure and good corporate governance have no direct effect on firm value. On the other hand, financial performance mediates the effect of carbon emission disclosure and good corporate governance on firm value. It shows that higher carbon emission disclosure and good corporate governance are meaningless for the investor if they do not give any financial performance improvement.