• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
• /
• v.9 no.8
• /
• pp.2854-2874
• /
• 2015

This paper presents a game theoretic approach to analyze the public goods (PGs) allocation in peer-to-peer (p2p) networks. In order to reduce the free-riders and promote the cooperation among peers, we propose an incentive mechanism with cooperation-based game theory. In this paper, we regarded the contributed resources by cooperators as public goods (PGs). We also build the PGs allocation in P2P networks to be the optimization problem, and the optimal solution of PGs allocation satisfies the Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium. Firstly, based on the subscriber mechanism, we analyze the feasibility and prove the validity, which can achieve Nash equilibrium. However, this strategy cannot meet to Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium as the free-riders do not pay with their private goods for consuming the PGs. Secondly, based on the Walker mechanism, we analyze the feasibility and prove the validity for the same allocation problem, which meets to Bowen-Lindahl-Samuelson equilibrium and achieves Pareto efficiency within cooperative game. Simulations show that the proposed walker mechanism can significantly improve the network performance of throughout, and effectively alleviate free-riding problem in P2P networks.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.25 no.1
• /
• pp.113-140
• /
• 2016

Achieving the two goals of providing stable remuneration and promoting market based incentive for generation capacity with only one kind of capacity price is a difficult proposition. This paper suggests a market design in which two different kinds of capacity prices are used to achieve these goals. It maintains the current capacity price that is determined administratively based on the fixed cost of the gas-turbine generator. A second capacity price is added that covers generators with higher fixed costs and lower fuel costs such as combined-cycle gas turbine, coal-powered, and nuclear generators. This second capacity price is conditional on a lower energy price ceiling and determined by the interaction of the market supply and a demand schedule derived from the optimal fuel mixed principle.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
• /
• v.5 no.1
• /
• pp.17-27
• /
• 2018

In 21^st Century business world, services are carried out in multifaceted, competitive and rationality manner that are characterized by evolving many factors, which are often unpredictable. On-the-go banking is a product in financial sector. However, it faces serious pitfalls being it riskiness. Bank customers compete for time-saving options. On contrary, PCBs compete for marginalizing its operating costs for enhancing its revenues. On strategic tactics, PCBs targets city customers in multi-facets including offering incentives for enhanced usages of on-the-go banking. Influencing customer's intention, attitude and behavior in banking, PCBs also offers incentive under market system along with often informational asymmetry. However, it causes exploitation. In most cases customers don't read terms & conditions of services. They don't save contract-copy. These weaknesses cause abuses. Customer faces hidden charges, extra fees, account hacked. Addressing the issue, Voluntary Insurance Option is proposed where PCBs will introduce it as a product of bank-services. Transferring risk away from customer will benefit both PCBs and bank-customers. This product can attract new customers who were on the brink using digital banking but just felt it was too risky. This model can facilitate the parties involved for increasing usage of on-the-go banking-services while customers can maintain optimal utility of usages.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
• /
• v.12 no.5
• /
• pp.7-16
• /
• 2021

Purpose: This study intends to examine how VMI with consignment performs over time and find out its on-going impacts on the individual supply chain member's achievement. Research design, data, and methodology: This study formulates the mathematical model that represents two-stage supply chain system. By analyzing the numerical examples, this study compares VMI with consignment with the traditional system. Results: VMI with consignment eventually makes higher supply chain profit than the traditional system, even though it's early performance is poor. The influence of VMI with consignment on the performance of the supply chain member is distinct depending on the individual member and time. The consignment may not be helpful to increase the system profit, but it reduces the manufacturer's burden of costs. Conclusions: VMI with consignment improves the supply chain performance after all, and it still takes times until its benefit becomes fully realized. To be a successful collaboration program, VMI with consignment requires a carefully designed incentive scheme that provides the timely compensation to the individual supply chain members. This study also finds out that the consignment contract of this collaboration program plays a role of financially supporting the manufacturer at the early stage of its implementation.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
• /
• v.20 no.3_spc
• /
• pp.201-217
• /
• 2013

This paper analyzes the effect of network neutrality regulation on social welfare using the two-sided market under the network congestion. This paper deals with zero price rule regulation which means the price regulation on the side of content. The results are as follows : First, under the monopoly platform, internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all decreasing as the network congestion increases. Second, under the monopoly platform internet use price, contents price, and the number of internet user and content provider are all increasing as the network capacity increases. Third, the price of internet use and contents internet use which maximize social welfare are increasing and the number of internet user and content provider are decreasing as the network congestion increases. Fourth, optimal network capacity for monopoly platform provider is less than socially optimal network capacity. Fifth, if network neutrality regulation is enforced, the price of internet use is higher than monopoly platform provider and the price of contents is lower than monopoly platform provider. Also, the number of internet user is less than monopoly platform provider and the number of content provider is more than that. By the way, when network congestion increases, internet use price, the number of internet user, and the number of content provider are decreasing. Sixth, network neutrality regulation is more effective for internet user side than contents provider when network congestion is considered. This means that network neutrality regulation is not effective for contents market side when network congestion is seriously large.

• Journal of Labour Economics
• /
• v.26 no.2
• /
• pp.31-59
• /
• 2003

This paper analyzes a social insurance system that integrates unemployment insurance with a pension program, allowing workers to borrow against their future wage income to finance consumption during an unemployment episode and thus improving their search incentives while reducing risks. This paper identifies the conditions under which the integration improves welfare and the factors which determine the optimal degree of integration. A fully integrated system is one in which no reliance is placed at all on a separate tax-funded unemployment insurance program. We show that when the duration of unemployment is very short compared to the period of employment or retirement, the optimal system involves an exclusive reliance on pension-funded self-insurance. This system imposes a negligible risk burden for workers while avoiding attenuating search incentives. We also argue that a joint integration of several social insurance programs with a pension program through an individual account is desirable unless the risks are perfectly correlated to each other.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.30 no.1
• /
• pp.131-170
• /
• 2008

Korea's public assistance system, represented by NBLS(National Basic livelihood Security), has disclosed critical problems despite the rapid increase in its budget, such as decreasing work incentive and deepening welfare trap. These typical problems of classical welfare system have been commonly witnessed in many other advanced countries. Therefore a number of efforts have been exerted to correct these problems by transferring the existing welfare system into a welfare-to-work(or workfare) system, and the most common one of such efforts is introducing the EITC(Earned Income Tax Credit)-type programs. They have already been implemented in many countries such as the USA, the UK and France, also Korean government decided to launch EITC program in 2009. This paper aims to propose some measures to improve Korean EITC program. For this, an optimization problem is constructed from the government's viewpoint. Optimal EITC program is defined to be a solution to the problem - a combination of phase-in rate, phase-out rate, and maximum credit that maximizes labor supply increase under a exogenously given budget constraint. Using a mechanism design analysis, we derive and characterize the optimal EITC program. Analysis results implies that Korean EITC structure needs to be modified so that phase-in rate is larger than phase-out rate and the upper limit of phase-out range becomes larger. Comparative static analysis results show that the feature of the optimal EITC program is sensitive to the change of income distribution, suggesting that if beneficiaries are categorized into different income groups, then it is desirable to apply distinctive EITC programs to each group.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.36 no.1
• /
• pp.81-106
• /
• 2014

This paper compares the monetary policy problem in open economies with that in closed economies. It is found that the monetary policy problems in open and closed economies are isomorphic even in the presence of distortions in a steady state and hence the optimal monetary policies have similar properties. On the other hand, the monetary policy maker in open economies has a distorted incentive to manipulate the terms-of-trade. Because of the additional distortion in open economies, there exist gains from international monetary policy cooperation even in the case of a unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution, in contrast to the literature that abstracts from distortions in a steady state. Also, it is found that in the presence of distortions inflation bias is decreasing in openness, which is line with empirical evidence. In addition, this paper presents a simple transformation so that methods in closed-economy models are easily applicable to open-economy models.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
• /
• v.14 no.6
• /
• pp.662-671
• /
• 2012

Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) will be widely used in future transportation systems to reduce oil fuel consumption. Therefore, the electrical energy demand will be increased due to the charging of a large number of vehicles. Without intelligent control strategies, the charging process can easily overload the electricity grid at peak hours. In this paper, we consider a smart charging and discharging process for multiple PHEVs in a building's garage to optimize the energy consumption profile of the building. We formulate a centralized optimization problem in which the building controller or planner aims to minimize the square Euclidean distance between the instantaneous energy demand and the average demand of the building by controlling the charging and discharging schedules of PHEVs (or 'users'). The PHEVs' batteries will be charged during low-demand periods and discharged during high-demand periods in order to reduce the peak load of the building. In a decentralized system, we design an energy cost-sharing model and apply a non-cooperative approach to formulate an energy charging and discharging scheduling game, in which the players are the users, their strategies are the battery charging and discharging schedules, and the utility function of each user is defined as the negative total energy payment to the building. Based on the game theory setup, we also propose a distributed algorithm in which each PHEV independently selects its best strategy to maximize the utility function. The PHEVs update the building planner with their energy charging and discharging schedules. We also show that the PHEV owners will have an incentive to participate in the energy charging and discharging game. Simulation results verify that the proposed distributed algorithm will minimize the peak load and the total energy cost simultaneously.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
• /
• v.19 no.3
• /
• pp.459-483
• /
• 2010

This paper constructs the two-part tax-a combined form of output tax and entrance fee-for polluting oligopolists under endogenous entry. In the presence of external damage that varies exogenously with aggregate output, we show that the two-part tax produces the ex post Pigouvian rule and thus achieves the first-best optimum. We also examine a detailed analysis of the impact of the two-part tax on social welfare and government revenues. Finally, when estimation errors exist in the process of regulation, we identify the incentive conflicts between interest groups and analyze the effects of estimation errors on determining optimal tax. In particular, we show that if the regulator takes care of both welfare loss and revenue gain under the proposed two-part tax, not only over-estimation on the slope of external damage but also under-estimation on the slope of market demand should be taken into the policy consideration.