• 수산해양교육연구
• /
• 제14권1호
• /
• pp.57-73
• /
• 2002

Illegal fishing is often cited as a principal cause of the failure of fisheries management, expecially fishing efforts regulations in traditional fisheries management. Usually, illegal fishing problems are perceived to be equivalent to inadequate enforcement, and policy prescription then follow to strengthen enforcement programs. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the illegal fishing behavior relatively recent emphasis on fishing efforts regulations in traditional fisheries management. The analysis focuses on measuring, explaining and developing the effectiveness way of enforcement strategies responding to imperfectly managed fishing efforts regulations through illegal fishing behavior and avoid enforcement fishing efforts measures. A model of fishermen fishing behavior and profit-maximizing decision making is analyzed to determine optimal fishing at individual fisherman level in response to fishing efforts regulation. The results of economic analysis of the enforcement of illegal fishing in traditional fisheries management results are as follows: First, illegal fishing will occur only if enforcement effort is not so high as to remove the incentive to do so, and if the effectiveness of avoidance is not too great, nor its cost too low. Second, avoidance effort will occur at a level jointly proportional to the extent of illegal activity and of enforcement; for given levels of the latter, the desired avoidance effort increase with its effectiveness and decrease with its cost Third, to improve the effectiveness of enforcement, understanding avoidance behavior appears to be crucial to any efforts. Forth, enforcement and fishermen behavior interact depends strongly on characteristics of avoidance, specifically its cost and effectiveness. When avoidance is neither too cheap nor too effective, the interaction is regular. Fifth, in this case, at low levels of enforcement, fishers respond to increases in enforcement by increasing avoidance, but at higher enforcement levels, it becomes uneconomical to continue to do so, and avoidance decreases with enforcement. Sixth, illegal fishing activity decreases steadily with enforcement, so the fishery manager is able, in theory, to reduce illegal fishing toward zero by increasing enforcement. If, however, avoidance is very inexpensive and/or very efficient/ then the optimal level of avoidance will increase indefinitely with increasing enforcement. Finally, less fishery enforcement is required if fishermen have less incentive to overfish, and fishermen have less incentive to avoid fishery enforcement measures.

• International Journal of Quality Innovation
• /
• 제9권2호
• /
• pp.129-147
• /
• 2008

This research is to investigate the effect of the improvement of investment environments with investment incentive on Korean national economy by looking into the foreign investment support system in Korea. To this end, first research model was set up based on our literary study and case study was conducted on 150 foreign companies that were located in industrial complex for foreign companies, received the tax benefit and government subsidization. And it was found that even though the foreign companies were contributing to the national economy in general such as in the area of production, export, employment, development of technology, there was no significant contributory difference between the investment incentive beneficiary and non-beneficiary foreign companies. Therefore it deemed reasonable to reconsider the way Korean government supports foreign companies in Korea and to reinforce foreign companies' relevance to national policy agenda with additional incentives to foreign companies located in comparatively less developed areas. As a way to promote foreign investment, promotion of investment infra such as improvement of follow-up services, openness to foreign investment, industrial deregulations in capital area, revitalization of free economic zone, efficient system to promote foreign investment and the reinforcement of public relations were considered necessary, especially the upgrading of economic structure and the integrated management of domestic and foreign investors deemed necessary for the optimal distribution of the industries.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
• /
• 제13권4호
• /
• pp.383-397
• /
• 2014

Reverse logistics network design issues have been popularly discussed in recent years. However, few papers in the past literature have been dedicated to incentive effect on return quantity of used products. The purpose of this study is to formulate a dynamic nonlinear programming model of reverse logistics network design with the aim of managing the used products allocation by coordinating the collection centers and recovery facilities to warrant economic efficiency. In the optimization model, a fuzzy approach is applied to interpret the relationship between the rate of return and the suggested incentives. Due to funding constraints in setting up the collection centers, this work considers these centers as multi-capacity levels, which can be opened or closed at different periods. In view of the fact that the problem is known as NP-hard, we propose a heuristic method based on tabu search procedure to solve the presented model. Finally, several dominance properties of optimal solutions are demonstrated in comparison with the results of a state-of-the-art commercial solver.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
• /
• 제7권3호
• /
• pp.109-124
• /
• 1997

Pricing information services, where congestion can threaten the efficient operation of information systems, has been studied in economics and information systems literature, Recent explosion of the Internet ana proliferation of multimedia content over the Internet have rekindled the research interest in designing pricing schedules for differentiated information services, In order for the information system to effectively serve users having heterogeneous needs, pricing rules for discriminated services should be considered. At the same time, when individual users' interest does not align with that of the organization that individual users belong to, organization-wide pricing policy should be devised to improve the value of the services rendered by the system. This paper, using a priority queuing model, addresses the need for such on incentive-compatible pricing for different information services.

• 수산경영론집
• /
• 제18권1호
• /
• pp.37-57
• /
• 1987

This article discussed the characteristics of several Pareto-optimal incentive contracts between owner and labor, more specifically, four situations: reporting output jointly observable by labor ana owner; reporting both output and effort; incorporating other endogenous elements (like capital) that affect the production process and Pareto-optimal fee schedules; and ascertaining the effects of private pre-decision information private- decision information, and per-contact informational asymmetries. Also presented were several extensions of the basic contractual model, and the different components of agency costs associated with labor-owner contractual relations. In a single-period model, the agency problem exists because the uncertainty prevents the owner from using the cash flow to determine unambiguously the labor's action. Holmstrom(1979) suggests that "when the same situation repeats itself over time, the effects of uncertainty tend to be reduced and dystunctional behavior is more accurately revealed, thus alleviating the problem of moral hazard. " Under these conditions, if the labor selects the first-best level of effect in each period, the cash flow will be independent and identically distributed over time. As the number of periods increases, the variance of the labows average output, if he selects the first-best level of effort in each period, gets smaller. Note that for this diversification effect to occur, it is necessary that the owner evaluate the labor's effort over the entire history of his employment, rather than evaluate each period's performance separately. Radner(1980) and Rubinstein and Yaari(1980) consider the extreme case in which there are an infinite number of observations. They show that the owner can eventually detect and systematic shirking on the part of the labor by comparing the labor's average output with what would be expected if the labor had been selecting the first-best level of effort in each period. In a dynamic model with incentive problems we have demonstrated that the labor's second-period compensation will depend on his first-period performance. This allows the owner to diversify away some of the uncertainty surrounding the labor's actions. In addition, this allows the owner to smooth the labor's income over time by spreading the risk of the first-period outcome over both periods. At least some unexplored avenves in this area invite future accounting research: situations where owner has different incompatible objectives and negotiates a contract with labor; circumstances in which owner deals with multiple objectives and negotiates contracts with several labors simultaneously; the value of costly accounting information systems and communication in establishing, Pareto-optimal incentive contracts, and the value and effects of inside information, Thorough theoretical or empirical research on each of these topics not only would increase our knowledge about the role and significance of accounting information but could also provide explanations of the inherent differences among various organizations and in their economic behavior. behavior.

• 한국경영과학회지
• /
• 제13권2호
• /
• pp.1-8
• /
• 1988

This study suggests on optimal process when decision maker is confronted with expert's biased information under the situation that the bias is caused mainly by the difference of their interest. In order to make honest transmission of expert's probabilistic information, the concept of expert use and scoring rule to provide expert with an incentive is used in this paper. And expected regret concept is introduced to evaluate the value of expert's information. A simple example is also shown.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
• /
• 대한전기학회 2009년도 제40회 하계학술대회
• /
• pp.587_588
• /
• 2009

본 논문에서 전력 시스템 운영자의 trigger poin와 수요 반응 프로그램 참여자의 가격 탄력성에 따라 수요 반응 이후의 전기 가격을 예측하여 경제성 수요 반응 프로그램에 어떤 영향을 끼치는 지 살펴보고 운영자가 수요 반응 프로그램 반응 정보를 쉽게 파악할 수 있게 PR을 제안한다.

• 환경정책연구
• /
• 제2권1호
• /
• pp.51-75
• /
• 2003

The objective of this study is to analyze the problems of disposal and collection, including administrative management of agricultural PE waste and suggest effective management measurements. Information regarding problems of agricultural PE waste management were collected from field survey of farmers, regional governments and officials. On the national level, the low ratio of collection for optimal treatment of agricultural PE waste is a critical problem. , the negative discharging behavior of farmers, an illegal incineration and landfill of farmers and a lack of education and extension etc. An ambiguity of the management principle to agricultural PE waste, the differences in management among the regional governments, a lack of will of the regional governments and officials to realize SARD and lack of education and extension etc. are some of the problems in administrative management of agricultural PE waste collection. The major suggestions of this study are as follows : (1) to strengthen education and extension, (2) to adopt an improved economic incentive system and strong, lawful regulation simultaneously, (3) to use temporang collection and permanent collection site, and (4) to organize "OTC(Optimal Treatment Conference)" composed of farmers, regional cooperative, PE producers etc. for operating an effective management system.

• 국제지역연구
• /
• 제15권1호
• /
• pp.59-86
• /
• 2011

본고는 공급측면(비용)의 비대칭정보가 존재할 때, 일국의 외국 독점기업에 부과하는 최적관세 정책에 관한 내용이다. 즉, 한 나라의 후생관점에서 시장 지배력을 가진 외국독점기업에 대한 최적관세의 결정 문제를 비용측면의 비대칭정보하에서 분석하는 것이 이 논문의 목적이다. 따라서 비대칭정보하에서의 전략적 최적관세가 도출되고 그 함축성이 논의된다. 주요 결과는 외국기업의 독점렌트를 이전하기 위한 최적관세의 크기가 완전정보하에서 보다 비대칭정보하에서 더 커진다는 것이다. 또한 외국독점렌트를 이전하기 위한 전략적 무역정책이 비대칭정보하에서 유동적임이 드러난다. 이 연구는 문헌적으로 기존의 전략적 무역정책을 보완하며 특히 이 분야의 선구적 이론인 브랜더-스펜서의 결과(1984)를 이론적으로 확장하는 의미를 가진다.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
• /
• 제23권1호
• /
• pp.1-19
• /
• 2013

The market for commercial open source software (OSS) has been rapidly growing with the proliferation of OSS. One way to commercialize OSS is the support model, which has been adopted by leading OSS firms such as Red Hat and JBoss. Despite the growing interest in OSS commercialization, little research has provided OSS support providers with a pricing guideline. In this paper, we examine the optimal pricing strategies for OSS support providers. Our benchmark is a monopoly case in which we investigate a startup software vendor's incentive to choose the OSS support regime over the proprietary one. Then we extend the model to a duopoly case in which OSS under the support regime competes against proprietary software. We characterize the conditions under which the OSS support model is viable under competition. We believe that our results offer insights to the OSS vendors who consider commercializing their OSS with a support model.