• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.233-271
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• 2013

Quinean "ontology" mislead us because it has been used ambiguously even in his single article. It can mean what there is, ie. ontological states of affairs, on what there is, ie. a study of them, or on on what there is, ie. meta-ontology. So it is natural to be confused when we try to fully understand what does Quine do by talking about ontological commitment and criterion of it. We will discriminate these ontologies, and clarity the scope and the task of ontology as a discipline. Ontology is on what there is, meta-ontology is a study on ontology. Ontological commitment is a kind of ontological assertion within ontology, the criterion of ontological commitment is located in meta-ontological level. As a result of this clarification, we can remove some obstacles to get a good grip on Quinean criterion of ontological commitment. Also, we are able to recognize ontological descent, the way by which Quinean substantive ontology proceed.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.1-22
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• 2005

This paper provides a comparison of three fundamentally different approaches to the issue of ontological commitment. It argues that despite superficial similarities on either side, Buridan's approach provides an intriguing third alternative to the two commonly recognized modern approaches.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.77-102
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• 2011

This paper is about the problems that Quine's criterion of ontological commitment creates for Nominalists. Quine's clear criterion of ontological commitment, summarized as "to be is to be the value of a variable", means that when we accept a sentence to be true, we are committed to the existence of things that must exist for the sentence to be true. The criterion causes problems for Nominalists. According to Quine's criterion, Nominalists who consider "Humility is a virtue" as true should accept the existence of the property, humility. However, Nominalists are reluctant to accept that properties such as humility exist, although they wish to accept what is meant by "humility is a virtue". The way out of this predicament is presenting a paraphrase which delivers what Nominalists wanted to say through the original sentence without ontological commitment to the property. Several attempts were made to paraphrase such sentences, only to fail. In this paper, successful paraphrases will be presented to cope with previously discussed difficulties. Beforehand, several issues involved in the Quine's criterion will be clarified. Also, Lewis's critical objection that we should give up the business of paraphrase will be discussed.

• Journal of The Korean Association For Science Education
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.100-116
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• 2003

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the objectivity of scientific knowledge, focusing on Michael Polanyi's epistemology. The objectivity of scientific knowledge could be examined in epistemological and ontological view. The former relates to the rationality, but the latter to the reality. Since the middle of 20th century science philosophers have debated about the objectivity of scientific knowledge. Their opinions are divided three parts by the criteria of objectivity in relation to the rationality. Exactly Objectivism approves the rationality of scientific knowledge, and Falsificationism accepts the panial rationality, but Relativism denies any rationality. In this paper, we will study the objectivity of knowledge in relation to the subjectivity, especially throughout the theory of Kant, Kierkegaard and Wang Yang-ming. Experienced good scientist Polanyi(1946; 1958) have ever suggested the new epistemology as the name of 'personal knowledge'. He argues that scientific knowledge is personal by faith, trust, passions, tacit understanding, method rules embodied in practice. Some implications were discussed for science education from the view of Polanyi. The first holds that science class needs human voice throughout the personal commitment. The second holds that intellectual passions should he recovered. The third holds that the teacher should act like real scientist. Finally, the theory of science education should be established for ourselves.