• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제52권4호
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• pp.674-680
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• 2020

We used MCNP6 computer code to model HTR-10 core reactor. We used two types of fuel; UO₂ and (Th+Pu)O₂ mixture. We determined the critical height at which the reactor approached criticality in both two cases. The neutronic and burnup parameters were investigated. The results indicated that the core fueled with mixed (Th+Pu)O₂, achieved about 24% higher fuel cycle length than the UO₂ case. It also enhanced safeguard security by burning Pu isotopes. The results were compared with previously published papers and good agreements were found.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제61권11호
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• pp.1565-1570
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• 2012

Nuclear power generation is increasing domestic power supply ratio by lower CO2 emission and fuel prices. Currently, nuclear power generator has been operated with maximum power output. Therefore, nuclear power generator could be no effect to managing the reactive power reserve on power system. The reactive power reserve is calculated to the difference between maximum facility and operation generation capacity of the power system. This paper was proposed that load following of nuclear power is control by using 15-bus power system model. In the simulation result, power system is shown to safety state by operating load following of nuclear power generator. This method has be improved the supplied reliability through economic and efficient operation.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제39권6호
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• pp.691-696
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• 2007

Nuclear energy programs around the world increasingly find themselves at the nexus of potentially conflicting demands from both domestic and international stakeholders. On one side, the rapid growth in demand for electricity coupled with the goal of reducing carbon emissions calls for a significant expansion of nuclear energy. On the other, stakeholders are seeking ever greater safety, environmental, security, and nonproliferation assurances before consenting to the construction of new nuclear energy facilities. Satisfying the demand for clean energy supplies will require nuclear energy operators to find new and innovative ways to build confidence among stakeholders. This paper discusses two related concepts which can contribute to meeting the needs of key stakeholders in cost effective and efficient ways. Structured processes and tools for assessing stakeholder needs can build trust and confidence while facilitating the "designing-in" of information collection systems for new facilities to achieve maximum efficiency and effectiveness. Integrated approaches to monitoring facilities and managing the resulting data can provide stakeholders with continued confidence while offering operators additional facility and process information to improve performance.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• 제50권7호
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• pp.1168-1172
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• 2018

This study went beyond making an indicator simply based on theoretical arguments, and explored a wide spectrum of different types of perceptions about energy safety to make a concept of energy safety for the Korean society. The energy safety schemata of people can be divided into three types. Type1 is concern about multi-level risks-responsibility-centric, type2 is concern about security and personal burden-expertise-centric, and type3 is concern about health and personal burden-responsibility-centric. Questions were designed on the basis of the characteristics, differences and commonalities of the three types of perceptions, explored through the Q methodology, and Koreans' perception of nuclear safety was examined. Based on the results of this research the following components of trust in nuclear safety were derived, risk perception, responsibility, honesty, expertise and procedural justification. The items for specifically evaluating them were developed, and factor analysis was conducted, and as a result, the validity of each item was proven. The components of the nuclear safety trust indicator do not exist independently, but influence each other continuously through interactions. For this reason, rather than focusing on any one of them, laws and systems must be improved first so that they can move together in one big frame.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.63-98
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• 2012

Northeast Asia has a multi-layered security structure within which major economic and military powers both confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative activities in the economic sphere while competing one another in order to secure a dominant position in the politico-military arena. The multifarious threats, posed by the North Korea's nuclear development, territorial disputes, and maritime demarcation line issues demonstrate that Northeast Asia suffers more from military conflicts and strifes than any other region in the world. Specifically, major maritime security threats include North Korea's nuclear proliferation and missile launching problems as well as military provocations nearby the Northern Limit Line(NLL) as witnessed in the Cheonan naval ship and Yeonpyong incidents. The ROK Navy has been supplementing its firm military readiness posture in consideration of North Korea's threats on the NLL. It has performed superb roles in defending the nation and establishing the Navy advanced and best picked. It also has been conducive to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, secure the sea lanes of communications, and establish regional stability and world peace. In order to effectively cope with the strategic environment and future warfares, the ROK Navy needs to shift its military structure to one that is more information and technology intensive. In addition, it should consolidate the ROK-US alliance and extend military cooperative measures with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Evolved steadily for the last 60 years, the ROK-US alliance format has contributed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. In conclusion, this manuscript contends that the ROK Navy should strive for the establishment of the following: (1) Construction of Jeju Naval Base; (2) Strategic Navy Equipped with War Deterrence Capabilities; (3) Korean-type of System of Systems; (4) Structure, Budget and Human Resources of the Naval Forces Similar to the Advanced Countries; and (5) Strategic Maritime Alliance and Alignment System as well as Domestic Governance Network for the Naval Families.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제7권3호
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• pp.115-144
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• 2023

特朗普政府时期美国已表明了 "中国是美国的战略竞争者, 也是修正主义势力, 更是对美国繁荣和安全的主要挑战" 这种立场, 拜登政府也基本上继承了这种对中国的认识。中国也对此积极应对。因此, 美中战略竞争已成为当今国际体系中最重要的背景因素, 也对东北亚安全局势产生了巨大的影响。尽管如此, 观察最近韩美日三边安全合作的形成过程时我们可以发现, 尹锡悦总统上台之后韩国的对外战略调整对韩美日三边安全合作的形成起到了关键性作用。这是因为美国一如既往希望构建的韩美日三边安全合作的成败取决于韩日关系的改善, 而尹锡悦政府不顾韩国国内政治的制约因素, 果断推动了韩日关系的快速改善。随后, 在戴维营召开的韩美日三国峰会为未来三国在安全及其他更广泛领域的合作奠定了基础。中国对韩美日三边安全合作的形成提出了强烈的不满和抗议。但本文认为, 韩国虽然同意与美国和日本形成韩美日三边安全合作, 但韩国的战略目标与美国和日本的战略目标都不完全一致。比如, 回顾冷战结束之后的美日同盟发展历程, 美国与日本都对中国的崛起持有类似的看法和认识。最近几年美日同盟加强的实际目标也主要是如何应对中国的崛起。与此相反, 韩国历届政府都对韩美日三边安全合作持消极的态度。这是因为韩国想要追求的最主要的战略目标是如何减少或消除来自北韩的威胁, 而不是应对中国。面对北韩不断增强的挑衅与威胁, 过半数的韩国人支持通过加强韩美日三边安全合作来遏制或缓解来自北韩的威胁。因此, 只要北韩的核威胁与导弹挑衅持续存在, 那韩国的对外战略方向就很可能是加强韩美日三边安全合作, 以确保自身的安全与生存。所以, 如果中国想要减少韩美日三边安全合作给中国带来的战略上的压力, 最好的方案是降低北韩对韩国的挑衅和威胁, 在让北韩放弃核武器的问题上扮演更加实质性的角色。

• Strategy21
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• 통권42호
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• pp.5-52
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• 2017

Debates about introducing nuclear submarines have been a main issue in Korea. The highest officials and the government has started to think seriously about the issue. Yet there were no certain decision to this issue or any agreements with US but it is still necessary to review about introducing nuclear submarines, the technologies and about the business. The reason for such issues are the highest officials of Korea to build nuclear submarine, nK's nuclear development and SLBM launching. ROKN's nuclear submarine's necessity will be to attack(capacity to revenge), defend(anti-SSBN Operation) and to respond against neighboring nation's threat(Russia, Japan, China). Among these nations, US, Russia (Soviet Union), Britain, France had built their submarines in a short term of time due to their industrial foundation regarding with nuclear propulsion submarines. However China and India have started their business without their industrial foundation prepared and took a long time to build their submarines. Current technology level of Korea have reached almost up to US, Russia, Britain and France when they first built their nuclear propulsion submarines since we have almost completed the business for the Changbogo-I,II and almost up to complete building the Changbogo-III which Korea have self designed/developed. Furthermore Korea have reached the level where we can self design large nuclear reactors and the integrated SMART reactor which we can call ourselves a nation with worldwide technologies. If introducing the nuclear submarine to the Korea gets decided, first of all we would have to review the technological problems and also introduce the foreign technologies when needed. The methods for the introduction will be developments after loans from the foreign, productions with technological cooperations, and individual production. The most significant thing will be that changes are continuous and new instances are keep showing up so that it is important to only have a simple reference to a current instances and have a review on every methods with many possibilities. Also developing all of the technologies for the nuclear propulsion submarines may be not possible and give financial damages so there may be a need to partially introduce foreign technologies. For the introduction of nuclear propulsion submarines, there must be a resolution of the international regulations together with the international/domestics resistances and the technological problems to work out for. Also there may be problem for the requirement fees to solve for and other tough problems to solve for. However nuclear submarines are powerful weapon system to risk everything above. This is an international/domestically a serious agenda. Therefore rather than having debates based on false facts, there must be a need to have an investigations and debates regarding the nation's benefits and national security.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• 제45권4호
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• pp.147-153
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• 2020

Background: Malawi's 2018 National Energy Policy includes nuclear power as an energy option with an operational 100 MW targeted for 2035. Materials and Methods: This paper challenges the scope of the policy on nuclear power by reviewing its implementation strategy and comparing it to: the strategy established for coal in the same policy; some experiences from other countries; and documents by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) relating to establishing a national position on nuclear power and infrastructural requirements for a nuclear power program. Results and Discussion: It is found that the pro-nuclear position is uninformed, and targets are unrealistic owing to a lack of understanding of nature of nuclear power including the requirements for safety, security and safeguards, and nuclear infrastructure. It is apparent that neither consultation nor a proper analysis were comprehensively conducted for nuclear. Though the national energy policy suggests a national position for nuclear energy, the content does not demonstrate that the position was arrived at knowledgeably. Conclusion: Thus, nuclear power may presently be viewed as a potential energy option that is yet to be seriously considered. It is important to build an appropriate level of literacy on nuclear science and technology for policy makers, key stakeholders, and the public to be better positioned for strategizing on nuclear power.

• Strategy21
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• 통권34호
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• pp.236-261
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• 2014

미래 한·미 안보동맹에 있어 핵 확장억제 능력은 중요한 현안이다. 북한의 핵무기 제조 능력이 증대되고 더욱 위협적으로 진화하는 가운데, 미국 국가안보정책 추진에 있어 오바마 대통령의 핵없는 세상 선언 등에 의해 핵무기에 의한 억제 능력이 점차 감소되고 있다. 이는 한·미 연합방위태세의 중요한 한 축인 한국에 대한 "핵우산(nuclear umbrella)" 능력이 과연 충분한가에 대한 새로운 의구심을 낳게 한다. 본 논문은 상기와 같은 상황 하에 핵 확장억제의 현재와 미래 역할에 대해 평가할 목적으로 작성되었다. 이를 위해 우선 전체적인 미국 핵무기 재고 감소 추세에 대해 평가를 하고, 다음으로 최근 북한의 국지 군사도발 양상과 미국 오바마 행정부의 핵정책 그리고 이에 대응해야 하는 한·미 핵 확장억제 전망에 관해 분석을 한다. 이를 통해 본 논문이 얻는 결과는 북한의 핵위협을 억제시키는 억제의 신뢰성과 동맹국에 대한 확실한 보증이 어렵고 장기적 이라는 것이다. 아울러 북한의 소규모 핵위협 또는 재래식 무기 위협에 대해 충분히 대응할 수 있는 정도의 핵무기 재고가 점차 축소되는 추세에 어떻게 한·미 양국이 대응해야 하는가를 과제로 제시하고 있다. 또한 본 논문은 한·미 간에 연합방위태세 유지를 위해 지속적이고도 전략적이며 정치적 상호협력을 강화하여 한·미 안보동맹의 신뢰도를 증진시켜야 한다는 과제를 제시하고 있다. 본 논문은 북한의 핵위협 또는 대규모 재래식 위협에 대응하기 위해 미국이 대규모 핵무기를 보유하는 것은 비효율적 전략인 바, 이를 극복하기 위해 강력한 한·미 연합방위태세를 지속적으로 유지 발전시켜야 한다는 것을 결론으로 제시한다. 특히 북한의 핵위협과 대규모 재래식 위협에 직면해 있는 한반도의 불확실성, 복잡성 그리고 위기상황에 대비하기 위해 한·미 간 핵 확장억제 능력을 계속적으로 협의하여 발전시켜야 할 것으로 판단되며, 이를 위해 한국 해군의 역할을 증대시켜야 한다는 것을 한·미 안보동맹의 중·장기 현안으로 제시하고 있다. 궁극적으로 본 논문은 한미 양국이 한반도 주변해역에서 발생하는 북한과의 해양분쟁이 전면전으로 확대되는 것을 최소화시키고 동시에 북한의 소규모 위협(smaller-scale threats)에 대응할 수 있는 한국 해군력 발전을 고려해야 한다고 주장하면서 이에 대한 심층적인 연구가 추가로 있어야 할 것이라고 제언하고 있다.

• 방사성폐기물학회지
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• 제13권4호
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• pp.243-251
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• 2015

국내 원자력발전은 현재 두 번째로 큰 전력 공급 방법이며 원전의 수 역시 증가되는 것으로 계획되어 있다. 그러나, 원자력발전에 의해 발생되는 사용후핵연료에 대해서는 아직 명확한 관리 정책이 확립되어 있지 않다. 원자로 이 후 핵물질 흐름과 관련된 후행 핵연료주기는 사용후핵연료 관리를 위한 기술들의 집합이다. 따라서, 사용후핵연료 관리 정책은 핵연료주기 선택과 함께한다. 핵연료주기 선택의 중요 항목은 경제성으로 이는 사적비용과 함께 외부비용을 더해 결정되어야 한다. 직접비용 인 사적비용과 달리 간접비용인 외부비용에 대한 연구는 원전에 집중되어 있으며 핵연료주기에 대한 연구는 없는 상황이다. 본 연구에서는 핵연료주기에 적용할 수 있는 외부비용 항목들을 도출하고 정량화를 시도하였다. 핵연료주기 외부비용 평가를 위해 고려될 수 있는 핵연료주기로 OT(직접처분), DUPIC(PWR-CANDU 연결), PWR-MOX(PWR 습식재처리), Pyro-SFR (파이로 처리와 고속로 연계)의 네 가지를 선정하였다. 원자력발전의 외부비용 평가에 고려되었던 항목들을 분석하여 핵연료주기에서 에너지 공급 안보비용, 사고위험비용과 수용성 비용을 외부비용 항목으로 도출하고 추산하였다.