• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.15-22
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• 2014

As the risk of the various external risk was increased, a study on the integrity assessment of the nuclear transport cask was needed. In this paper, an integrity assessment of the nuclear transport cask under the ballistic impact was studied. The projectile with L/D = 5 was used in simulation. The applied head shapes of the projectile were five types such as flat shape, conical shape, hemispherical shape, truncated conical and sliced flat shape, respectively. The range on the velocity of the projectile was 85 m/s to 680 m/s. The cask body of the nuclear transport cask was not penetrated by the projectile speed up to Vprojectile = 510 m/s. As the cask body was penetrated by the all types projectile with Vprojectile = 680 m/s and the cask lead in the nuclear transport cask was collided with the projectile. As the projectile moved to 31.3 mm in the cask lead, the cask lead was not penetrated by the projectile with Vprojectile = 680 m/s. The integrity assessment on the nuclear transport cask under ballistic impact up to Vprojectile = 680 m/s was obtained.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.291-298
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• 2003

The KN-12 transport cask has been designed to transport 12 PWR spent nuclear fuel assemblies and to comply with the regulatory requirements for a Type B(U) package. The containment boundary of the cask is defined by a cask body, a cask lid, lid bolts with nuts, O-ring seals and a bolted closure lid. The containment vessel for the cask consists of a forged thick-walled carbon steel cylindrical body with an integrally-welded carbon steel bottom and is closed by a lid made of stainless steel, which is fastened to the cask body by lid bolts with nuts and sealed by double elastomer O-rings. In the cask lid an opening is closed by a plug with an O-ring seal and covered by the bolted closure lid sealed with an O-ring. The cask must maintain a radioactivity release rate of not more than the regulatory limit for normal transport conditions and for hypothetical accident conditions, as required by the related regulations. The containment requirements of the cask are satisfied by maintaining a maximum air reference leak rate of $2.7{\times}10^{-4}ref.cm^3s^{-1}$ or a helium leak rate of $3.3{\times}10^{-4}cm^3s^{-1}$ for normal transport conditions and for hypothetical accident conditions.

• Journal of Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology(JNFCWT)
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.357-364
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• 2022

The safety of a KTC-360 transport cask, a large-capacity pressurized heavy-water reactor transport cask that transports CANDU spent nuclear fuel discharged from the reactor after burning in a pressurized heavy-water reactor, must be demonstrated under the normal transport and accident conditions specified under transport cask regulations. To confirm the thermal integrity of this cask under normal transport and accident conditions, high-temperature and fire tests were performed using a one-third slice model of an actual KTC-360 cask. The results revealed that the surface temperature of the cask was 62℃, indicating that such casks must be transported separately. The highest temperature of the CANDU spent nuclear fuel was predicted to be lower than the melting temperature of Zircaloy-4, which was the sheath material used. Therefore, if normal operating conditions are applied, the thermal integrity of a KTC-360 cask can be maintained under normal transport conditions. The fire test revealed that the maximum temperatures of the structural materials, stainless steel, and carbon steel were 446℃ lower than the permitted maximum temperatures, proving the thermal integrity of the cask under fire accident conditions.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.281-290
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• 2003

The KN-12 spent nuclear fuel transport cask, which is a Type B(U) package designed to comply with the requirements of Korea Atomic Energy Act[1], IAEA Safety Standards Series No.TS-R-1[2] and US 10 CFR Part 71[3], is designed for carrying up to 12 PWR spent fuel assemblies in a basket structure. The cask has been licensed in accordance with Korea Atomic Energy Act and was fabricated in Korea in accordance with the requirements of ASME B&PV Sec.III, Div.3[4]. The cask must maintain thermal integrity in accordance with the related regulations and be evaluated to verify that the thermal performance of the cask complies with the regulatory requirements. The temperatures of the cask and components were determined by using finite elements methods with a numerical tool, safety tests using an 1/8 height slice model of the real cask were conducted to demonstrate verification of the numerical tool and methods, and heat transfer tests for normal transport conditions were performed as a fabrication acceptance test to demonstrate the heat transfer capability of the cask.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.207-214
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• 2001

The KN-12 spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transport cask is designed for transportation of up to 12 assemblies and is in standby status for being licensed in accordance with Korea Atomic Energy Act. To evaluate radiation shielding and criticality safety of the KN-12 cask, each case of study was carried out using MCNP4B Code. MCNP code is verified by performing benchmark calculation for the KSC-4 SNF cask designed in 1989. As a result of radiation safety evaluation for the KN-12 cask, calculated dose rates always satisfied the standards at the cask surface, at 2m from the surface in normal transport condition, and at 1 m from the surface in hypothetical accident condition. Maximum dose rate was always arisen on the side of the cask. For normal transport condition, photons primarily contribute to dose rate between two kinds of released sources, neutrons and photons, from spent nuclear fuel but for hypothetical accident condition, contrary case was resulted. The level of calculated dose rate was 27.8% of the limit at the cask surface, 89.3% at 2 m from the cask surface, and 25.1% at 1 m from the cask surface. For criticality analysis, keff resulting from the criticality analysis considering the condition of optimum partial flooding with fresh water is 0.89708(0.00065. The results confirm the standards recommended by all regulations on radiation safety.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.54 no.10
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• pp.3766-3777
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• 2022

It is essential to ensure the safety of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transport cask in drop situation that is included in transport accident scenarios. The safety of the drop situation is affected by the impact absorption performance of impact limiters. Therefore, when designing an impact limiter, the uncertainty in the material properties that affect the impact absorption performance must be considered. In this study, the material properties of the wood inside the impact limiter were selected as the variables for a parametric study. The sensitivity analysis of the drop response of the SNF transport cask with impact limiter was performed. The minimum wood strength required to prevent a direct collision between the cask and floor was derived from the analysis results. In addition, the plastic strain response was analyzed and strain-based evaluation was performed. Based on this result, the critical values of wood properties that change the impact dynamic characteristics were investigated. Finally, the optimal material properties of wood were obtained to secure the structural safety of the SNF transport cask. The results of this study can contribute to the development of SNF transport cask, thereby ensuring safety in transport accident conditions.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.34 no.3
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• pp.187-201
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• 2002

The KN-12 cask is designed to transport 12 PWR spent nuclear fuels and to comply with the requirements of Korea Atomic Energy Act, IAEA Safety Standards Series No.57-1 and US 10 CFR Part 71 for a Type B(U)F package. It provides containment, radiation shielding, structural integrity, criticality control and heat removal for normal transport and hypothetical accident conditions. W.H 14$\times$14, 16$\times$16 and 17$\times$17 fuel assemblies with maximum allowable initial enrichment of 5.0 wt.%, maximum average burn-up of 50,000 MWD/MTU and minimum cooling time of 7 years being used in Korea will be loaded and subsequently transported under dry and wet conditions. A forged cylindrical cask body which constitutes the containment vessel is closed by a cask lid. Polyethylene rods for neutron shielding are arranged in two rows of longitudinal bore holes in the cask body wall. A fuel basket to accommodate up to 12 PWR fuel assemblies provides support of the fuels, control of criticality and a path to dissipate heat. Impact limiters to absorb the impact energy under the hypothetical accident conditions are attacked at the top and at the bottom side of the cask during transport. Handling weight loaded with water is 74.8 tons and transport weight loaded with water with the impact limiters is 84.3 tons. The cask will be licensed in accordance with Korea Atomic Energy Act 3nd fabricated in Korea in accordance with ASME B&PV Code Section 111, Division 3.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.51 no.8
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• pp.2018-2025
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• 2019

This study systematically compared two hybrid deterministic/Monte Carlo transport codes, ADVANTG/MCNP and MAVRIC, in solving a difficult shielding problem for a real-world spent fuel storage cask. Both hybrid codes were developed based on the consistent adjoint driven importance sampling (CADIS) methodology but with different implementations. The dose rate distributions on the cask surface were of primary interest and their predicted results were compared with each other and with a straightforward MCNP calculation as a baseline case. Forward-Weighted CADIS was applied for optimization toward uniform statistical uncertainties for all tallies on the cask surface. Both ADVANTG/MCNP and MAVRIC achieved substantial improvements in overall computational efficiencies, especially for gamma-ray transport. Compared with the continuous-energy ADVANTG/MCNP calculations, the coarse-group MAVRIC calculations underestimated the neutron dose rates on the cask's side surface by an approximate factor of two and slightly overestimated the dose rates on the cask's top and side surfaces for fuel gamma and hardware gamma sources because of the impact of multigroup approximation. The fine-group MAVRIC calculations improved to a certain extent and the addition of continuous-energy treatment to the Monte Carlo code in the latest MAVRIC sequence greatly reduced these discrepancies. For the two continuous-energy calculations of ADVANTG/MCNP and MAVRIC, a remaining difference of approximately 30% between the neutron dose rates on the cask's side surface resulted from inconsistent use of thermal scattering treatment of hydrogen in concrete.

• Transactions of the Korean Society of Pressure Vessels and Piping
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.50-53
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• 2022

To investigate the validity of the finite element analysis program to assess structural integrity of a spent nuclear fuel transport cask subjected to extreme impact loads, structural integrity of the cask for the case of an aircraft engine collision is evaluated using three FE analysis programs: Autodyn, Speed and ABAQUS explicit version. As a result of all analyses, it is confirmed that no penetration occurred in the cask wall. Even though the different programs are used, it is identified that there are insignificant differences in the FE analysis variables such as von Mises effective stress and equivalent plastic strain among the programs.

• Transactions of the Korean Society of Pressure Vessels and Piping
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.69-74
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• 2023

The paper presents the results investigating the effect of aircraft engine impact location on the intended function evaluation results of spent nuclear fuel transport cask. As a result of the investigation, it is found that the structural integrity is maintained as the maximum accumulated equivalent plastic strain is below the acceptable criterion regardless of the collision location. It is identified that when the aircraft engine collided with the upper part of the transport cask without considering impact limiter the containment performance is weakened compared to when the aircraft engine collided with the central part.