• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.37-46
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• 2006

For the first step to develop a reference disposal container of spent fuel to be used in a deep geological repository, this paper examined safe dimensions of the disposal container on the points of nuclear criticality and radiation safety and mechanical structural safety and provided basic information for dimensioning the container and configuration of the container components, and establishing the favorable and safe disposal conditions. When the safety factor for stress due to the external loads (hydrostatic and swelling pressure) is taken as 2.0, the safe diameter of the filler material to provide enough container strength under the assumed external loads is found to be 112cm with 13cm spacing between inner baskets in PWR container. Also the thickness of the thinner section between the fuel basket and the surface of the cast insert is determined to be 150 mm. Regarding these dimensions of the container, the PWR fuel container is sketched to accommodate 4 square assemblies or 297 CANDU fuel 297 bundles (33 circle tubes x 9 stacks). However the top and bottom parts need to be checked again through the detail radiation shielding analysis with respects to the emplacement position and handling processes of the disposal container.

• Proceedings of the KSR Conference
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• 2008.11b
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• pp.1487-1493
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• 2008

Railway vehicle is very important to implement the effective maintenance in proper to prevent any failure during operation period. Many railway authorities are making efforts to maintain the railway vehicle through scientific and systematic procedure. To achieve this, Reliability Centered Maintenance(RCM) is partially applied. The efficiency of RCM has proven and its terminology was familiar with nuclear power, military and chemical plant etc. since the commercial aircraft's industries has introduced the maintenance program based on the target of reliability. The application of RCM on railway vehicle can be utilized with systematic analysis method to select the best effective maintenance period and action to prevent the failures by selecting the equipment affecting the its safety and reliability. This paper is presented that the procedure of adequate and effective maintenance for railway vehicle by comparing among the related standards in example IEC60300-3,11, MIL-STD-2173, and technical documents or papers. In accordance with above result, RCM procedure is proposed to apply effectively for maintenance of railway vehicle. That is, (1) Analysis of data and Calculation of criticality per equipment (2) Selection of equipment to analyze (3) Analysis of failure mode and effect (4) Evaluation of maintenance method and period (5) Optimization of maintenance program through renewal of maintenance method and period.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.54 no.1
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• pp.162-176
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• 2022

In Lead-based reactor (LBR) severe accident, the meltdown and migration inside the reactor core will lead to fuel fragment concentration, which may further cause re-criticality and even core disintegration. Accurately predicting the migration and solidification behavior of melt in LBR severe accidents is of prime importance for safety analysis of LBR. In this study, the Moving Particle Semi-implicit (MPS) method is validated and used to simulate the migration and solidification behavior. Two main surface tension models are validated and compared. Meanwhile, the MPS method is validated by the L-plate solidification test. Based on the improved MPS method, the migration and solidification behavior of melt in LBR severe accident was studied furthermore. In the Pb-Bi coolant, the melt flows upward due to density difference. The migration and solidification behavior are greatly affected by the surface tension and viscous resistance varying with enthalpy. The whole movement process can be divided into three stages depending on the change in velocity. The heat transfer of core melt is determined jointly by two heat transfer modes: flow heat transfer and solid conductivity. Generally, the research results indicate that the MPS method has unique advantage in studying the migration and solidification behavior in LBR severe accident.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.196-203
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• 1982

To transport the spent fuel assemblies of Korea Nuclear Unit 1, which is a Westinghouse type two loop pressurized water reactor, it has been found that steel is the most appropriate material for the design of a shipping cask in comparison with lead and depleted uranium. The proposed shipping cask will transport nine fuel assemblies at the same time and is well within the weight limit of transportation by unrestricted rail car. The cask requires 33cm thick steel shield and 27cm thick water region to satisfy the 3 feet apart dose rate limit set forth in 10 CFR 71, and 1.27cm thick steel boron fuel basket to hold the fuel elements inside the cask and control the effective multiplication factor. As a safety analysis, the fuel cladding and centerline temperatures were calculated under the accident condition of complete loss of water coolant, and it was found that the temperature was much lower than the limit of the melting point. k$_{eff}$ was calculated with fresh fuel assemblies, which was found to be well lower than 0.95. For shielding computation, the multipurpose Monte Carlo code MORSE-CG and one dimensional discrete ordinates transport code ANISN were used, and the Monte Carlo codes KENO and MORSE-CG were used for criticality calculation. The radiation source terms were calculated using ORIGEN-79.9.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.41 no.2
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• pp.117-121
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• 2016

Background: Definition and grouping of initiating events (IEs) are important basics for probabilistic safety assessment (PSA). An IE in a spent fuel reprocessing plant (SFRP) is an event that probably leads to the release of dangerous material to jeopardize workers, public and environment. The main difference between SFRPs and nuclear power plants (NPPs) is that hazard materials spread diffusely in a SFRP and radioactive material is just one kind of hazard material. Materials and Methods: Since the research on IEs for NPPs is in-depth around the world, there are several general methods to identify IEs: reference of lists in existence, review of experience feedback, qualitative analysis method, and deductive analysis method. While failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is an important qualitative analysis method, master logic diagram (MLD) method is the deductive analysis method. IE identification in SFRPs should be consulted with the experience of NPPs, however the differences between SFRPs and NPPs should be considered seriously. Results and Discussion: The plutonium uranium reduction extraction (Purex) process is adopted by the technics in a model reprocessing plant. The first extraction cycle (FEC) is the pivotal process in the Purex process. Whether the FEC can function safely and steadily would directly influence the production process of the whole plant-production quality. Important facilities of the FEC are installed in the equipment cells (ECs). In this work, IEs in the FEC process were identified and categorized by FMEA and MLD two methods, based on the fact that ECs are containments in the plant. Conclusion: The results show that only two ECs in the FEC do not need to be concerned particularly with safety problems, and criticality, fire and red oil explosion are IEs which should be emphatically analyzed. The results are accordant with the references.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.86-91
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• 1982

In 1977, spent fuel storage capacity of Ko-Ri Unit 1 was raised to contain 4-2/3 core, by reducing the center-to-center spacing between fuel assemblies from 53.34cm to 36cm. In this paper the adequacy is discussed in detail by examining the previous design analysis report. According to the analytic method presented by Core Performance Branch, study on credible abnormal moderator density condition is performed by using KENO-IV for the redesigned spent fuel storage facility. Result shows that 36cm for the center-to-center spacing between fuel assemblies is not enough to keep the storage safe at water density of 0.1143g/㎤, which gives the maximum $K_{eff}$ 0.9958$\pm$0.0048, which exceeds the CPB regulation limit 0.98. From sensitivity study regarding to the center-to-center spacing, it should be maintained to space greater than 43cm in order to meet the CPB requirements.s.