• Title/Summary/Keyword: Northeast chinese ports

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Effects of Macroeconomic Conditions and External Shocks for Port Business: Forecasting Cargo Throughput of Busan Port Using ARIMA and VEC Models

  • Nam, Hyung-Sik;D'agostini, Enrico;Kang, Dal-Won
    • Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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    • v.46 no.5
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    • pp.449-457
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    • 2022
  • The Port of Busan is currently ranked as the seventh largest container port worldwide in terms of cargo throughput. However, port competition in the Far-East region is fierce. The growth rate of container throughput handled by the port of Busan has recently slowed down. In this study, we analyzed how economic conditions and multiple external shocks could influence cargo throughput and identified potential implications for port business. The aim of this study was to build a model to accurately forecast port throughput using the ARIMA model, which could incorporate external socio-economic shocks, and the VEC model considering causal variables having long-term effects on transshipment cargo. Findings of this study suggest that there are three main areas affecting container throughput in the port of Busan, namely the Russia-Ukraine war, the increased competition for transshipment cargo of Chinese ports, and the weaker growth rate of the Korean economy. Based on the forecast, in order for the Port of the Port of Busan to continue to grow as a logistics hub in Northeast-Asia, policy intervention is necessary to diversify the demand for transshipment cargo and maximize benefits of planned infrastructural investments.

A Study on Global Strategies of Tank Terminal Operators and Implications for Korea's Oil Hub Policy in Northeast Asia (탱크터미널 운영기업의 글로벌 전략과 우리나라의 동북아 석유물류허브 정책에 대한 시사점)

  • Lee, Choong-Bae;Park, Sun-Young
    • Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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    • v.25 no.1
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    • pp.63-86
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    • 2009
  • With increasing uncertainty of energy market in the world, the policies for the energy resource security have become crucial Several countries with poor energy resource like Netherlands and Singapore have pursued the policy for becoming an oil hub in the region. Singapore has been an oil hub in East Asia for a long time not only because it is well located with a large number of countries exporting and importing oil but it has also pursued strong policies to become an oil hub while establishing favourable institutional, regulatory and business environment for accommodating major refineries and petro-chemical companies. However with growing trading volume of petroleum products in Northeast Asia and a record high price of oil in these days, the necessities of another oil hub in the region are considered in order to reap benefits of the security of economical and stable oil. South Korea is situated astride the main North Pacific shipping route, with deep water ports and proximity to Chinese and Japanese industrial centres that make tank terminal operators Ideal choices for the oil hub in Northeast Asia although it has several disadvantages such as lack of independent storage facilities, underdeveloped oil trading market and unfavourable business friendly climates etc. This study is focused on examining the globalization strategies of tank terminal operators such as Vopak, Oiltanking and Odfjell in order to suggest the policy implications for becoming an oil tub in Northeast Asia.

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Implications of China's Maritime Power and BRI : Future China- ROK Strategic Cooperative Partnership Relations (중국의 해양강국 및 일대일로 구상과 미래 한·중 협력 전망)

  • Yoon, Sukjoon
    • Strategy21
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    • s.37
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    • pp.104-143
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    • 2015
  • China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.

An Estimation of the Change in Transshipment Traffic in Northeast Asia using the System Dynamics (SD기법에 의한 한.중.일 환적물동량 변화량 추정에 관한 연구)

  • Yeo, Gi-Tae;Jung, Hyun-Jae
    • Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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    • v.27 no.4
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    • pp.165-185
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    • 2011
  • Transshipment traffic has significant meanings because it gives positive effects on increasing the container handling volumes in seaports, and revitalizes the regional and national development. Korean container port's transshipment traffic volumes, however, will slowly decrease due to the direct ships' calling into Chinese ports, which recently has a huge development plan. There are a lot of stress on forecasting the transshipment traffic volumes because the Korean container port development plans are designed based on this container traffic which consists of import and export traffic, and transshipment traffic. The transshipment traffic volumes are assumed to occupy 40% of total container traffic volumes. Despite of the importance of forecasting the transshipment traffic, a little studies are suggested using the concepts of the port competitiveness. In this respect, this study aims to estimate the Port Competitiveness Index and Transshipment traffic Volumes using the System Dynamics methodology. As a result, transshipment traffic volumes are predicted as: 20 million TEUs in Korea under the 4% annual increasing rates, 90 million TEUs in China under the 6% annual increasing rates, and 2.5 million TEUs in Japan under the 1% annual increasing rates respectively. The suggested results can be used to enhance the container port competitiveness and produce more transshipment traffic volumes.