• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.63-98
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• 2012

Northeast Asia has a multi-layered security structure within which major economic and military powers both confront one another and cooperate at the same time. Major regional powers maintain mutually cooperative activities in the economic sphere while competing one another in order to secure a dominant position in the politico-military arena. The multifarious threats, posed by the North Korea's nuclear development, territorial disputes, and maritime demarcation line issues demonstrate that Northeast Asia suffers more from military conflicts and strifes than any other region in the world. Specifically, major maritime security threats include North Korea's nuclear proliferation and missile launching problems as well as military provocations nearby the Northern Limit Line(NLL) as witnessed in the Cheonan naval ship and Yeonpyong incidents. The ROK Navy has been supplementing its firm military readiness posture in consideration of North Korea's threats on the NLL. It has performed superb roles in defending the nation and establishing the Navy advanced and best picked. It also has been conducive to defend the nation from external military threats and invasion, secure the sea lanes of communications, and establish regional stability and world peace. In order to effectively cope with the strategic environment and future warfares, the ROK Navy needs to shift its military structure to one that is more information and technology intensive. In addition, it should consolidate the ROK-US alliance and extend military cooperative measures with neighboring countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Evolved steadily for the last 60 years, the ROK-US alliance format has contributed to peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region. In conclusion, this manuscript contends that the ROK Navy should strive for the establishment of the following: (1) Construction of Jeju Naval Base; (2) Strategic Navy Equipped with War Deterrence Capabilities; (3) Korean-type of System of Systems; (4) Structure, Budget and Human Resources of the Naval Forces Similar to the Advanced Countries; and (5) Strategic Maritime Alliance and Alignment System as well as Domestic Governance Network for the Naval Families.

• 분석과 대안
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• 제2권1호
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• pp.5-29
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• 2018

Models of South-North Korean economic integration have the problem of circular reasoning. While many studies argue that South-North Korean economic integration would contribute to alleviate security risks in the Korean peninsular, they emphasize the success of any economic model of inter-Korean economic integration is subject to favorable geo-political and security environment. It is a failure in distinguishing between goals and constraints. After identifying three major goals of South-North Korean economic cooperation, this study shows the trilemma among the goals; they are 1) formation of a complete economic community, 2) maintaining independent sovereignty of the two Koreas, 3) promotion of mutual economic interests. The trilemma suggests that it is theoretically impossible to achieve the above three goals at the same time. Only two goals are achievable simultaneously. This study argues that the most practical option is to pursue the combination of goals 2) and 3) considering the complex political and security environment around the Korean peninsular. Recognizing that North Korea is the least developed country in the Northeast Asia region, South Korea's initiatives for inter-Korean economic cooperation should focus on assisting industrialization and integration of the North Korea economy into the Northeast Asian regional production sharing structure. In view of the 'flying geese model' of the sequential industrialization in the region, the least developed economic status of North Korea can partially be explained by its failure to participate in the production network in the region as well as lack of effective implementation of appropriate industrial policy. Therefore, promotion of industrialization of North Korea should be the immediate goal of economic cooperation between North and South Korea. It is an interesting fact that North Korea has rapidly expanded its apparel exports in recent years. It could mean that the North Korean economy is actively responding to the dynamics of international comparative advantage structure, although the production activities are limited to exports to China since the closure of the Gaesung Industrial Complex. The recent increase in apparel export is a starting point for incorporating the Easy Import Substitution fulfilling both domestic and neighboring regional demand of North Korea. It could help integrate North Korea's industry into the production network of Northeast Asia. An immediate policy implication is that the economic cooperation between the two Koreas should focus on facilitating this process and supporting North Korea's industrial policy through South Korea's contribution of capital, technology, and service intermediary inputs.

• 항공우주정책ㆍ법학회지
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• 제19권2호
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• pp.97-136
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• 2004

동북아 항공운송시장에서는 중국시장의 개방으로 항공운송시장이 전에 없는 급팽창을 하고 있으며, 전 세계 항공운송시장에서 아시아-태평양의 비중이 커지고 있다. 향후 점차적으로 확대될 이 지역의 인적, 물적, 서비스 그리고 정보의 교류를 위해서는 동북아 역내에서 보다 자유로운 항공편의 연결이 필요하다. 이런 측면에서 이 글에서는 지역 내 항공운송시장 통합을 위한 동북아 항공운송시장에 적용 가능한 대안을 제시하였다. 첫째, 각 국의 국내 항공운송시장에 대한 정책 변화가 필요하고, 둘째, 각 국 국내시장의 자유화 정책의 확대, 셋째, 동북아 지역 내의 양자협정의 보다 자유로운 항공협정의 체결이 필요 넷째, 동북아 항공시장에 참여하고 있는 각 국 항공사 간 전략적제휴의 확대, 다섯째, 경쟁력 있는 공항 및 노선 또는 저수요 노선부터 단계적으로 자유화 실시, 여섯째, 동북아 3 국의 주요 공항 간 셔틀 운영 필요, 일곱째, 동북아 삼국간 국제표준의 항공안전 및 보안체계의 공동 구축, 여덟째, 항공 외의 분야에서 우선적 자유화 추진, 마지막으로 아시아-태평양 지역 민간항공기구의 설립과 한, 중, 일간의 협의기구를 설립하여 각 국이 정기적으로 항공운송시장의 통합과 자유화에 대한 의견 개진을 통한 점진적인 자유화를 유도해야 할 것이다. 동북아에서 항공자유화를 위한 단기적 차원의 진전은 어려울 것이다. 그러나 중국 항공사의 계속적인 성장과 일본계 항공사들의 저비용 구조화에 대한 진전이 이루어질 경우 의외로 조속한 항공운송시장의 통합이 이루어질 수 도 있다. 항공운송시장은 과거 25년간 대변혁의 과정을 겪었다. 대 변혁의 과정 중에 가장 크게 영향을 미친것은 자유화였으며, 그 결과로 요금은 인하되고, 항공수요는 증가하였다. 이로써 침체되어있던 항공운송산업은 새로운 성장 산업으로 등장하게 되었다. 자유화 정책의 확대 추진을 통해서 만이 지역 내 교류를 활성화 할 수 있으며, 이를 주도한 국가가 지역의 중심으로서 역할을 수행할 수 있을 것이다.

• 시큐리티연구
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• 제37호
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• pp.29-50
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• 2013

최근 동북아시아 각국은 천안함 피격, 연평도 포격 등 북한의 대남 도발, 북한의 장거리미사일 발사와 핵실험 등 군사적 위협, 센카쿠 열도(댜오위다오)를 둘러싼 중국과 일본 간의 충돌 등 심각한 안보 위기를 맞고 있다. 특히 한국과 일본은 각기 2013년 2월 박근혜 정부, 2012년 12월 제2차 아베 신조(안부보삼(安部普三)) 내각 등 새로운 정권 출범을 맞아, 공히 주요 선거공약으로 제시한바 있는 위기관리 및 안보 정책의 정비 강화를 시도하고 있다. 그 핵심 중 하나는 최근 미국의 모델을 참조로 한 안보 및 위기관리 정책에서의 NSC 또는 그 유사 기구의 기능 확대 및 강화이다. 해당 각국의 NSC 조직은 각기 다른 특성을 가지고 있으나, 현 정치 안보 상황에서 안보 및 위기관리 정책의 컨트롤 타워로서 주된 역할을 담당할 수 있는 잠재성이 있다고 볼 수 있다. 따라서 이 논문에서는 한국, 미국, 일본 등 3개 국가 정부의 NSC 기구를 그 조직, 기능, 역사를 중심으로 비교 분석하고, 최근 이 3개 국가들, 특히 대한민국이 직면한 정치 안보 상황에 비추어 시사점을 도출해 보고자 한다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권37호
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• pp.104-143
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• 2015

China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21^st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.