• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권5호
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• pp.173-202
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• 2007

After successful nuclear tests Pakistan launched a more severe surprise attack toward India than before. It is highly possible that North Korea will adopt this Pakistan military strategy if it is armed with nuclear weapons. The North Korean forces armed, with nuclear bombs could make double its war capability through strengthening aggressive force structure and come into effect on blocking reinforcement of the US forces at the initial phase of war time. Therefore we may regard that Pyongyang's nuclear arming is a major one of various factors which increase possibility of waging a conventional warfare or a nuclear war. North Korea's high self-confidence after nuclear arming will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula via aggressive military threat or terror toward South Korea, and endeavor to accomplish its political purpose via low-intensity conflicts. For instance, nuclear arming of the Pyongyang regime enforces the North Korean forces to invade the Northern Limit Line(NLL), provoke naval battles at the West Sea, and occupy one or two among the Five Islands at the West Sea. In that case, the South Korean forces will be faced with a serious dilemma. In order to recapture the islands, Seoul should be ready for escalating a war. However it is hard to imagine that South Korea fights with North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. This paper concludes that the Pyongyang regime after nuclear arming strongly tends to occupy superiority of military strategy and wage military provocations on the Korean Peninsula.

• 기독교교육논총
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• 제61권
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• pp.109-129
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• 2020

이 연구는 동북아 국가의 지역적 쟁점을 성찰한다. 특히, 북한의 핵 문제에 대한 미국의 대외정책의 기조에서 연구가 시작되는 동기를 탐구한다. 연구자는 주된 연구방법으로 탐구에 기초한 실천신학의 방법론을 사용한다. 이 분석은 정치적 쟁점과 종교교육의 복합적인 관계를 연결하는 접근을 선호한다. 여기서 복합적인 관계란 정치학의 사회과학적 전제와 종교교육의 규범적 가치를 학제 간 대화의 방법으로 접근하는 관점을 의미한다. 이러한 관점에서 종교교육의 생태는 백인 우월성에 관한 인류학적이며 인종적인 차별의 위협을 무력화하는 교육적 목적을 지향한다. 특히 연구자는 학습자와 교사의 공유적 페다고지를 지지하며, 하나님의 민주적 임재라는 관점을 통해 예수 그리스도께서 억압의 환경에 도전하는 내러티브를 구성하는 연구의 목적을 실행한다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권31호
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• pp.57-84
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• 2013

North Korea's continuous threats and provocative behaviors have aggravated tension on the Korean peninsula particularly with the recent nuclear weapons test. South Korea's best way to cope with this situation is to maintain the balance among three policy directions: dialogue, sanctions, and deterrence. Among the three, I argue that deterrence should be prioritized. There are different sources of deterrence such as military power, economic power, and diplomatic clouts. States can build deterrence capability independently. Alternatively, they may do so through relations with other states including alliances, bilateral relations, or multilateral relations in the international community. What South Korea needs most urgently is to maintain deterrence against North Korea's local provocations through the enhancement of independent military capability particularly by addressing the asymmetric vulnerability between militaries of the South and the North. Most of all, the South Korean government should recognize the seriousness of the negative consequences that North Korea's 'Nuclear shadow strategy' would bring about for the inter-Korea relations and security situations in Northeast Asia. Based on this understanding, it should develop an 'assertive deterrence strategy' that emphasizes 'multi-purpose, multi-stage, and tailored deterrence whose main idea lies in punitive retaliation.' This deterrence strategy requires a flexible targeting policy and a variety of retaliatory measures capable of taking out all targets in North Korea. At the same time, the force structures of the army, the air force, and the navy should be improved in a way that maximizes their deterrence capability. For example, the army should work on expanding the guided missile command and the special forces command and reforming the reserve forces. The navy and the air force should increase striking capabilities including air-to-ground, ship-to-ground, and submarine-to-ground strikes to a great extent. The marine corps can enhance its deterrence capability by changing the force structure from the stationary defense-oriented one that would have to suffer some degree of troop attrition at the early stage of hostilities to the one that focuses on 'counteroffensive landing operations.' The government should continue efforts for defense reform in order to obtain these capabilities while building the 'Korean-style triad system' that consists of advanced air, ground, and surface/ subsurface weapon systems. Besides these measures, South Korea should start to acquire a minimum level of nuclear potential within the legal boundary that the international law defines. For this, South Korea should withdraw from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Moreover, it should obtain the right to process and enrich uranium through changing the U.S.-South Korea nuclear cooperation treaty. Whether or not we should be armed with nuclear weapons should not be understood in terms of "all or nothing." We should consider an 'in-between' option as the Japanese case proves. With regard to the wartime OPCON transition, we need to re-consider the timing of the transition as an effort to demonstrate the costliness of North Korea's provocative behaviors. If impossible, South Korea should take measures to make the Strategic Alliance 2015 serve as a persisting deterrence system against North Korea. As the last point, all the following governments of South Korea should keep in mind that continuing reconciliatory efforts should always be pursued along with other security policies toward North Korea.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.99-142
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• 2012

Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

• 시큐리티연구
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• 제49호
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• pp.157-183
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• 2016

유럽 등 세계 곳곳에서 이슬람 무장단체(IS)나 자생적 테러 및 국제 테러조직이 다양한 방법으로 철도교통시설에서 폭발물 테러를 발생시켜 "테러와의 전쟁"을 벌이고 있다. 우리나라가 미국의 중동지역에서의 전쟁에 협력하는데 대해 이슬람권 국가들이 반한 감정을 갖고 있고, 이슬람 무장단체(IS)는 2015.9.9 이후 우리나라를 4번이나 테러 대상국으로 지목했다. 또한 북한은 핵 실험, 미사일 발사 실험으로 국제사회에서 고립 당하고 남 북한 간 긴장을 고조시키며 우리의 중요인사 및 시설에 대한 테러 위협을 하고 있다. 이와 같은 테러가 철도교통시설에서 발생하는 것을 예방 및 차단하지 못할 경우 많은 인명 및 재산피해, 사회혼란, 국 내외적으로 테러 대응 정책실패에 대한 정부의 신뢰 하락으로 관광객 감소, 외국의 투자기피, 자본이탈 등 국가적 위기 상황이 발생할 수도 있을 것으로 예상 된다. 본 연구에서는 철도경찰의 철도보안검색 등의 업무를 바탕으로 국민보호와 공공의 안전을 위해 철도보안검색 강화를 위한 정책적 대응 방안을 제안하고자 함에 목적이 있다. 그 방안으로 첫째, 철도경찰의 인력증원 및 일반경찰과 업무 관할권 조정 둘째, 철도 보안검색의 단계적 확대 셋째, 철도의 중요시설 보안시스템 강화 넷째, 철도안전법 보완 다섯째, 동남아 등 각국의 불법체류자 단속 강화 여섯째, 보안검색요원의 인권침해 예방과 전문화대책 일곱째, 보안검색 및 테러예방 홍보와 테러 발생 시 신속한 대응을 위한 관련 기관들의 선제적 주기적 협력 방안 등이 필요하다.