• Strategy21
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• s.31
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• pp.220-250
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• 2013

South Korean national security strategy should be developed to effectively handle and counter increasing maritime threats and challenges. There are three major maritime threats South Korea faces today; maritime disputes on the EEZ boundary and Dokdo islet issues, North Korean threats, and international maritime security. Maritime disputes in the region are getting intensified and turned into a military confrontation after 2010. Now regional countries confront each other with military and police forces and use economic leverage to coerce the others. They are very eager to create advantageous de facto situations to legitimize their territorial claims. North Korean threat is also increasing in the sea as we witnessed in the Cheonan incident and Yeonpyoung shelling in 2010. North Korea resorts to local provocations and nuclear threats to coerce South Korea in which it may enjoy asymmetric advantages. The NLL area of the west sea would be a main hot spot that North Korea may continue to make a local provocation. Also, South Korean national economy is heavily dependent upon foreign trade and national strategic resources such as oil are all imported. Without an assurance on the safety of sea routes, these economic activities cannot be maintained and expanded. This paper argues that South Korea should make national maritime strategy and enhance the strength of naval forces. As a middle power, its national security strategy needs to consider all the threats and challenges not only from North Korea but also to maritime security. This is not a matter of choice but a mandate for national survival and prosperity. This paper discusses the importance of maritime security, changing characteristics of maritime threats and challenges, regional maritime disputes and its threat to South Korea's security, and South Korea's future security strategy and ways to enhance the role of naval forces. Our national maritime strategy needs to show middle and long term policy directions on how we will protect our maritime interests. Especially, it is important to build proper naval might to carry out all the roles and missions required to the military.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Computer Information Conference
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• 2020.07a
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• pp.107-110
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• 2020

북한의 사이버 공격은 매년 증가하고 있으며 공격 수행인력 또한 6,800여 명으로 지속 늘어나고 있어 우리에게 큰 위협이 되고 있다. 그럼에도 불구하고 현재까지 북한의 사이버 공격사례 분석은 각각의 사건에 대한 개별 현황분석밖에 되지 않아 큰 시각에서의 공격 기술 유형이 어떻게 변화하였는지와 관련된 연구가 필요하다. 이에 따라 본 논문에서는 우선 사이버전의 일반사항 및 공격 기술을 확인하고 최근 3년간 발생한 북한의 사이버 공격사례를 조사하여 세부적으로 사용된 주요 공격 기술의 유형을 확인하고자 한다.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.5-31
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• 2015

The Republic of Korean Navy (ROKN) started from scratch. However, ROKN demonstrated its Blue Navy capabilities successfully to the entire world by conducting "Operation Early Dawn" at the Aden Bay, Yemen in Jan 2011. On the event of the 70th anniversary of the ROKN, I would like to retrospect past gleaning from voyages and challenges we had in the past. At the very inception of the ROKN, Korean government as well as senior military leaders recognized that it had no time to spare to clean up military those were insinuated deeply by communist agents. It was the top priority of the government. The Mongumpo Operation which was not well known, conducted by ROKN was one of the clean-up drive. The Korean War sometimes called as "a fire from land put-off at the sea". The world famous "Incheon Landing" which reversed war situation from the Nakdong Perimeter also done by Sea Power. ROKN conducted various maritime operations including not only Incheon Landing, but amphibious operation at Hungnam, mine sweeping, sea convoy, Wonsan Withdrawal. On the same day of the Korean War started, 25th June 1950, unless the victory of the ROKNS Baekdusan (PC 701) at the Korean Strait, the waning lamp light of Korea could not be rekindled by the participation of the U.N. The ROKN rescued the 17th regiment of Korean Army from the isolation at the Ongjin Peninsular and transported gold and silver bars stored at the Bank of Korea to the Navy supply deposit in Jinhae safely. ROKN special intelligence unit conducted critical HUMINT which led Incheon Landing success. One of important mission ROKN conducted successfully was not only transporting war fighting materials but also U.S. provided grains to starving Koreans. ROKN participated Vietnam campaign from 1960s and conducted numerous maritime transportation operations supplying materials to Vietnam military forces along the long coastal lines. Experienced Naval Officers and enlisted men who discharged and acquired as merchant marine certificate supported most of the U.S. sea lift operations throughout the Vietnam campaign. ROK-US Combined Forces which had been honed and improved its war fighting capabilities through the Korean War and out of Vietnam jungle playing key deterrent against threat from north Korea. However, those threat level will be completely different when north Korea finish its nuclear weapon ambition. In order to stand firm against north Korean nuclear threat, I would like to expect strong political leadership supporting nuclear submarine for ROKN.

• Journal of the Korean Professional Engineers Association
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• v.42 no.3
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• pp.35-40
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• 2009

After the yield of North Korea conducted underground the first nuclear test in 2006, which was less than a kiloton, it launched a vehicle on this April 9 again, which is believed to be a Taepo-dong 2 missile, defying international warnings that the move would violate U.N. resolutions, from Musudan-ni, North Korea. Its development and proliferation of ballistic missile and nuclear bomb technology pose a threat to the northeast Asian region and to international peace and security. In the other launching the missile, a newspaper reported that "While the launch was dubbed a failure by the U.S., it was an improvement over the North Koreans' July 2006 test of the Taepodong-2, said Green of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "It was definitely better than last time, but it's still not an operational system," Green said.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.8 no.5
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• pp.393-398
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• 2022

Megacities of the Repulic of Korea(ROK) will have increased by urbanization and the fourth industrial revolution. Mgacities are absolutely the opportunity factor to make human life enriched. Simultaneously, those are the challenge foctor considering the crucial conventional threat such as massive artillery and multiple rocket launcher from the North Korea. Israel that has faced the geopolitical situation of ROK developed the Multi-layer air defense system to offset the low altitude threat from the neighboring nations. As a result, Israel substantially removed plenty of Hamas' rockes and suicidal drones in 2021. Applying Israel's concept, North Korea's low altitude threat toward the ROK's megacities can effectively be eliminated. Furthermore, this Multi-layer air defense system can be a game-changer that gets rid of the low and high altitude threat from North Korea and neighboring nations with both hyperconnected sensor-C2-shooter and artificial intelligence. Through this approach, the ROK will be able to achieve the prosperity and prowth of nation at the center of Megacities concentrated on PMESII(Politics, Military, Economy, Society, Information, and Infrastructure) factors.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.5
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• pp.173-202
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• 2007

After successful nuclear tests Pakistan launched a more severe surprise attack toward India than before. It is highly possible that North Korea will adopt this Pakistan military strategy if it is armed with nuclear weapons. The North Korean forces armed, with nuclear bombs could make double its war capability through strengthening aggressive force structure and come into effect on blocking reinforcement of the US forces at the initial phase of war time. Therefore we may regard that Pyongyang's nuclear arming is a major one of various factors which increase possibility of waging a conventional warfare or a nuclear war. North Korea's high self-confidence after nuclear arming will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula via aggressive military threat or terror toward South Korea, and endeavor to accomplish its political purpose via low-intensity conflicts. For instance, nuclear arming of the Pyongyang regime enforces the North Korean forces to invade the Northern Limit Line(NLL), provoke naval battles at the West Sea, and occupy one or two among the Five Islands at the West Sea. In that case, the South Korean forces will be faced with a serious dilemma. In order to recapture the islands, Seoul should be ready for escalating a war. However it is hard to imagine that South Korea fights with North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. This paper concludes that the Pyongyang regime after nuclear arming strongly tends to occupy superiority of military strategy and wage military provocations on the Korean Peninsula.

• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.190-215
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• 2016

As North Korea's asymmetric threats are growing, there have been numerous discussions to find out effective counter-measures and many official plans and procurements efforts have been established. However, discussions on ROK Navy's roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threats have been taken place very limitedly. Decision makers and military planners put enormous efforts in getting counter-measures, however, most of the options on the table are systems of Army and Air Force. This is true if one looks at components of Kill-Chain, KAMD, and KMPR. With worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula, it has been said by many commentators that ROK Navy needs to consider expanding its roles in countering against North Korea's asymmetric military threats. They asked ROK Navy to go beyond the mind-set that has confined Navy's roles in deterring North Korean naval threats. That is, ROK Navy should fight 'from the sea' as well as fight 'on the sea.' If ROK Navy begins to think about fight 'from the sea,' there would be many possibilities for the Navy to be a part of countering North Korea's asymmetric military threats. In order to pursue proactive roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threat, ROK Navy needs to consider various options. Massive missile forces, nuclear-propelled submarines, naval special forces may be some of them. With those measures, ROK Navy would launch massive and decisive attacks from the sea without risking survivability of our forces. Considering North Korean Navy's weakness, it is very probable that sea would be safer place than ground or sky. Expanding ROK Navy's roles and being a proactive deterrent forces against North Korean asymmetric threats would provide very reliable counter-measures to South Korean military. Thus, military planners should think how to take the best advantage of expanded ROK Navy's roles and capabilities against North Korean asymmetric threats.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.208-231
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• 2017

The balance of power in conventional forces between the two Koreas works in favor of the South Korea in the Korea peninsula. But, the balancing mechanism between the two Koreas in asymmetric forces like nuclear and missile forces works absolutely in favor of the North Korea. That's why it should be timely for the ROK military to review existing strategy and revise a new counter strategy against the threat posed by the North Korea's nuclear and missile forces. The ROK military is now developing 4D, KAMD, KILL Chain strategies as means to cope with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. Considering efforts and resources invested now, the strategies are expected to be in place in next five or more years. However, approaches to those strategies seem to be rather fragmentary and conceptual than comprehensive and pragmatic. The types of strategies against the North Korea's military threats need to be a deterrence in peace time and a fighting and winning in war time in the Korean theater. But, the most important element in the deterrence strategy is the credibility. This study concludes with an new strategic concept titled "ADAD(Assured Defense, Assured Destruction)" as an alternative to existing strategies to deal with the North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2015.10a
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• pp.439-441
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• 2015

The ballistic missile is very threatening weapon system because it is difficult to detect and intercept due to fast speed. Recently, many countries worry about North Korea's ballistic missile launching tests especially the success of launching Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite by Eunha-3 long range rocket at 2012. This event means announcement of North Korea have capability to develop ICBM(Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) to all over the world. In this paper, it is surveyed and described that history, types and threat of ballistic missiles.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.56 no.7
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• pp.2666-2675
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• 2024

This study explores the potential for tritium production in North Korea's 5MWe graphite-moderated reactor, a facility primarily associated with nuclear weapons material production. While existing research on these reactors has largely centered on plutonium, our focus shifts to tritium, a crucial element in boosted fission bombs. Utilizing the MCNP6 code for simulations, the results estimate that North Korea can possibly produce approximately 7-12 g of tritium annually. This translates to the potential production of 1-3 boosted fission bombs each year. By incorporating tritium production into assessments of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, our methodology provides insights into the dynamics of the country's nuclear force, revealing a more diversified and complex composition than previously assumed. The findings significantly aid policymakers, regulatory bodies, and researchers in comprehending potential proliferation risks associated with graphite-moderated reactors and in developing strategies to address the nuclear threat emanating from North Korea.