• 제목/요약/키워드: North Korea's SLBM(Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile)

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북한 SLBM 위협과 대응방향 (ROKN's Response Strategy to North Korea's SLBM Threat)

  • 문창환
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권40호
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    • pp.82-114
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    • 2016
  • The purpose of this article is to analyze the progress of North Korea's SLBM threat, and to assess the technological capacity and threat level of its SLBMs. Currently, North Korea has approximately 1000 ballistic missiles, such as the SCUD, Musudan, and Nodong, in stock. This article pays close attention to the background and strategical implication behind North Korea's obsession with developing SLBMs despite possessing sufficient means to launch provocations with its current arsenal of ground based ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. Based on the abovementioned analysis, this article will recommend possible response directions for the ROK Armed Forces to North Korea's SLBM threat. It is highly difficult to detect SLBMs due to its stealthy nature, as it is launched underwater after covert infiltration. North Korea's SLBM is considered a game changer in that even one SLBM can significantly change the strategic balance of North East Asia. North Korea's SLBM test launch in August has made a 500km flight, landing 80km inside the JADIZ (Japan Air Defense Identification Zone), and as such, it is assessed that North Korea already possesses underwater ejection and cold launch capabilities. The most realistic response to North Korea's imminent SLBM threat is bolstering anti-submarine capabilities. ROK Armed Forces need to upgrade its underwater kill-chain by modernizing and introducing new airborne anti-submarine assets and nuclear-powered submarines, among many options. Moreover, we should integrate SM-3 missiles with the Aegis Combat system that possess strong detection capabilities and flexibility, thereby establishing a sea-based Ballistic Missle Defense (BMD) system centered around the Aegis Combat System, as sea-based ballistic missile threats are best countered out in the seas. Finally, the capabilities gap that could arise as a result of budgetary concerns and timing of fielding new assets should be filled by establishing firm ROK-US-Japan combined defense posture.

잠수함 발사 탄도미사일 탐지를 위한 해상 센서플랫폼의 배치에 관한 연구 (A Study on the Deployment of a Sea Based Sensor Platform for the Detection of a SLBM)

  • 김지원;권용수;김남기;김동민;박영한
    • 한국항행학회논문지
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    • 제19권5호
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    • pp.363-369
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    • 2015
  • 본 논문은 잠수함 발사 탄도미사일(SLBM) 탐지를 위한 해상 센서플랫폼의 배치에 관한 연구이다. 최근 북한은 SLBM의 수중 사출시험을 실시하였으며 이는 국제사회에 심각한 안보 위협이 되고 있다. 이러한 위협에 효과적으로 대응하기 위해 기동이 가능한 해상 센서플랫폼은 SLBM의 탐지 가능성이 높은 위치에 배치되어야 한다. 그러나 전형적인 레이더 센서체계의 최대탐지거리 특성은 표적의 비행궤적과 레이더 반사 단면적(RCS)에 따라 달라진다. 이러한 관점에서 본 연구는 SLBM의 전술적 특성에 따른 비행궤적을 분석하고, RCS를 계산하였다. 또한 센서 플랫폼의 위치에 따른 탐지 시간을 분석하여 효과적으로 SLBM을 탐지할 수 있는 해상 센서 플랫폼의 위치를 제시하였다.

북한 SLBM 평가와 한국 해군의 대응방안 (North Korean Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) and Reaction of Republic of Korea Navy)

  • 윤석준
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권39호
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    • pp.47-81
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    • 2016
  • This paper has attempted to examine the political and operational contexts within which North Korea's latest acts of nuclear blackmail, its test-firing of an SLBM on April 23rd 2016 and its fourth nuclear test on January 6th 2016, should be understood. Analysis of the KN-11 SLBM and the Sinpo-class SSB is based on official South Korean, US and others sources, especially the ROK MND, as well as other resources from South Korea, US and others. Unfortunately, the results of this exploration are inconclusive: there is simply not enough evidence available at present to either confirm or refute the existence of a functional North Korean SLBM and SSB. Nevertheless, the North Korean determination to possess such assets should not be taken lightly. But even accepting North Korea's claims about its SLBMs at face value, which is undermined by news of apparently unsuccessful follow-up test-firings in November, and probably December 2015, there is little proof that North Korea has yet succeeded in miniaturizing its nuclear warhead, so the most extravagant fears are not yet justified. Taken together with North Korea's latest announcement of a supposed successful SLBM ejection-test, on March 23th 2016, the KN-11 SLBM claims should probably be seen as primarily about proving North Korea's status as a nuclear power, both to exert external political pressure and to bolster internal political support for Kim Jong-un's rule. In conclusion, this paper recommends formulating a preemptive anti-access strategy for the ROKN, proposes acquiring an ASW CV and SSNs to implement submarine strategic deterrent patrols, and urges extending the existing limited AORs to facilitate the preemptive anti-access strategy. Other deterrence options may be suggested, but it is surely significant that the ROKN has recently publically referred to the deployment of an ASW CV and SSNs for the first time.

북 핵·미사일 시대의 억제전략 : 도전과 나아갈 방향 (Deterrent Strategy in the era of North Korea's WMD and Missile Threats : Challenges and the Ways to go)

  • 이상엽
    • Strategy21
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    • 통권41호
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    • pp.232-260
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    • 2017
  • The purpose of this paper is to open a debate about what kind of deterrent strategy the ROK military should pursue in the era of NK's weapons of mass destruction and missile threats. I argue that the ROK military needs a comprehensive deterrent strategy that reflects the international security situations and trends and that builds on clear understanding of the basic concepts and how deterrence operates. The paper starts with surveying the basic knowledge of deterrence from the perspectives of both theory and practice. Then, it provides explanations on why deterrence against NK can be particularly difficult given the security environment in and around the Korean peninsula. For example, South Korea and North Korea hardly share 'common knowledge' that serves as a basic element for the operation of deterrence. Deterrence against North Korea involves complex situations in that both deterrence and compellence strategies may be relevant particularly to North Korea's WMD and missile threats. It also involves both immediate and general deterrence. Based on the discussion, I suggest several ideas that may serve as guidelines for establishing a deterrent strategy against NK. First, our threats for deterrence should be the ones that can be realized, particularly in terms of the international norms. In other words, they must be considered appropriate among other nations in the international community. Second, there should be separate plans for the different kinds of threats: one is conventional, local provocations and the other is WMD/missile related provocations. Third, we should pursue much closer cooperative relations with the U.S. military to enhance the effectiveness of immediate deterrence in the Korean peninsula. Fourth, the ROK military should aim to accomplish 'smart deterrence' maximizing the benefits of technological superiority. Fifth, the ROK military readiness and structure should be able to deny emerging North Korean military threats such as the submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Lastly, in executing threats, we should consider that the current action influences credibility and reputation of the ROK, which in turn affect the decisions for future provocations. North Korea's WMD/missile threats may soon become critical strategic-level threats to South Korea. In retrospect, the first debate on building a missile defense system in South Korea dates back to the 1980s. Mostly the debate has centered on whether or not South Korea's system should be integrated into the U.S. missile defense system. In the meantime, North Korea has become a small nuclear power that can threaten the United States with the ballistic missiles capability. If North Korea completes the SLBM program and loads the missiles on a submarine with improved underwater operation capability, then, South Korea may have to face the reality of power politics demonstrated by Thucydides through the Athenians: "The strong do what they have the power to do, the weak accept what they have to accept."

극초음속 무기체계의 개발 경쟁과 국가 안보의 함의 (Hypersonic Weapons and National Security)

  • 손현승;이호일;고덕곤
    • 항공우주시스템공학회지
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    • 제16권1호
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    • pp.56-69
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    • 2022
  • 주요 선진국들은 극초음속 무기체계 개발에 경쟁을 가속화하고 있다. 북한은 잠수함 발사 탄도 미사일을 탑재한 신형 잠수함 건조를 눈앞에 두고 있고, 한국은 핵추진 잠수함, 경 항공모함, 신형 미사일 개발 등 다양한 전력 증강 계획을 추진하고 있다. 동북 아시아 지역은 한국을 비롯하여, 북한, 미국, 중국, 러시아, 일본이 군사적 경쟁 속에서 긴장감을 늦출 수 없는 상황을 지속하고 있다. 이에 따라, 이들 국가들의 무기체계 개발 경쟁도 전 세계의 최고 수준을 보여주고 있으며, 그 중심에 한국이 놓여있다. 본 논문에서는 주요 국가들이 개발 경쟁을 하고 있는 극초음속 무기체계가 왜 필요한지 기술적 분석을 통해 그 의미를 알아보고, 한국군이 추구하고자 하는 군사력 발전 방향을 분석해 본다. 그리고 극초음속 무기체계 개발을 위해 극복해야 하는 기술적 한계와 추진 전략에 대해 제안하고자 한다.

자항 기뢰와 초공동 어뢰의 융복합 무기체계 연구 (A study on Convergence Weapon Systems of Self propelled Mobile Mines and Supercavitating Rocket Torpedoes)

  • 이은수;신진
    • 해양안보
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    • 제7권1호
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    • pp.31-60
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    • 2023
  • 본 논문은 북한의 SLBM 탑재 신형 잠수함과 핵 무인 수중 공격정 '해일'에 효과적으로 대응하기 위해 자항 기뢰와 초공동 어뢰를 결합한 융복합 무기체계를 제안하고, 그 효과성을 분석하였다. 자항 기뢰와 초공동 어뢰의 융복합 무기체계는 자항 기뢰의 은밀 매복 및 탐지 능력과 초공동 어뢰의 초고속 주행 능력을 결합하여, 각 무기체계의 장점을 극대화하고 단점을 상호 보완한다. 이 무기체계의 효과성을 분석하기 위해 국방전력발전업무훈령의 소요제기서 작성 기준을 참고하여 수중 유도무기의 작전 운용에 요구되는 성능에 적합하게 분석 기준을 선정하고, 기존 무기체계 대비 효과성을 수중 방어 지속성, 전투력 운용 융통성, 생존성, 지휘/통제, 운영 비용 효율성, 기상 영향 요인 등 6가지 측면에서 분석하였다. 또한, 시나리오 구상을 통해 이 무기체계의 실용성을 입증하였다. 자항 기뢰와 초공동 어뢰의 융복합 무기체계가 현실화 된다면 미래의 수중환경에서 한국의 안보에 매우 중요한 역할을 할 수 있을 것으로 기대된다.

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