While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.
According to the character states of nostrils in the Barbatula species comprising 1,366 specimens collected from the major river system in Korea, distribution pattern of the two Korean Barbatula species was reviewed. The taxonomic character related to nostrils in Barbatula was very stable and two character states (widely separated and closely set) were observed in the present materials. B. toni (Dybowski, 1869) with widely separated nostrils distributes in the streams flowing into the East Sea north of Sokcho, Gangwon-do Province; Eogokcheon Stream, a tributary of Namhangang River; and Anseongcheon Stream, Gyeonggi-do Province, whereas B. nuda (Bleeker, 1864) with closely set occurs in most rivers flowing into the Yellow Sea including Nakdonggang River as well as in the Yangyangnamdaecheon Stream, Gangwon-do Province south to Bangyulcheon Stream, Gyeongbukdo Province, flowing into the East Sea as previously reported with some exception. Especially, both Barbatula species were co-occurred in the Yeongokcheon Stream, Gangwon-do Province and Eogokcheon Stream. The present results will provide a useful guide to study the regional fish fauna or fish community analysis as well as to clarify the taxonomical status of the Korean Barbatula species.
It is a wrong decision to use only topographic and geological maps for the study of pediment morphology in Korea. For the study of pediment morphology it is necessary to survey the earth structure by field techniques. In Korea, pediments are mostly found in granite areas with hardrock cover. But, pediments also developed in gneiss areas and what is worse in limestone areas. So, all areas in Korea developed pediment morphology. Only in South Korea pediments show a direction from south to north or from west to east. They developed only in right angles to each other, either parallel or in right angles to the strike, depending on the bedrock structure. Pediments are found in two levels. The upper level pediments are correlated with the lower level erosion surface. Besides this pediments are found in Hoenggye-ri of the Taegwolryong area in a third level 800m above sea level. The pediments developed in basins, at the lower margins of steep slopes dividing three levels of erosion surfaces and around the residual mountains on the erosion surfaces. The first belong to the early stage of pedimentation, the second to the middle stage and the third to the last stage. Also, in Korea monadnock and residual mountain have developed the pediments are correlated the slope of the hinter mountains. Akagki states that the only pedimentation times have been times of arid climate and that they are dissected by gulley erosion with climatic change, but writer's study proves that pedimentation takes place with eustatic movement, reckless defore-station and convectional rain. These facts indicate that the landforms, geological character and process of erosional cycle of the pediments in Korea resemble much those in the Chugoku Mountains of south wertern Japan, but they are larger in scale than those in the Chugoku Mountains. In conclusion, while Akagki emphasizes the geological character and climatic change in pedimentation, the writer studies prove that eustatic movements, especially the sea level rise after the Wurm age are important factors for pedimentation. Besides this the author's studies allow a classification of gentle slopes.
The sodium-glucose cotransporter-2 inhibitor (SGLT2i) is a new anti-hyperglycemic agent that have function to concomitantly inhibit the reabsorption of glucose and sodium in the renal proximal convoluting tubule. Recent two cardiovascular outcome trials showed that a lower risk of cardiovascular events with SGLT2i in people with type 2 diabetes. In addition, prior real-world data demonstrated similar SGLT2i effects, but these studies were limited to the United States and Europe. Thus, the CVD-REAL (Comparative Effectiveness of Cardiovascular Outcomes in New Users of Sodium-Glucose Cotransporter-2 Inhibitors) 2 Study was investigated cardiovascular outcomes in those initiated on SGLT2i versus other glucose-lowering drugs (oGLDs) across 6 countries in the Asia Pacific, the Middle East, and North American regions. In Korea, 336,644 episodes of initiation in SGLT2i or oGLD group between September 2014 and December 2016 were identified in Korea National Health Insurance database after propensity score matching. SGLT2i users was associated with a lower risk of all-cause death (hazard ratio [HR], 0.72; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.67~0.77), hospitalization for heart failure (HHF) (HR, 0.87; 95% CI, 0.82~0.92), all-cause death or HHF (HR, 0.81; 95% CI, 0.78~0.85), myocardial infarction (HR, 0.81; 95% CI, 0.74~0.89), and stroke (HR, 0.82; 95% CI, 0.78~0.86) compared with oGLD users. In conclusion, initiation of SGLT2i had a lower risk of cardiovascular events in people with type 2 diabetes compared with oGLDs.
Russia's push in the Asia-Pacific region stems from its interests that have the national, regional and global dimensions. In their turn, the aims of this policy are civilizational, geopolitical, economic and prospective, with a long-term outlook. In the course of their achievement, cooperation with Northeast Asia's countries will play one of the key roles owing to the factors of geographic proximity, Northeast Asia's economic potential, risk hedging and a growing influence Northeast Asia exerts upon the global development. A new cooperation paradigm between Russia and the states of Northeast Asia should be based upon establishing and cementing self-reproducing ties. This is the central aim of Russian initiatives in relations, with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mongolia and China. However, numerous obstacles ranging from Russia's absence in the regional free trade agreements and supply-production chains of value-added production to the permanent international instability generated by Pyongyang's missile-nuclear developments hamper the practical implementation of this task. Realizing the necessity to give an additional impetus to this new cooperative paradigm, Russia has to develop directions with an apparent consolidating effect. The most promising may be the establishment of a permanent security forum based upon Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism chaired by the Russian Federation. The urgency of this measure and its expected support stem from the necessity to strengthen security in Northeast Asia, a task neither the US-led hub-and-spoke system nor ASE-AN-led multilateral dialogue venues have been able to resolve. The issues addressed at the security forum must include the unification of approaches to North Korean nuclear issue and producing a document specifying actions of the claimants on the disputed maritime territories in the "direct contact" situations. At the expert level, Russia has elaborated on the idea to establish such a forum outlining the spectrum of the key directions of cooperation. With the urgency in the establishment of this dialogue venue, its agenda has to be coordinated with the agendas of the existing security systems presented by the US alliances and the ASE-AN-led multilateral negotiations. The practical implementation of this initiative will strengthen security in Northeast Asia as its challenges will be resolved in the pre-emptive way based on coordinated approaches. Therefore, Russia as the Eurasian state will be one of the role players in the advent of the Asian century.
The purpose of this paper is to compare and analyze the similarities and differences between the security environment, information organization and information activities of Korea and the United States. The comparison will provide insight into Korea and other national intelligence agencies, as well as methodological advances in information research, by providing insight into the overall information and a broad understanding As the history, culture and national power of Korea and the U.S. are different, the organization and activities of intelligence agencies are also different. First of all, in terms of environment, the U.S. carries out intelligence activities for national interest and security in a wide range of areas ranging from North American continental countries to South America, the Middle East, Asia and Asia, while South Korea's intelligence activities are mainly aimed at North Korea and neighboring countries around the Korean Peninsula. In terms of information organization, U.S. intelligence agencies are separate, whereas domestic and foreign intelligence agencies are separate, whereas Korean intelligence agencies are a type of integrated intelligence agency that combines information and investigation, unlike the U.S. In the U.S., the U.S. also operates as an intelligence community, and there are many flexible organizations such as non-tier organizations and centers. Intelligence activities by U.S. intelligence agencies are mainly focused on analysis and overseas processing activities, while Korean intelligence agencies still account for a large portion of domestic information activities. Despite these differences, Korea's intelligence agency was created by imitating U.S. intelligence agencies, and thus has similar aspects in terms of evaluation of security, organization and activities. However, this similarity is shared by all intelligence agencies, so the article will focus on analyzing differences. Finally, for the development of Korean intelligence agencies, the establishment of an intelligence community and efficient control of the National Assembly will be proposed.
This study is written to bring the proposal forward for the direction of south korean naval force. The political situation and the circumstance of the world, especially in the area of Pacific Ocean, are changing very rapidly. North Korea has been always the conventional existing intimidator for South Korea since the 6·25-War. Additionally, the strengthening movements of the national defense, which is easily noticed from China and Russia, is also an other part of intimidating countries against South Korea. Those three mentioned countries are continually developing the asymmetrical warfare systems, for example a strategic nuclear weapon. Since the Obama Administration, the Asia-Pacific Rebalancing-Strategy has been changed as an East Asian foreign policy. Nowadays, Trump Administration renamed the 'United States Pacific-Command' to 'United States Indo-Pacific Command'. The purpose of this is not only letting India to participate in american alliance, but also reducing an economic burden, which is often mentioned in USA. West Germany was located in the very similar geopolitical position during the Cold War just like South Korea these days. And that's why the strategy of West German Navy is worthy of notice for south korean naval force to decide its suitable strategy. Most of all, the two most important things to refer to this study are the plan to expand naval air force and the realistic political stand for us to take it. In conclusion, I laid an emphasis on maintenance of 'green-water-navy'. instead of selecting the strategy as a 'blue-water-navy'. The reason I would like to say, is that south korean navy is not available to hold the unnecessary war potential, just like Aircraft-Carrier. However, this is not meaning to let the expansion of naval force carelessly. We must search the best solution in order to maintain the firm peace within the situation. To fulfill this concept, it is mostly very important to maintain the stream of laying down a keel of destroyers, submarines and air-defense-missile, as well as the hight-tech software system, taking a survey of 4th industrial revolution. Research and development for the best solution of future aircraft by south korean navy is likewise necessary. Besides, we must also set the international diplomatic flexibly. As well as maintaining the relationship with US Forces, it is also very important to improve the relationship with other potential allied nation.
This thesis is to make an appropriate national defense policy of Republic of Korea through studying the Hegemony Strategy of United States. I searched the theory of hegemony. The hegemony was differently defined by the point of time and region. The strong power nations with the hegemony have been making efforts to maintain their hegemony everytime. I have conclusion that the presence of hegemony once emerged, it brought regional stability in place whether it is coercive or beneficial. The stability and instability of international order IS not exclusively dependent on hegemony. Even if the safety of hegemony cannot guarantee absolute stability of international order, there IS on doubt that the hegemony has enormous impact on that. According to the hegemonic theory, the history of mankind equals to the history of rising and falling hegemony. The international order was changed as the hegemony changes. The United States has been making efforts to maintain her global hegemony during the post cold-war era as well. Taking all these into consideration, relevant military strategy direction able to pursue national interest is that to make up for the relative weakness in the strategic environment. South Korea have to prepare security policy response as following. First, South Korea should build the military force equipped with advanced weapons in military technology sector and solidify military diplomatic relation able to form cooperative relation in wartime. Second, South Korea should make solid Alliance of Korea and U.S. Third, develop and maintain multilateral security cooperation of East Asia. Forth, we could realize that there are means that can neutralize opponent's strong point by seeking one or two and more asymmetry in the aspect of strategy, tactics, and means through asymmetric strategy. Than the military force of South Korea should develop into a force that is able to overcome to the traditional North Korea's threat and new type of conflicts. And the force should have sufficient strength and be deployed to effectively defend the Korean Peninsula. So, we need to establish a denial and defense system against any hostile neighboring country. Therefore, ROK military forces preparing for the future should try to construct a future military power to gradually establish enough strength for self-defense to prepare for a uncertain security environment and when the Korean Peninsula is unified in a future.
Journal of the Korean Society for Marine Environment & Energy
/
v.6
no.1
/
pp.30-43
/
2003
The geography, circulation pattern, and ecology show that the semi-closed seas of Northwest Pacific be managed as one complete system. Ongoing multilateral cooperative efforts relevant to marine environmental protection in the Northwest Pacific area, include the Working Group for the Western Pacific (WESTPAC) established under the auspices of WNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commissions, the UNDP/GEF Programme on Prevention and Management of Marine Pollution in East Asian Seas (PEMSEA), the North Pacific Marine Science Organization(PICES), and the United Nations Environment Programme(WNEP)'s Northwest Pacific Action Plan(NOWPAP). The present report firstly describes the current situations on the existing regional cooperative regimes for marine environmental conservation in the Northwest Pacific region, with a special respect to the Northwest Pacific Action Plan(NOWPAP) which was adopted in 1994 by Japan, People's Republic of China, Republic of Korea and Russian Federation. Then, problems of the existing regimes are also discussed, together with the suggestion of the possible solutions, focusing on NOWPAP. Suggestions include: 1) the Northeast Asian countries should understand the importance of legally-binding regional convention, and should build up any legally-binding instrument which can function as a big umbrella for real regional cooperation without prejudice to the rights of the States, 2) At present stage, it will be possible to make a regional convention flexible without prejudice to the sovereign right of the States or territorial issues; 3) taking into account that the region often faces many generic political problems that often inhibit the effective collective actions on environmental issues, the leadership from UNEP or other international organizations is required; 4) strong institutional and financial framework should be made, and 5) multilateral efforts to respond to the new marine environmental threats should be taken at the regional level in order to protect the coastal and marine environments in the Northwest Pacific.
The article is devoted to the theoretical and practical analysis of Chinese global leadership. The concept of leadership is applied as a methodology, which involves identifying the main factors, such as strategic power, the attractiveness of political institutions, the ability to provide acceptable ideas and the presence of allies that contribute to a comprehensive analysis of the country's leadership potential. The authors also describe the relevance of Chinese global leadership and analyze its domestic, economic and international causes. Moreover, the ''Belt and Road'' initiative is defined as the main mechanism for providing the influence of China on the global level which is now being changed its quantitative component, namely the increasing attention to the security aspects of this initiative. In addition to that, it is important to note that China maintains its economic and political positions in Africa, Central Asia and South-East Asia. Africa has a special role in the Chinese ''Belt and Road'' initiative as a recipient of Chinese investments and a site for the deployment of China's naval facilities to protect the trade routes. On the regional level, China will strive to become a leader of the trade and economic processes in the Asia-Pacific region, the South China Sea and the North Korea nuclear program issues. The American factor in modern international relations, namely so-called "Trump factor", which means the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement, will cause demand for Chinese leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world as well. However, in this case a number of questions arise: is China prepared for this? Is Beijing able to bear greater responsibility? Does China have the potential for this? The article concludes that China will not become global leaders in the next 20-30 years, because of internal (political reforms) and foreign policy reasons (doctrinal formulation of foreign policy initiatives, military-political and economic power, international posture and relations with other states). The authors believe that the implementation of Chinese leadership is possible not on the condition of confrontation between China and the United States, but on the establishing of constructive relations between these countries. The last meeting between Trump and Xi Jinping showed a trend for creating channels for dialogue between Beijing and Washington, which can become the basis for interaction. An important place in the work is given to the analysis of development and forecasting the evolution of Russian-Chinese and U.S.-China relations. As for Russia, Moscow should conduct a policy that will not allow it to become a ''junior partner'' of China.
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