• Title/Summary/Keyword: Nash model

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Evaluation of the evaporation estimation approaches based on solar radiation (일사량에 기초한 증발량 산정방법들의 적용성 평가)

  • Rim, Chang-Soo
    • Journal of Korea Water Resources Association
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    • v.49 no.2
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    • pp.165-175
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    • 2016
  • In order to examine the applicability, the evaporation estimation approaches based on solar radiation are classified into 3 different model groups (Model groups A, B, and C) in this study. Each group is tested in the 6 study stations (Seoul, Daejeon, Jeonju, Busan, Mokpo, and Jeju). The model parameters of each model group are estimated and verified with measured pan evaporation data. The applicability of verified model groups are compared with results of Penman (1948) combination approach. Nash-Sutcliffe (N-S) efficiency coefficients greater than 0.663 in all study stations indicate satisfactory estimates of evaporation. On the other hand, in the model verification process, N-S efficiency coefficients greater than 0.526 in all study stations indicate also satisfactory estimates of evaporation. However, N-S efficiency coefficients in all study cases except Model groups B and C in Busan are less than those of Penman (1948) combination approach. Therefore, it is concluded in this study that the evaporation estimation approaches based on solar radiation have capability to replace Penman (1948) combination approach for the estimation of evaporation in case that some meteorological data (wind speed, relative humidity) are missing or not measured.

Development of a Grid-based Daily Watershed Runoff Model and the Evaluation of Its Applicability (분포형 유역 일유출 모형의 개발 및 적용성 검토)

  • Hong, Woo-Yong;Park, Geun-Ae;Jeong, In-Kyun;Kim, Seong-Joon
    • KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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    • v.30 no.5B
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    • pp.459-469
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    • 2010
  • This study is to develop a grid-based daily runoff model considering seasonal vegetation canopy condition. The model simulates the temporal and spatial variation of runoff components (surface, interflow, and baseflow), evapotranspiration (ET) and soil moisture contents of each grid element. The model is composed of three main modules of runoff, ET, and soil moisture. The total runoff was simulated by using soil water storage capacity of the day, and was allocated by introducing recession curves of each runoff component. The ET was calculated by Penman-Monteith method considering MODIS leaf area index (LAI). The daily soil moisture was routed by soil water balance equation. The model was evaluated for 930 $km^2$ Yongdam watershed. The model uses 1 km spatial data on landuse, soil, boundary, MODIS LAI. The daily weather data was built using IDW method (2000-2008). Model calibration was carried out to compare with the observed streamflow at the watershed outlet. The Nash-Sutcliffe model efficiency was 0.78~0.93. The watershed soil moisture was sensitive to precipitation and soil texture, consequently affected the streamflow, and the evapotranspiration responded to landuse type.

Conflicts in Overlay Environments: Inefficient Equilibrium and Incentive Mechanism

  • Liao, Jianxin;Gong, Jun;Jiang, Shan;Li, Tonghong;Wang, Jingyu
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • v.10 no.5
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    • pp.2286-2309
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    • 2016
  • Overlay networks have been widely deployed upon the Internet by Service Providers (SPs) to provide improved network services. However, the interaction between each overlay and traffic engineering (TE) as well as the interaction among co-existing overlays may occur. In this paper, we adopt both non-cooperative and cooperative game theory to analyze these interactions, which are collectively called hybrid interaction. Firstly, we model a situation of the hybrid interaction as an n+1-player non-cooperative game, in which overlays and TE are of equal status, and prove the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) for this game. Secondly, we model another situation of the hybrid interaction as a 1-leader-n-follower Stackelberg-Nash game, in which TE is the leader and co-existing overlays are followers, and prove that the cost at Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium (SNE) is at least as good as that at NE for TE. Thirdly, we propose a cooperative coalition mechanism based on Shapley value to overcome the inherent inefficiency of NE and SNE, in which players can improve their performance and form stable coalitions. Finally, we apply distinct genetic algorithms (GA) to calculate the values for NE, SNE and the assigned cost for each player in each coalition, respectively. Analytical results are confirmed by the simulation on complex network topologies.

Effect of Network Externality on the Price Competition in Vertically Differentiated Market (망외부성이 수직 차별화된 시장의 가격경쟁에 미치는 영향 분석)

  • Cho, Hyung-Rae;Rhee, Minho
    • Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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    • v.44 no.1
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    • pp.37-44
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    • 2021
  • The information products dramatically reduce the production costs of vertically differentiated products. Information products are also more likely to be affected by network externalities. Thus the proliferation of digital products is increasing the interests in network externality and vertical product differentiation. In step with this trend, the impact of network externalities on price competition in vertically differentiated markets has been continuously studied. Existing studies related to this topic have assumed that network externalities increase consumers' willingness to pay per unit quality. The results show that higher quality products are affected more by network externality. However, network externality is essentially a concept affected by the size of the consumer, not a concept associated with quality. In this work, unlike previous studies, we present a new market model that reflects the essential definition of network externality. Based on the proposed market model, we derive both simultaneous and sequential Nash equilibria and analyze them numerically. The main results obtained from the analysis can be summarized as follows. First, network externalities primarily increase the demand for low-quality products and have a secondary impact on the demand for high-quality products. Second, the larger the quality difference between products, the more profitable they are. It also has been shown that sequential pricing methods are more advantageous in terms of revenue than simultaneous pricing method.

Analysis of marketing Channel competition in Electronic Commerce Incorporating Web Awareness (Web 인지도를 반영한 전자상거래 마케팅 채널 경쟁에 관한 연구)

  • 차춘남;조형래
    • Korean Management Science Review
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    • v.17 no.3
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    • pp.49-60
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    • 2000
  • The proliferation of electronic commerce(EC) has led manufactureres to consider Internet based marketing as a salient candidate for strategic diversification of marketing channel. In this case, each manufacturer can build its own Web store or rent an existing special EC store. Such decision making of ‘build’ or ‘rent’ can be analyzed by a game model which derives the Nash solutions for price and profit considering degree of competition with other competitive manufacturers. In this paper, to overcome the drawbacks of the traditional linear demand function, we first propose a new linear demand function which incorporates not only the price difference between competitive products but the awareness of Web stores perceived by the consumers, then design the game models to analyze the characteristics of three typical types of marketing channel in duopoly market. Based on the Nash solutions of the game models, we analyzed the effect of the degree of competition and Web awareness in selecting the optimal marketing channel.

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Supply Function Nash Equilibrium Considering Stochastic Demand Function (확률적 수요함수를 고려한 공급함수의 전략변수 내쉬균형 연구)

  • Lee, Kwang-Ho
    • The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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    • v.57 no.1
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    • pp.20-24
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    • 2008
  • A bid-based pool(BBP) model is representative of energy market structure in a number of restructured electricity markets. Supply function equilibrium(SFE) models of interaction better match what is explicitly required in the bid formats of typical BBP markets. Many of the results in the SFE literature involve restrictive parametrization of the bid cost functions. In the SFE models, two parameters, intercept and slope, are available for strategic bidding. This paper addresses the realistic competition format that players can choose both parameters arbitrarily. In a fixed demand function, equilibrium conditions for generation company's profit maximization have a degree of freedom, which induces multi-equilibrium. So it is hard to choose a convergent equilibrium. However, consideration of stochastic demand function makes the equilibrium conditions independent each other based on the amount of variance of stochastic demand function. This variance provides the bidding players with incentives to change the slope parameter from an equilibrium for a fixed demand function until the slope parameter equilibrium.

The Estimation of Incomplete Information in Electricity Markets by Using Load Pattern Changes (부하패턴을 이용한 전력시장 정보의 불완비성 추정에 관한 연구)

  • Shin, Jae-Hong;Lee, Kwang-Ho
    • The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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    • v.56 no.5
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    • pp.848-853
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    • 2007
  • This paper presents a methodology of estimating incomplete information in electricity markets for analyzing the gaming behavior of Generating Companies (GENCOs). Each GENCO needs to model its opponents' unknown information of strategic biddings and cost functions. In electricity markets with complete information, each GENCO knows its rivals' payoff functions and tries to maximize its own profit at Nash equilibriurnl Nli) by acknowledging the rivals' cost function. On the other hand, in the incomplete information markets, each GENCO lacks information about its rivals. Load patterns can change continuously due to many factors such as weather, price, contingency, etc. In this paper, we propose the method of the estimation of the opponents' cost function using market price, transaction quantities. and customer load patterns. A numerical example with two GENCOs is illustrated to show the basic idea and effectiveness of the proposed methodology.

A Study on the Strategic Competition Model of Pumped Storage Plant (양수발전기의 전략적 시장참여에 대한 해석 모형 연구)

  • Lee, Kwang-Ho
    • The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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    • v.56 no.10
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    • pp.1738-1743
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    • 2007
  • This paper addresses the bidding strategies of a pumped-storage hydro plant in an electricity market. Competitive bidding of pumping and generating of a pumped-storage plant is formulated in a game theoretic problem in accordance with the three different ownership of scheduling; Market Operator(MO), generating company(Genco), and combined type of MO and Genco. Optimal conditions for Nash Equilibrium are derived in the form of market prices during the scheduling periods. Simulation results show the different ownership models produce different schedules of pumping and generating, which correspond to the objective of the scheduling owner of a pumped-storage hydro plant.

Game Theoretic Analysis of the Direct Marketing Channel Strategy of a Manufacturer (게임이론을 이용한 제조업체의 직접마케팅 진입전략 분석)

  • Rhee, Min-Ho;Cho, Hyung-Rae
    • Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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    • v.32 no.3
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    • pp.168-177
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    • 2009
  • The proliferation of the internet and electronic commerce has given the manufacturers the opportunity of direct marketing. This study analyzes the decision of manufacturers regarding whether to sell the products through independent sales company or to sell the products to the consumer directly. To do this, a new demand function is proposed and sub and super games are modeled and analyzed based on the demand function. By analyzing the Nash equilibria, it is shown that the manufacturers' decision of direct or indirect marketing not only depends on the competitiveness between the products but the absolute and relative marketing capabilities of the manufacturers. It is also shown that, in some cases, the manufactures have incentive to rise the competitiveness between the products to maximize the channel profit.

A Solution Method of a Three-Player Game for Application to an Electric Power Market (전력시장 해석을 위한 3연 참여 게임의 해법 연구)

  • 이광호
    • The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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    • v.52 no.6
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    • pp.347-353
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    • 2003
  • In models of imperfect competition of deregulated electricity markets, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium(NE). The approaches for finding the NE have had two major bottlenecks: computation of mixed strategy equilibrium and treatment of multi-player games. This paper proposes a payoff matrix approach that resolves these bottlenecks. The proposed method can efficiently find a mixed strategy equilibrium in a multi-player game. The formulation of the m condition for a three-player game is introduced and a basic computation scheme of solving nonlinear equalities and checking inequalities is proposed. In order to relieve the inevitable burden of searching the subspace of payoffs, several techniques are adopted in this paper. Two example application problems arising from electricity markets and involving a Cournot and a Bertrand model, respectively, are investigated for verifying the proposed method.