• 대한교통학회지
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• 제23권4호
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• pp.37-45
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• 2005

본 연구는 Nash의 협력게임인 협상게임(bargaining game)과 Wardrop의 사용자 균형해와의 관계를 규명하는 데 목적이 있다. Wardrop의 균형은 다수의 운전자들이 교통상황을 정확히 알고 있고(perfect information), 동시에 합리적으로 경로를 선택(rationality)한다는 경직된 가정이 존재하는데, 이는 실제로 존재하는 운전자 상호간의 교류나 타협을 배제하고 있다. 이런 측면에서 운전자간의 교류와 조절과정을 Nash게임의 협상과정(bargaining process)으로 표현할 경우, Wardrop의 경직된 기본가정들을 어느 정도 완화할 수 있을 것으로 보인다. 이를 위하여 본 연구에서는 Nash의 협상게임에 대한 교통망측면의 검토와 Nash의 협상해(bargaining solution)가 Wardrop의 사용자 균형(user equilibrium)과 동일함을 정리(theorem)를 통하여 증명하고 몇 가지 예제로 이를 확인한다. 협상게임은 대표적인 2인 협조게임(two-person cooperative game)으로 본 연구에서도 주로 2인 게임에 대해서 기술하며, 향후 n-인게임(n-person game) 모형에 대해서는 간략히 언급토록 한다.

• East Asian Economic Review
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• 제21권2호
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• pp.167-197
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• 2017

I build a small open economy (SOE) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model to investigate the effect of a heterogeneous wage contract between regular and temporary workers on a macroeconomic volatility in a financially fragile economy. The imperfect financial market condition is captured by a quadratic financial adjustment cost for borrowing foreign assets, and the labor market friction is captured by a Nash bargaining process which is only available to the regular workers when they negotiate their wages with the firms while the temporary workers are given their wage which simply equals the marginal cost. As a result of impulse responsesto a domestic productivity shock, the higher elasticity of substitution between two types of workers and the lower weight on the regular workers in the firm's production process induce the higher volatilities in most variables. This is reasoned that the higher substitutability creates more volatile wage determination process while the lower share of the regular workers weakens their Nash bargaining power in the contract process.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제51권7호
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• pp.311-316
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• 2002

It has been a basic model for the present electric power industry that more than two generators compete, and thereby the market clearing price and the generation schedules are determined through the bid process. In order for this paradigm to be applicable to real electric power systems and markets, it is necessary to reflect many physical and economic constraints related to frequency and transmission in the dispatching schedule. The paper presents an approach to deriving a Nash bargaining solution in a competitive electricity market where multiple generators are playing with the system operator who mitigates the transmission congestion to minimize the total transaction cost. In this study, we take the effect of the line flows and the role of system operator into the Game. Finally, a case study has been demonstrated to verify the proposed cooperative game.

• 상하수도학회지
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• 제24권1호
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• pp.63-72
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• 2010

This study aims to make a decision about the rational option for a multipurpose dams development of the Tumen river basin so that the adjoining countries will effectively deal with the chronic problems and fully satisfy the fast growing demand of water and power. It has been thus far investigated that the interests between North Korea and China closely depend on the selected option, and they are not well compatible with each other. These situations are defined in terms of the cooperative two-person nonzero-sum game. The Nash bargaining model is then applied to contemplate the rational option, considering two scenarios of economic growth of the North Korea. After analyzing the model, it was expected that 1) two multipurpose dams must be cooperatively developed, and 2) their benefits should be allocated according to demand of each country. The authors finally suggest that a cooperative organisation be established to effectively manage the dams beyond the border of the countries.

• 유통과학연구
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• 제13권10호
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• pp.15-21
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• 2015

Purpose - This study examines a bundling effect on production and distribution in a patent-protected industry. Despite the heavy use of bundling strategies in the information and technology industry, literature has paid scant attention to bundling of intellectual property rights. This study examines a theoretical exploration of the bundling effect on licensing behavior. Research design, data, and methodology - To address this behavior, we build a simplified model consisting of three stages: 1) bundling decision, 2) licensing agreement, and 3) competition. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is applied to the model. Results - A single-patent holder with superior technology grants its own license to the multiple-patent firm, thereby leaving the market. Anticipating the single right holder's licensing strategy, the multiple-patent firm offers a bundle, making the single-right holder's bargaining position weaker. Conclusions - Bundling is an effective business strategy, resulting in multiple products for a firm as it faces other firms with single-product lines in each market. Taking advantage of the multi-patent or multi-product lines, the firm utilizes the bundling strategy obtaining better technology from the standalone single-patent firms.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제9권10호
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• pp.4177-4190
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• 2015

Current research on Internet of Things (IoT) has primarily addressed the means to enhancing smart resource allocation, automatic network operation, and secure service provisioning. In particular, providing satisfactory security service in IoT systems is indispensable to its mission critical applications. However, limited resources prevent full security coverage at all times. Therefore, these limited resources must be deployed intelligently by considering differences in priorities of targets that require security coverage. In this study, we have developed a new application of Cognitive Radio (CR) technology for IoT systems and provide an appropriate security solution that will enable IoT to be more affordable and applicable than it is currently. To resolve the security-related resource allocation problem, game theory is a suitable and effective tool. Based on the Blotto game model, we propose a new strategic power allocation scheme to ensure secure CR communications. A simulation shows that our proposed scheme can effectively respond to current system conditions and perform more effectively than other existing schemes in dynamically changeable IoT environments.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제8권11호
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• pp.3674-3710
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• 2014

In this tutorial, we integrate the concept of cognitive radio technology into game theory and supermarket game theory to address the problem of resource allocation in multiuser multicarrier cognitive radio networks. In addition, multiuser multicarrier transmission technique is chosen as a candidate to study the resource allocation problem via game and supermarket game theory. This tutorial also includes various definitions, scenarios and examples related to (i) game theory (including both non-cooperative and cooperative games), (ii) supermarket game theory (including pricing, auction theory and oligopoly markets), and (iii) resource allocation in multicarrier techniques. Thus, interested readers can better understand the main tools that allow them to model the resource allocation problem in multicarrier networks via game and supermarket game theory. In this tutorial article, we first review the most fundamental concepts and architectures of CRNs and subsequently introduce the concepts of game theory, supermarket game theory and common solution to game models such as the Nash equilibrium and the Nash bargaining solution. Finally, a list of related studies is highlighted and compared in this tutorial.

• 기술혁신학회지
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• 제15권3호
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• pp.700-721
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• 2012

본 연구는 특허권의 경제적 가치를 산정하는데 있어서, 합리적인 로열티율을 구하기 위한 방법에 관한 것이다. 특허권 자체의 합리적인 로열티율을 산정하기 위해, 기존의 25% 룰의 장단점과 최근 동향을 살펴보았으며, 내쉬 협상 방정식의 게임이론을 이용한 산정방법과 재무분석을 통한 투자수익률 방법을 적용하여 합리적인 로열티율을 산출하였다. 손해액 산정 모형에서는 최근의 미국 특허침해 손해액 산정 시 실시료 상당액으로 판결한 미국 법원의 판례를 이용하여 당해 침해 관련 특허를 분석하고, 각 특허의 서지(書誌)사항 항목에서 특허지표를 추출해서 이를 회귀분석을 이용하여 개별 특허권의 합리적인 로열티율을 산정하는 모형을 제시하고 미국의 판례자료를 이용한 분석결과를 제시하였다.

• 통상정보연구
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• 제13권4호
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• pp.399-410
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• 2011

전통적으로 자국 산업의 이익보호를 위해 관세는 널리 사용되어 왔다. 개발도상의 단계에 있는 나라들은 자국의 유치산업을 보호할 목적으로 관세를 사용하는 반면, 선진국들은 자국의 상품이 타국의 시장에 진출할 수 있도록 타국을 압박하는 수단으로 사용되는 경우가 많다. 본 논문에서는 선진국이 자국의 특정 수출품을 개발도상국 시장에 일정한 비율 이상 진출시키기 위해 개발도상국의 제3의 생산품에 관세를 부과하겠다는 위협을 하는 경우 그 경제적 효과를 간단한 게임이론 모형을 통해 살펴본다. 만약 관세가 부과된 제3의 생산품이 주력 수출품인 경우 개발도상국 정부는-주력 수출품 생산자들의 로비 등을 통해-문제가 된 상품에 일정한 제재를 부과함으로써 선진국과의 마찰을 자발적으로 해소하려는 유인을 갖게 됨을 보인다. 이러한 결과는 최근 FTA로 대변되는 양자 간 무역협정의 체결에서 나타나는 산업 간 이해득실의 차이를 개별 산업의 협상력 차이로 설명할 수 있다는 의미를 지닌다.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제9권1호
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• pp.34-49
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• 2015

Market means of spectrum trading have been utilized as a vital method of spectrum sharing and access in future cognitive radio system. In this paper, we consider the spectrum trading with multiple primary carrier providers (PCP) leasing the spectrum to multiple secondary carrier providers (SCP) for a short period of time. Several factors including the price of the resource, duration of leasing, and the spectrum quality guides the proposed model. We formulate three trading policies based on the game theory for dynamic spectrum access in a LTE based cognitive radio system (CRS). In the first, we consider utility function based resource sharing (UFRS) without any knowledge of past transaction. In the second policy, each SCP deals with PCP using a non-cooperative resource sharing (NCRS) method which employs optimal strategy based on reinforcement learning. In variation of second policy, third policy adopts a Nash bargaining while incorporating a recommendation entity in resource sharing (RERS). The simulation results suggest overall increase in throughput while maintaining higher spectrum efficiency and fairness.