• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.44 no.5
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• pp.471-482
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• 2012

To assess the risk of nuclear power plant operation and to determine the risk impact of digital systems, there is a need to quantitatively assess the reliability of the digital systems in a justifiable manner. The Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) is a tool which can reveal shortcomings of the NPP design in general and PRA analysts have not had sufficient guiding principles in modelling particular digital components malfunctions. Currently digital I&C systems are mostly analyzed simply and conventionally in PRA, based on failure mode and effects analysis and fault tree modelling. More dynamic approaches are still in the trial stage and can be difficult to apply in full scale PRA-models. As basic events CPU failures, application software failures and common cause failures (CCF) between identical components are modelled.The primary goal is to model dependencies. However, it is not clear which failure modes or system parts CCF:s should be postulated for. A clear distinction can be made between the treatment of protection and control systems. There is a general consensus that protection systems shall be included in PRA, while control systems can be treated in a limited manner. OECD/NEA CSNI Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRisk) has set up a task group, called DIGREL, to develop taxonomy of failure modes of digital components for the purposes of PRA. The taxonomy is aimed to be the basis of future modelling and quantification efforts. It will also help to define a structure for data collection and to review PRA studies.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.34 no.5
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• pp.468-481
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• 2002

There are 4 CANDU6 type reactors operating at Wolsong site. For fuelling operation of certain fuel channels (with flow less than 21.5 kg/s) a FARE flow Assist Ram Extension) device is used. During the refuelling operation, two remote controlled F/Ms (Fuelling Machines) are attached to a designated fuel channel and carry out refuelling job. The upstream F/M inserts new fuel bundles into the fuel channel while the downstream F/M discharges spent fuel bundles. In order to assist fuelling operation of channels that has lower coolant How rate, the FARE device is used instead of F/M C-ram to push the fuel bundle string. The FARE device is essentially a How restricting element that produces enough drag force to push the fuel bundle string toward downstream F/M. Channels that require the use of FARE device for refuelling are located along the outside perimeter of reactor. This paper presents the FARE device design feature, steady state hydraulic and operational characteristics and behavior of the device when coupled with fuel bundle string during fuelling operation. The study showed that the steady state performance of FARE device meets the design objective that was confirmed by downstream F/M C-ram force to be positive.

• Journal of Radiation Protection and Research
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• v.44 no.3
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• pp.118-126
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• 2019

Background: Government conducts environmental radioactivity surveillance for verification purpose around nuclear facilities based on the Nuclear Safety Law and issues a surveillance report every year. This study aims to evaluate the short and the long-term fluctuation of radionuclides detected above MDC and their origins using concentration ratios between these radionuclides. Materials and Methods: Sample media for verification surveillance are air, rainwater, groundwater, soil, and milk for terrestrial samples, and seawater, marine sediment, fish, and seaweed for marine samples. Gamma-emitting radionuclides including $^{137}Cs$, $^{90}Sr$, Pu, $^3H$, and $^{14}C$ are evaluated in these samples. Results and Discussion: According to the result of the environmental radioactivity verification surveillance in the vicinity of nuclear power facilities in 2017, the anthropogenic radionuclides were not detected in most of the environmental samples except for the detection of a trace level of $^{137}Cs$, $^{90}Sr$, Pu, and $^{131}I$ in some samples. Radioactivity concentration ratios between the anthropogenic radionuclides ($^{137}Cs/^{90}Sr$, $^{137}Cs/^{239+240}Pu$, $^{90}Sr/^{239+240}Pu$) were similar to those reported in the environmental samples, which were affected by the global fallout of the past nuclear weapon test, and Pu atomic ratios ($^{240}Pu/^{239}Pu$) in the terrestrial sample and marine sample showed significant differences due to the different input pathway and the Pu source. Radioactive iodine ($^{131}I$) was detected at the range of < $5.6-190mBq{\cdot}kg-fresh^{-1}$ in the gulfweed and sea trumpet collected from the area of Kori and Wolsong intake and discharge. A high level of $^3H$ was observed in the air (Sangbong: $0.688{\pm}0.841Bq{\cdot}m^{-3}$) and the precipitation (Meteorology Post: $199{\pm}126Bq{\cdot}L^{-1}$) samples of the Wolsong nuclear power plant (NPP). $^3H$ concentration in the precipitation and pine needle samples showed typical variation pattern with the distance and the wind direction from the stack due to the gaseous release of $^3H$ in Wolsong NPP. Conclusion: Except for the detection of a trace level of $^{137}Cs$, $^{90}Sr$, Pu, and $^{131}I$ in some samples, anthropogenic radionuclides were below MDC in most of the environmental samples. Overall, no unusual radionuclides and abnormal concentration were detected in the 2017's surveillance result for verification. This research will be available in the assessment of environment around nuclear facilities in the event of radioactive material release.