• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.37 no.3
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• pp.117-134
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• 2012

We analyze a systematic relationship between transaction mechanisms and wholesale pricing schemes within a supply-chain with two competing suppliers and a monopolistic retailor. When one of the suppliers changes its transaction mechanism from an independent scheme to a cooperative one, then the wholesale prices of the suppliers become cheaper than before. When one supplier changes its transaction scheme to a cooperative one while the other supplier sticks to the existing independent transaction scheme, we show that the supplier with a cooperative transaction scheme can realize the increased profit via a profit sharing contract with the retailer but the supplier with independent transaction scheme can face the decreased profit. We also show that both suppliers can achieve the higher profits by adopting the cooperative schemes with the retailer.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.37 no.1
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• pp.45-59
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• 2012

We analyze a transaction mechanism so-called the revenue sharing transaction model and its dynamics in a supply chain with two competing suppliers and a monopolistic retailer when the demand pattern is uncertain and the back-order is allowed in case. We assume that the products by the suppliers are substitutable each other with a certain degree even though their retail prices are different. It is proved that a supplier and the retailer in the supply chain have some room for enjoying the possibility of their increased profits comparing with the present ones by adopting the suggested revenue sharing scheme. Furthermore, such a transaction model is beneficial even to the customers by offering a lower retail price than before. On the contrary, we observe that another supplier which sticks to an existing transaction scheme is supposed to suffer some decrease in its profit as a result.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.7 no.3
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• pp.257-265
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• 2008

This paper deals with the joint decisions on pricing and ordering for a monopolistic retailer who sells perishable goods with a fixed lifetime or demand period. The newsvendor-typed problem is formulated as a two-period inventory system where the first period represents the inventory of fresh or new-arrival items and the second period represents the inventory of items that are older but still usable. Demand may be for either fresh items or for somewhat older items that exhibit physical decay or deterioration. The retailer is allowed to adjust the selling price of the deteriorated items in the second period, which stimulates demand and reduces excess season-end or stale inventory. This paper develops a stochastic dynamic programming model that solves the problem of preseason decisions on ordering-pricing and a within-season decision on markdown pricing. We also develop a fixed-price model as a benchmark against the dual-price dynamic model. To illustrate the effect of the dual-price policy on expected profit, we conduct a comparative study between the two models. Extension to a generalized multi-period model is also discussed.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.15 no.5
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• pp.103-126
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• 2010

The development of an industry including distribution sector is influenced by not only government policy but the related firms' behaviors. Recently the large-scale retailers have had more enormous channel power than any other distributors including monopolistic makers. Now is the time for government to prepare some policies against the unfair transaction behaviors by large-scale retailers. In this paper I tried to inquire into the distribution competition policy from a political correspondent point of view related with the transition of distribution system. For the purpose of this article I compared the case of Korea with Japan. According to the results so far inquired, there are some commons and differences in the cases of the two. Some suggestions are as follows. Considering the predominant position the concept of large-scale retailers is to be extended from a single store to numerous chain stores in the political level. Government needs to examine the standard propriety for large-scale retailer; the size of selling area and amount of sales a year. When a large-scale retailer store is to be established, it need to be taken a permit or a pre-inspection. The Fair Trade Commission have to secure the neutrality from Government's strategies. And government should find out the examples of unfair transaction behavior types and prepare some proper guidelines continually. For the last time statistical data by distributors are to be fitted out and the actual investigations for estimating the effects of government policies need to be enforced.