• 제목/요약/키워드: Minority Shareholder

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Protection of Minority Shareholder Investment in the Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

  • KANTHAPANIT, Chinnapat;KANTHAPANIT, Chutiya
    • The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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    • 제7권8호
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    • pp.451-459
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    • 2020
  • This study aims to examine the relationship of the four factors that increase the protection of minority shareholder investment. The factors are non-controlling shareholders, corporate governance, free cash flow, and shareholder wealth. The data for this study is obtained from the 2017 annual reports of 136 Thai public companies listed in the Market of Alternative Investment of Thailand (MAI). The analysis uses a multiple regression model to determine which factors encourage and which inhibit the protection of minority shareholder investment. The study tests four hypotheses. The results rejected H1 because non-controlling shareholders have negatively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta -0.155 and p-value 0.050). The results accepted H2, H3 and H4 as follows. H2: corporate governance has positively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta 0.17 and p-value 0.031). H3: free cash flow has positively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta 0.214 and p-value 0.007). H4: shareholder wealth has positively correlated with minority shareholder investment protection (beta 0.318 and p-value 0.000). The major findings suggest strong minority shareholder investment protection was enhanced by increasing corporate governance, free cash flow and shareholder wealth. The protection of minority shareholder investment needs to reduce non-controlling shareholding pattern.

The Effects of Agents' Competing Interests on Corporate Cash Policy and Cash Holdings Adjustment Speed: The Distribution and Service Industries

  • RYU, Haeyoung;CHAE, Soo-Joon
    • 유통과학연구
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    • 제20권3호
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    • pp.53-58
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    • 2022
  • Purpose: Controlling and minority shareholders sometimes have conflicting interests. Controlling shareholders who do not have adequate monitoring can exhibit a strong tendency to maximize their personal wealth. In this case, cash holdings can be the easiest means for them to pursue their personal interests. This study examined whether the largest shareholder's ownership proportion affected the speed at which firms adjust their cash holdings to target levels in Korean distribution and service companies. Research design, data, and methodology: The study uses regression analysis to examine 834 firm-year samples listed on the KOSPI between 2013 and 2018 in the distribution and service sectors. Results: The largest shareholder's ownership is positively related to a firm's cash holdings adjustment speed. That is, the larger the largest shareholder's ownership, the faster the firm adjusts its cash holdings to achieve the target level. Conclusions: This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that the cash holdings adjustment speed in Korean service and distribution companies is affected by the largest shareholder's ownership. As the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders in Korea is a major issue, minority owners' sensitivity to agency costs may help restrict controlling owners' ability to maximize their personal wealth.

기업의 소유구조와 현금보유간의 관계 (The Relations between Ownership Structure and Cash Holdings of Firms)

  • 신민식;김수은
    • 재무관리연구
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    • 제27권1호
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    • pp.89-120
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    • 2010
  • 본 연구는 1997년 1월 1일부터 2008년 12월 31일까지 한국거래소의 유가증권시장과 코스닥시장에 상장된 기업을 대상으로 소유구조와 현금보유간의 관계를 실증분석 하였으며, 주요한 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 대주주 지분율이 클수록 대주주들이 이사회 참여를 통한 경영권 통제 등을 통하여 수익성이 낮은 현금보유를 증가시키는 방향으로 소액주주의 이익을 침해할 수 있다. 1대주주와 2대주주 간의 지분율 차이가 증가할수록, 그리고 대주주들 간의 소유집중도가 증가할수록 현금보유가 증가한다. 그리고 경영자지분율은 현금보유에 비선형적으로 영향을 미친다. 다시 말해, 경영자지분율이 낮은 단계에서는 이익침해가설에 따라 현금보유에 양(+)의 영향을 미치지만, 경영자지분율이 일정 수준 이상으로 증가하면 이해일치가설에 따라 음(-)의 영향을 미치며, 경영자지분율이 매우 높은 수준으로 증가하면 다시 이익침해가설에 따라 양(+)의 영향을 미친다. 그리고 소유자지배기업은 경영자지배기업보다 대주주들이 현금보유에 미치는 영향력이 상대적으로 증가하여 현금보유를 증가시킬 수 있다. 이러한 결과는 한국기업의 현금보유는 주로 상충이론과 자금조달순서 이론으로 설명할 수 있으나, 대리인 이론으로도 부분적으로 설명할 수 있으며, 이는 대주주들이 소액주주와 균등한 혜택이 분배되는 재무정책을 기피하고 소액주주의 희생 하에 사적 이익을 취할 가능성이 있음을 시사한다. 따라서 우리나라에서도 대주주가 소액주주의 이익을 침해하는 행위를 예방하고, 소액주주의 이익을 보호할 수 있는 제도적 장치와 소유집중도를 완화시킬 수 있는 소유구조 정책이 필요하다고 생각한다.

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금융기관지배구조가 내부통제품질에 미치는 영향 - 상호저축은행의 최대주주 지분율을 중심으로 - (The Impact of Block shareholder on Quality of Internal Control in Korea's Mutual Savings Banks)

  • 유순미
    • 경영과정보연구
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    • 제34권5호
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    • pp.277-293
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    • 2015
  • 저축은행은 서민의 금융기관으로서 일반은행에 비하여 규모가 작고 상대적으로 리스크 관리도 취약하다. 또한 일반 은행과 같이 예금자보호법에 따라 5천만원 이하의 예금은 보호되기는 하지만 일반서민이나 중소기업이 주된 고객이라는 점에서 일반 기업과 차이가 있다. 따라서 지배주주의 사적이익추구로 인하여 극단적으로 영업정지등의 사태가 발생할 경우 그로 인한 이익의 침해는 소액주주 이외에도 다수의 예금자, 정부, 일반 국민들도 잠재적인 피해를 볼 수 있고 그로 인한 공익비용은 일반기업보다 훨씬 크다 할 수 있다. 지배주주의 지분율과 관련한 가설로 이익침해가설과 이해일치가설로 상반되는 주장이 존재한다. 먼저, 외부 소액주주들에 대한 지배주주의 이익침해가설(expropriation of minority shareholder hypothesis)에서는 지배주주의 지분율이 증가할수록 경영자는 이익을 증가시켜 보고할 유인이 있다. 또한 이해일치가설(convergence of interest hypothesis)은 지배주주 지분율이 증가함에 따라 경영자는 이익을 감소시켜 보고할 유인이 있다. 이에 본 연구는 국내 상호저축은행 대상으로 최대주주 지분율이 기업의 내부통제의 질에 어떠한 영향을 미치는 지에 대한 실증적 연구를 수행하고자 한다. 분석 결과, 최대주주지분율은 내부회계관리제도 취약점 공시에 유의적인 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 이것은 최대주주지분율이 높을수록 회계투명성이 저하되어 내부통제의 질이 낮아져서 내부회계관리제도 취약점 보고가능성이 높아진다는 것을 의미한다.

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중국의 상장기업에서 소유구조가 기업의 성과에 미치는 영향 (The Impacts of Ownership Structure on Performance of Listed Firms in China)

  • 강영삼
    • 국제지역연구
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    • 제13권1호
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    • pp.241-263
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    • 2009
  • 이 논문은 1994년부터 2002년까지의 중국 상장기업의 데이터를 이용, 기업의 소유구조가 기업성과에 미치는 영향을 분석한 것이다. 특히 이 논문은 중국의 상장기업에 관한 새로운 주식 분류체계를 이용하여 기업 지배주주의 유형, 지배주주의 지분, 소주주들의 지분이 기업성과에 미치는 영향을 분석하고, 관련 가설을 검증하였다. 이 연구를 통해 얻은 결론은 다음과 같다. 주주로서 국가의 존재가 이윤보다는 고용을 유지하는 등 정책적 목표를 우선적으로 추구하거나 혹은 당과 정부의 개입을 초래함으로써 정치비용을 발생시켜 기업성과에 부정적인 영향을 끼칠 것이라는 주장은 적어도 정부지배 기업에게는 적용될 수 있음을 확인하였다. 아울러, 지배주주의 지분이 클수록 지배주주가 경영자에 대한 감시를 강화할 유인이 커지거나 혹은 지배주주가 소주주를 착취(expropriate)할 유인이 줄어 드는 것으로 인해 기업성과에 양의 영향을 미치게 된다는 주장은 민간기업 및 부분적으로는 시장화 국유기업에는 적용될 수 있는 것으로 나타났다. 마지막으로 소주주들은 경영자 감시에 적극적으로 나섬으로써 기업성과에 양의 영향을 미친다는 주장은 시장화 국유기업과 부분적으로는 민간 기업에는 적용될 수 있는 것으로 나타났다.

A Case study of Equity Carve-out In the Korean Distribution Industry: Focusing on the SSG.com

  • Ilhang SHIN;Taegon MOON
    • 유통과학연구
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    • 제21권6호
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    • pp.21-29
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    • 2023
  • Purpose: Research on equity carve-outs is necessary because the market has realized that they lead to holding company discounts by double counting, which can only be observed in the Korean market. Considering the differences in the SSG.com equity carve-out compared to previous cases in terms of business strategy, this study contributes to the literature by examining the effects on shareholder value in the Korean distribution industry. Research design, data, and methodology: This study investigated literature, analyst reports, and news articles to examine the causes of holding company discounts and analyze the SSG.com equity carve-out. Results: The monopoly of holding companies' listing premiums is the main cause underlying holding company discounts from equity carve-outs. Protections for minority shareholder value are challenging owing to the complexity of the process of acquiring rights, the short exercise period, and additional costs. Therefore, the motivation for equity carve-outs should be to increase overall shareholder value. Conclusion: By analyzing the reasons for holding company discounts in the Korean distribution industry, this study provides recommendations for improving shareholder value. Moreover, it contributes to the maturation of the Korean capital market by promoting a discussion on the revision of equity carve-outs.

우리나라 대기업의 지배구조 개선에 관한 연구 (A Study on Governance Structure Improvement of Large Corporate in Our Country)

  • 이재범
    • 대한안전경영과학회지
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    • 제5권1호
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    • pp.143-162
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    • 2003
  • The governance structure of corporate is very important to raise the nation's economic efficiency and the operation result of firm. However, the innovation of corporate governance structure is a important problem to improve international confidence in our country, since most large corporate in our country has a promodern governance structure to be influenced in decision making of corporate group by minority governance-shareholder. Therefore, in our country the improvement of corporate governance structure is very urgent. This study examine the improvement device of corporate governance structure to be introduced in our country, and present the improvement direction to be suitable to our country's economic circumstance.

대규모 기업집단의 순환출자 해소를 위한 최적화 모형 (An Optimization Model for Resolving Circular Shareholdings of Korean Large Business Groups)

  • 박찬규;김대룡
    • 한국경영과학회지
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    • 제34권4호
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    • pp.73-89
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    • 2009
  • Circular shareholdings among three companies are formed when company A owns stock in company B, company B owns stock in company C, and company C owns stock in company A. Since circular shareholdings among large family-controlled firms are used to give the controlling shareholder greater control or more opportunities to expropriate minority investors, the government has encouraged large business groups to gradually remove their circular shareholdings. In this paper, we propose a combinatorial optimization model that can answer the question, which equity investments among complicated investment relationships of one large business group should be removed to resolve its circular shareholdings. To the best knowledge of the authors, our research is the first one that has approached the circular shareholding problem in respect of management science. The proposed combinatorial optimization model are formulated into integer programming problem and applied to some Korean major business groups.

Non-Controlling Interests and Proxy of Real Activities Manipulation in Stakeholder-Oriented Corporate Governance

  • FUJITA, Kento;YAMADA, Akihiro
    • The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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    • 제9권10호
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    • pp.105-113
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    • 2022
  • The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the ratio of non-controlling shareholder interests (minority equity ratio, MER) and the measurement error in real activities manipulation (RM) proxy for Japanese firms. Many Japanese firms have practiced stakeholder-oriented corporate governance systems. Previous studies suggest that the higher the MER, the more Japanese businesses tend to employ management techniques for the group's sales growth while also reallocating resources inside the group to reduce principal-principal conflicts. Such differences in management strategies by firms could lead to measurement error in the RM proxy. The analysis uses 16,450 firm-years listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The results of our analysis show that there is a positive relationship between MER and the RM proxy, and high persistence of RM proxies, suggesting that the RM proxies may contain measurement error. We also find that MER is correlated with variables associated with management strategy and that controlling for these variables can reduce the measurement error of RM proxy in firms with large MER. This study extends previous research on measurement error in RM proxy by relating them to ownership structure and corporate governance. This paper would contribute to researchers examining issues related to RM.

특수관계자 거래가 주가급락에 미치는 영향 (The Effect of Related Party Transactions on Crash Risk)

  • 유혜영
    • 산경연구논집
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    • 제9권6호
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    • pp.49-55
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    • 2018
  • Purpose - This paper examines the effect of related party transactions on crash firm-specific stock price crash risk. Ownership of a typical Korean conglomerate is concentrated in a single family. In those entities, management and board positions are often filled by family members. Therefore, a dominant shareholder can benefit from related party transactions. In Korea, firms have to report related party transactions in financial statement footnotes. However, those are not disclosed in detail. The more related party transactions are the greater information risk. Thus, companies with related party transactions are likely to experience stock price crashes. Research design, data, and methodology - 2,598 firm-year observations are used for the main analysis. Those samples are from TS2000 database from 2009 to 2013, and the database covers KOSPI-listed firms in Korea. The proxy for related party transactions (RTP) is calculated by dividing total transactions to the related-party by total sales. A dummy variable is used as a dependent variable (CRASH) in the regression model. Logistic regression is used to explain the relationship between related party transactions and crash risk. Then, the sample was separated into two groups; tunneling firms and propping firms. The relation between related party transactions and crash risk variances with features of the transaction were investigated. Results - Using a sample of KOSPI-listed firms in TS2000 database for the period of 2009-2013, I find that stock price crash risk increases as the trade volume of related-party transactions increases. Specifically, I find that the coefficient of RPT is significantly positive, supporting the prediction. In addition, this relationship is strong and robust in tunneling firms. Conclusions - The results report that firms with related party transactions are more likely to experience stock price crashes. The results mean that related party transactions increase the possibility of future stock price crashes by enlarging information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. In case of tunneling, it could be seen that related party transactions are positively associated with stock crash risk. The result implies that the characteristic of the transaction influences crash risk. This study is related to a literature that investigates the effect of related party transactions on the stock market.