An Optimization Model for Resolving Circular Shareholdings of Korean Large Business Groups

대규모 기업집단의 순환출자 해소를 위한 최적화 모형

  • Published : 2009.12.31

Abstract

Circular shareholdings among three companies are formed when company A owns stock in company B, company B owns stock in company C, and company C owns stock in company A. Since circular shareholdings among large family-controlled firms are used to give the controlling shareholder greater control or more opportunities to expropriate minority investors, the government has encouraged large business groups to gradually remove their circular shareholdings. In this paper, we propose a combinatorial optimization model that can answer the question, which equity investments among complicated investment relationships of one large business group should be removed to resolve its circular shareholdings. To the best knowledge of the authors, our research is the first one that has approached the circular shareholding problem in respect of management science. The proposed combinatorial optimization model are formulated into integer programming problem and applied to some Korean major business groups.

Keywords

References

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