• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.26 no.4
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• pp.165-189
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• 2009

According to disclosure regulation, insider can hide their trading until disclosure day, because there be interval between trading time and disclosure time. To accommodate strategic trade, they have an incentive to be brought disclosure interval as long as possible. This research investigate whether strategical behaviour of informed traders using disclosure intervals exists in domestic stock market.ls xt, we aney he whether they can get abnormal return through stealth strategy after announcement date. We also evaluate the effect of mimicking trading on price impact with the assumption of existence of mimicking trading. Our major research results are as follows: In case of main shareholder without having no prompt disclosure duty, the frequency of trading started at the beginning of month is shown significantly higher than others. This result shows a direct evidence that informed traders buy or sell their equity strategically using disclosure intervals. Also, we find the result that the coefficient of strategic variables has highest value in middle size information. However, the empirical evidence that informed trader get abnormal return through strategic trading was not shown in this study. Meanwhile, stock price over-reacts for selling transaction on trading point and is recovered after disclosure date., so we assume possibility of mimicking trading exists in domestic stock market.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.83-105
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• 2013

There are many literatures about the herding behavior of institutional investors but there is lack of literatures about the relation among several investor groups consisting of institutional investors. So we investigate the relation among sub-institutional investor groups like bank, insurance companies, pension funds using KRX intraday trading data of 2009. As the result, we find that foreign, individual, and securities firm investors trade in the opposite direction of other investor groups including pension funds. And pension, insurance, asset management, private equity funds, other companies, government, and banks are cross-mimicking each other, so we conclude that these investors make herding behavior. In 2009 institutional investors except securities firms make herding in a short period, and insurance, asset management, pension funds and other companies make herding and self-mimicking in all period, but there is no herding and mimicking after foreign investors.