• Strategy21
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• s.40
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• pp.190-215
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• 2016

As North Korea's asymmetric threats are growing, there have been numerous discussions to find out effective counter-measures and many official plans and procurements efforts have been established. However, discussions on ROK Navy's roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threats have been taken place very limitedly. Decision makers and military planners put enormous efforts in getting counter-measures, however, most of the options on the table are systems of Army and Air Force. This is true if one looks at components of Kill-Chain, KAMD, and KMPR. With worsening security environment of the Korean peninsula, it has been said by many commentators that ROK Navy needs to consider expanding its roles in countering against North Korea's asymmetric military threats. They asked ROK Navy to go beyond the mind-set that has confined Navy's roles in deterring North Korean naval threats. That is, ROK Navy should fight 'from the sea' as well as fight 'on the sea.' If ROK Navy begins to think about fight 'from the sea,' there would be many possibilities for the Navy to be a part of countering North Korea's asymmetric military threats. In order to pursue proactive roles in countering North Korea's asymmetric threat, ROK Navy needs to consider various options. Massive missile forces, nuclear-propelled submarines, naval special forces may be some of them. With those measures, ROK Navy would launch massive and decisive attacks from the sea without risking survivability of our forces. Considering North Korean Navy's weakness, it is very probable that sea would be safer place than ground or sky. Expanding ROK Navy's roles and being a proactive deterrent forces against North Korean asymmetric threats would provide very reliable counter-measures to South Korean military. Thus, military planners should think how to take the best advantage of expanded ROK Navy's roles and capabilities against North Korean asymmetric threats.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.8 no.6
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• pp.435-439
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• 2022

ROK has a lot to benchmark from how Ukraine is fighting Russia back with its tactical wins. They have taken a targeted strategy to strike Russia's top generals with high precision. To carry out this strategy, Ukraine is operating a Special Operations Force, which utilizes US/NATO forces, civilian and own resources for maximum impact. Of note, they utilize Starlink for seamless connection from detection, decision-making to strike to maximize operational efficiency. As ROK faces security threat of weapons of mass destruction, Ukraine's military intelligence organization set-up, weapons system and operations can provide some guidance on how to leverage its various SOF as well.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.239-270
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• 2010

This thesis is to make an appropriate national defense policy of Republic of Korea through studying the Hegemony Strategy of United States. I searched the theory of hegemony. The hegemony was differently defined by the point of time and region. The strong power nations with the hegemony have been making efforts to maintain their hegemony everytime. I have conclusion that the presence of hegemony once emerged, it brought regional stability in place whether it is coercive or beneficial. The stability and instability of international order IS not exclusively dependent on hegemony. Even if the safety of hegemony cannot guarantee absolute stability of international order, there IS on doubt that the hegemony has enormous impact on that. According to the hegemonic theory, the history of mankind equals to the history of rising and falling hegemony. The international order was changed as the hegemony changes. The United States has been making efforts to maintain her global hegemony during the post cold-war era as well. Taking all these into consideration, relevant military strategy direction able to pursue national interest is that to make up for the relative weakness in the strategic environment. South Korea have to prepare security policy response as following. First, South Korea should build the military force equipped with advanced weapons in military technology sector and solidify military diplomatic relation able to form cooperative relation in wartime. Second, South Korea should make solid Alliance of Korea and U.S. Third, develop and maintain multilateral security cooperation of East Asia. Forth, we could realize that there are means that can neutralize opponent's strong point by seeking one or two and more asymmetry in the aspect of strategy, tactics, and means through asymmetric strategy. Than the military force of South Korea should develop into a force that is able to overcome to the traditional North Korea's threat and new type of conflicts. And the force should have sufficient strength and be deployed to effectively defend the Korean Peninsula. So, we need to establish a denial and defense system against any hostile neighboring country. Therefore, ROK military forces preparing for the future should try to construct a future military power to gradually establish enough strength for self-defense to prepare for a uncertain security environment and when the Korean Peninsula is unified in a future.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.42
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• pp.205-227
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• 2015

The Korean Peninsula is put in a position to carry out a highly strategic game vis-a-vis nK, which is asserting itself as a nuclear power amongst Northeast Asia's complex dynamics. While the international community recognizes nK's possession of nuclear weapons as released secret based on nK's three nuclear tests, shrewd strategic thinking is needed by ROK to secure itself as a non-nuclear nation in order to assume a responsible role to the international community, while simultaneously being ready to respond at all times for nK's military provocations. ROK must continue with its twofold strategy, by firm response to military confrontation with nK and maintaining flexible policy of tolerance in the areas of economy and ethnicity. Various strategic options to overcome nK's nuclear threats have been presented to ROK, whose possession of nuclear weapons have been difficult, and nK's nuclear capability is a real threat to ROK's national security. We must be able to respond to nK's nuclear threats strictly from ROK's national security perspective. This thesis aims to propose a response policy for nK's nuclear capability and nK's nuclear attack based on analysis of such nuclear damage, ROK Government's response posture against nK's nuclear threats, centered around ROK Government's non-military response posture.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.39-76
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• 2019

This paper is to analyze the trend and implications of the publication of China's defense and security white papers. To this end the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled instruction; publication details and composition of China's defense and security white paper; the gist of the white paper on national defense and security during the Chinese president Xi Jinping era; the implications of Chinese white paper on national defense and security during the Chinese president Xi Jinping era; and conclusion. The Chinese Ministry of National Defense had published seven books every two years since 1998 to 2010. In 1995, the ministry published a white paper titled 'China's arms control and disarmament' for the first time. In 2013, it published a white paper titled 'The Diversified Employment of China's Armed Forces' and 'China's Military Strategy' in 2015. All have the common characteristic of being a propaganda policy reflecting China's strategic calculations. It seems that China has began to publish defense white papers in a proactive manner, due to the following factors: (1)pressure on China to demand military transparency from neighboring countries such as the United States; (2)the erosion of the 'China threat.' and (3)confidence in the achievement of China's military modernization. The 'active defensive strategy' and the 'strong defense strategy' of Si Jinping are implied in the words "China's dream is a dream of a powerful country and dream of a strong nation is essential to construct a strong nation." His these strategies have raised security concerns for neighboring countries. We need to maintain and reinforce strong ROK-US security cooperation, and hedging strategies to harmoniously promote ROK-China economic cooperation.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Building Construction
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• v.16 no.4
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• pp.341-348
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• 2016

The aim of this study is to suggest design requirements on the military barriers which are installed to reduce critical damage on protective facilities against sudden pin-point attacks caused by North Korean artilleries. For this purpose, site investigation and review of design drawings associated with barriers built in the contact areas are conducted. With identified data concerning barriers, the geometric modeling, which is used in the structural analysis, is performed. And then, the possible threat of North Korea is determined based on intelligence preparation of battlefields. Once the structural modeling and threat analysis are completed, structural damage on barriers and protective facilities are assessed in terms of impact, penetration, scabbing, and blast pressure effects. According to the analysis results, the thickness of barriers should be 450mm at least and current established barriers need to be structurally reinforced via sectional enlargement.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.16 no.5
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• pp.1102-1112
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• 2012

The policy of the United States is a Korean Peninsula free of all nuclear weapons. The United States government was considering the possibility of military action to eliminate the North Korean nuclear threat. Talk of military action peaked from mid-1993 through mid-1994. Such an attack might have led directly to a Korean war. At that time the nuclear crisis solutioned by North Korea-United States negotiation and ROK-United States alliance. PSI's purpose is to prevent or at least inhibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors whose possession would be a serious threat to global or regional security. The most controversial activity of PSI is interdiction. North Korea has expressed grave concern over the initiative, stating that it has a sovereign right to develop, deploy, and export weapons, and that it would view any interdiction of its ships as a declaration of war. If South Korea is to execute interdiction North Korean ships expect tensions to increase dramatically on the peninsula with North Korea doing something quite provacative in response. South Korea cannot help approaching PSI with great caution, since it has to consider the ROK-United States alliance, and inter-Korean relations.

• Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.47-54
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• 2020

North Korea has recently developed and deployed missiles with various ranges as asymmetrical forces. Among them, short-range ballistic missiles with improved accuracy are expected to aim at achieving tactical goals by hitting important military facilities in Korea with a small number of missiles. Damage to the air force airfields, one of North Korea's main targets of missiles attack, could limit the operation of air force fighters essential to gaining air superiority. Based on the attack by the short range ballistic missiles, the damage probability of military airfields was simulated. And as the one of the concepts of passive defense, the way to reduce the loss of combat power was studied through the changes of the air force squadrons deployment. As a result, the effective deployment plan could be obtained to reduce the amount of power loss compared to the current deployment.

• Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.31-42
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• 2021

In order to respond to the ballistic missile threat of North Korea, the ROK military is constructing a multi-layered defense that can minimize the vulnerability of single-layered defense. Accordingly, it is necessary to study an operation plan which can maximize the intercept rate of a multi-layered defense system. And to study the operation plan of the Korean missile defense system, it must be considered that the operational environment of the Korean military and the effects of the strategic strike system. Therefore, this study proposes a simulation model that reflects the characteristics of the Korean missile defense system and analyzes four interceptor missile operation plans. The simulation result indicates that a high intercept rate can be achieved in various situations by comprehensively considering the ballistic missile threat estimate, interceptor missile reserve, and the strategic strike system effect.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.53
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• pp.63-79
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• 2017

Defence Security Command is the only military intelligence and investigation agency which is in charge of safeguarding military information and investigating specific crimes such as subversion and disloyalty in military. While the presidential security provided by Defence Security Command, along with Presidential Security Service(PSS) and the police, forms one of three pillars sustaining presidential security, its works and activities have been rarely known to the public due to the military confidentiality. This study looks into some data specialized into the presidential security among works of Defense Security Command by using various resources such as biographies of key people, media reports, and public materials. It reviews the presidential security works in a historical sense that the works have developed and changed in accordance with the historical changes of Defense Security Command, which was rooted in Counter-Intelligence Corps (Teukmubudae in Korean) in 1948 and leads to the present. The study findings are as follows. First, when the Korean War broke out in 1950 and since then the South Korea was under the threat of the North Korean armed forces and left wing forces, Counter-Intelligence Corps(Bangcheopdudae in Korean) took the lead in presidential security more than the police who was in charge of it. Secondly, even after the Presidential Security Office has founded in 1963, the role of the military on presidential security has been extended by changing its titles from Counter-Intelligence Corps to Army Security corps to Armed Forces Security Command. It has developed their provision of presidential security based on the experience at the president Rhee regime when they could successfully guard the president Rhee and the important government members. Third, since the re-establishment into Defence Security Command in 1990, it has added more security services and strengthened its legal basis. With the excellent expertise, it played a pivotal role in the G20 and other state-level events. After the establishment of the Moon Jaeinin government, its function has been reduced or abolished by the National Defense Reform Act. However, the presidential security field has been strengthening by improving security capabilities through reinforcing the organization. This strengthening of the security capacity is not only effective in coping with the current confrontation situation with the hostile North Korean regime, but also is important and necessary in conducting constant monitoring of the military movement and security-threat factors within military during the national security events.