• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.167-172
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• 2024

In major wars of the 21st century, drones are expanding beyond surveillance and reconnaissance to include land and air as well as sea and underwater for purposes such as precision strikes, suicide attacks, and cognitive warfare. These drones will perform multi-domain operations, and to this end, they will continue to develop by improving the level of autonomy and strengthening scalability based on the High-Low Mix concept. Recently, drones have been used as a major means in major wars around the world, and there seems to be a good chance that they will evolve into game changers in the future. North Korea has also been making significant efforts to operate reconnaissance and attack drones for a long time. North Korea has recently continued to engage in provocations using drones, and its capabilities are gradually becoming more sophisticated. In addition, with the recent emergence of new strategic Drones, wartime and peacetime threats such as North Korea's use of these to secure surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning capabilities against South Korea and new types of provocations are expected to be strengthened. Through this study, we hope to provide implications by analyzing the capabilities of North Korea's strategic Drones, predicting their operation patterns, and conducting active follow-up research on the establishment of a comprehensive strategy, such as our military's drone deployment and counter-drone system solutions.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.141-151
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• 2023

Since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, European countries have cut defense costs and reduced armaments as an era of peace without large-scale wars continues, and as a result, the West's defense industry base has gradually weakened. On the other hand, South Korea, the world's only divided country, was able to achieve high growth in the defense industry as a result of continuous arms strengthening in the face of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. With the rapid increase in demand for conventional weapons systems and changes in the structure of the global defense market due to the Russia-Ukraine war, Korea's weapons system drew great attention as a large-scale defense export contract with Poland was signed in 2022. In 2023, K-Defense ranked ninth in the world's arms exports and aims to become the world's fourth-largest defense exporter by 2027. Therefore, this study analyzed the case of Korea-Poland defense exports to derive problems, and presented development strategies related to export revitalization of K-Defense, a national strategic industry. In order for the defense industry to become Korea's next growth engine, it is necessary to establish a defense organization, prepare government-level measures to protect defense industry technology, and expand military and security cooperation with allies linked to defense exports.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.7
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• pp.95-124
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• 2004

It can be said that 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' in 2001 were not only the indiscriminate attacks on innocent people but also the whole - political, economical and military - attacks on human life. Also, 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' can be regarded as the significant events in the history of world, which were on the peak of the super-terrorism or new-terrorism that had emerged from the 1980s. However, if one would have analysed the developments of terrorism from the 1970s, they could have been foreknown without difficulty. The finding from this study can be summarized as the followings, First, in spite that the USA responsive system against terrorism had been assessed as perfect before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks', the fragilities were found in the aspects of the response on the new-terrorism or super-terrorism. The previous responsive system before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks' had the following defects as the followings: (1) it was impossible to establish the integrated strategy, because the organizations related to the response against terrorism had not integrated; (2) there were some weakness to collect and diffuse the informations related to terrorism; (3) the security system for the domestic airline service in USA and the responsive system of air defense against terrors on aircraft were very fragile. For these reasons, USA government established the 'Department of Homeland Security' of which the President is the head so that the many organizations related to terrorism were integrated into a single management system. And, it legislated a new act to protect security from terrors, which legalized of the wiretapping in spite of the risk of encroachment upon personal rights, increased the jail terms upon terrorists, froze the bank related to terrorist organization, and could censor e-mails. Second, it seem that Korean responsive system against terrors more fragile than that of USA. One of the reasons is that people have some perception that Korea is a safe zone from terrors, because there were little attacks from international terrorists in Korea. This can be found from the fact that the legal arrangement against terrorism is only the President's instruction No. 47. Under this responsive system against terrorism dependent on only the President's instruction, it is expected that there would be a poor response against terrors due to the lack of unified and integrated responsive agency as like the case of USA before 'the September 11th Terrorist Attacks'. And, where there is no legal countermeasure, it is impossible to expect the binding force on the outside of administrative agencies and the performances to prevent and hinder the terrorist actions can not but be limited. That is to say, the current responsive system can not counteract effectively against the new-terrorism and super-terrorism. Third, although there were some changes in Korean government's policies against terrorism. there still are problems. One of the most important problems is that the new responsive system against terrorism in Korea, different from that of USA, is not a permanent agency but a meeting body that is organized by a commission. This commission is controled by the Prime Minister and the substantial tasks are under the National Intelligence Service. Under this configuration, there can be the lack of strong leadership and control. Additionally, because there is no statute to response against terrorism, it is impossible to prevent and counteract effectively against terrorism. The above summarized suggests that, because the contemporary super-terrorism or new-terrorism makes numerous casualties of unspecified persons and enormous nationwide damages, the thorough prevention against terrorism is the most important challenge, and that the full range of legal and institutional arrangements for the ex post counteraction should be established. In order to do so, it is necessary for the government to make legal and institutional arrangements such as the permanent agency for protection from terrorism in which the related departments cooperates with together and the development of efficient anti-terror programs, and to show its willingness and ability that it can counteract upon any type of domestic and foreign terrorism so that obtain the active supports and confidence from citizens.

• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.37-76
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• 2017

$Nguy{\tilde{\hat{e}}}n$ Cư Trinh has two faces in the history of territorial expansion of Vietnam into the Mekong delta. One is his heroic contribution to the $Nguy{\tilde{\hat{e}}}n$ family gaining control over the large part of the Mekong delta. The other is his role to make the eyes of readers of Vietnamese history be fixed only to the present territory of Vietnam. To the readers, $Nguy{\tilde{\hat{e}}}n$ Cư Trinh's achievement of territorial expansion was the final stage of the nam $ti{\acute{\hat{e}}n$ of Vietnam. In fact, however, his achievement was partial. This study pays attention to the King $V{\tilde{o}}$ instead of $Nguy{\tilde{\hat{e}}}n$ Cư Trinh in the history of the territorial expansion in the Mekong delta. King's goal was more ambitious. And the ambition was propelled by his dream to build a new world, and its order, in which his new capital, $Ph{\acute{u}}$ $Xu{\hat{a}}n$ was to be the center with his status as an emperor. To improve my assertion, three elements were examined in this article. First is the nature of $V{\tilde{o}}$ Vương's new kingship. Second is the preparation and the background of the military operation in the Mekong Delta. The nature of the new territory is the third element of the discussion. In 1744, six years after this ascending to the throne, $V{\tilde{o}}$ Vương declared he was a king. Author points out this event as the departure of the southern kingdom from the traditional dynasties based on the Red River delta. Besides, the government system, northern custom and way of dressings were abandoned and new southern modes were adopted. $V{\tilde{o}}$ Vương had enough tributary kingdoms such as Cambodia, Champa, Thủy $X{\tilde{a}}$, Hoả $X{\tilde{a}}$, Vạn Tượng, and Nam Chưởng. Compared with the $L{\hat{e}}$ empire, the number of the tributary kingdoms was higher and the number was equivalent to that of the Đại Nam empire of the 19th century. In reality, author claims, the King $V{\tilde{o}}^{\prime}s$ real intention was to become an emperor. Though he failed in using the title of emperor, he distinguished himself by claiming himself as the Heaven King, $Thi{\hat{e}}n$ Vương. Cambodian king's attack on the thousands of Cham ethnics in Cambodian territory was an enough reason to the King $V{\tilde{o}}^{\prime}s$ military intervention. He considered these Cham men and women as his amicable subjects, and he saw them a branch of the Cham communities in his realm. He declared war against Cambodia in 1750. At the same time he sent a lengthy letter to the Siamese king claiming that the Cambodia was his exclusive tributary kingdom. Before he launched a fatal strike on the Mekong delta which had been the southern part of Cambodia, $V{\tilde{o}}$ Vương renovated his capital $Ph{\acute{u}}$ $Xu{\hat{a}}n$ to the level of the new center of power equivalent to that of empire for his sake. Inflation, famine, economic distortion were also the features of this time. But this study pays attention more to the active policy of the King $V{\tilde{o}}$ as an empire builder than to the economic situation that has been told as the main reason for King $V{\tilde{o}}^{\prime}s$ annexation of the large part of the Mekong delta. From the year of 1754, by the initiative of $Nguy{\tilde{\hat{e}}}n$ Cư Trinh, almost whole region of the Mekong delta within the current border line was incorporated into the territory of $V{\tilde{o}}$ Vương within three years, though the intention of the king was to extend his land to the right side of the Mekong Basin beyond the current border such as Kampong Cham, Prey Vieng, and Svai Rieng. The main reason was $V{\tilde{o}}$ Vương's need to expand his territory to be matched with that of his potential empire with the large number of the tributary kingdoms. King $V{\tilde{o}}^{\prime}s$ strategy was the variation of 'silkworm nibbling' and 'to strike barbarians by barbarians.' He ate the land of Lower Cambodia, the region of the Mekong delta step by step as silkworm nibbles mulberry leave(general meaning of $t{\acute{a}}m$ thực), but his final goal was to eat all(another meaning of $t{\acute{a}}m$ thực) the part of the Mekong delta including the three provinces of Cambodia mentioned above. He used Cham to strike Cambodian in the process of getting land from Long An area to $Ch{\hat{a}}u$ Đốc. This is a faithful application of the Dĩ Man $C{\hat{o}}ng$ Man (to strike barbarians by barbarians). In addition he used Chinese refugees led by the Mạc family or their quasi kingdom to gain land in the region of $H{\grave{a}}$ $Ti{\hat{e}}n$ and its environs from the hand of Cambodian king. This is another application of Dĩ Man $C{\hat{o}}ng$ Man. In sum, author claims a new way of looking at the origin of the imperial world order which emerged during the first half of the 19th century. It was not the result of the long history of Đại Việt empires based on the Red River delta, but the succession of the King $V{\tilde{o}}^{\prime}s$ new world based on $Ph{\acute{u}}$ $Xu{\hat{a}}n$. The same ways of Dĩ Man $C{\hat{o}}ng$ Man and $T{\acute{a}}m$ Thực Chi $K{\acute{\hat{e}}}$ were still used by $V{\tilde{o}}^{\prime}s$ descendents. His grandson Gia Long used man such as Thai, Khmer, Lao, Chinese, and European to win another man the '$T{\hat{a}}y$ Sơn bandits' that included many of Chinese pirates, Cham, and other mountain peoples. His great grand son Minh Mạng constructed a splendid empire. At the same time, however, Minh Mạng kept expanding the size of his empire by eating all the part of Cambodia and Cham territories.

• Korean Business Review
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.137-170
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• 2008

This study is presenting the logistics strategy in the international logistics markets which makes competition and corporation among north-east Asian countries to establishing the multi-pass Eurasian railroads. The countries located in north-east area of Eurasia like China, Japan, Russia and Korea are paying higher costs and disutility to the transportations and communications due to repeated conflicts and confrontations causes from the politic problems. They are being used surface transportation for most of all logistics between Europe and Asia except special merchandises because of characteristic of cargo to be air, the Silk Road remains vestige only which was main logistic passage to this area since BC. So far the Trans-Siberian Railway is being used by Russia mostly as north of Eurasian transport because of difficulties of service. The Trans-China Railway built in 1992 is not accomplishing as a international logistic passages. It is expected to take a long lead time because of characteristic of resource development and poor logistic infrastructure to the countries like Uzbekistan, double landlocked country, Mongolia and Azerbaijan, the countries do not be adjacent to the sea, even they have great economic jump-up plans through the development of their own resources. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization(SCO) start to sail officially in 2001 is constructed with China, Russia, Tadzhikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as regular members of 6 countries and Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran as observers 5 countries. It is started as a military alliance to protect terror, but now, it is expended to cooperate with the traffic, transportation, trade and share of energies. The Russia is doing their best to activate TSR as a government target to developnorth area equivalently, and economic develop of far-east Siberia. And also it is agreed provisionally to improve and repair of rail road between Nahjin and Hassan to connect TSR and TKR( Trans-Korea Railroad) by Russia, North Korea and South Korea with Russian's aggressive efforts. The development plan of this area is over lapped with GTI(Greater Tumen Initiative) promoted by UNDP, and is a cooperated project by 5 countries of South Korea, Mongolia, China, Russia and North Korea, subject to review the appropriation of energy, tour, environment, rail road connection between Mongolia and China and establishing a ferry route to north-east Asia. It is Japanese situation to pay attention to Russia and China even they have been supplying large-scope of infrastructure in Mongol area without any charges, target to get East Asia Main Rail Road to connect Mongolia and Zalubino of Russia. In case of the program for the Denuclearization of North Korea is not creeping, it will be accelerated to connect the TKR and TSR, TKR and TCR by somehow attending United States, including developing program promoted by UN ESCAP. As the result, Korean peninsular will continue the central role of competition and cooperation as in the past, now and future of north-east Asia, as of geographical-economics and geographical-politics whether it is requested or not wanted by neighbor countries.